本文選題：公司治理 + 公司投資行為�。� 參考：《湖南大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，企業(yè)在整個社會經(jīng)濟體系中所扮演的角色亦越來越重要，這其實是一種相互作用的結(jié)果。在企業(yè)的發(fā)展方面，公司治理作為確保公司資金投資者獲得投資回報的一項制度安排，關(guān)于公司治理的研究對企業(yè)的健康發(fā)展有著重要的參考價值，因而這一研究無論在國外還是在國內(nèi)，，都引起了理論界和實務(wù)界的高度重視，推動我們對公司治理問題的研究變得越來越細致，包括對董事會結(jié)構(gòu)、股東參與、獨立董事薪酬、投資者保護等公司治理的某一特定方面與公司治理的經(jīng)濟后果進行的研究。這些研究成果為進一步完善我國公司治理提供了寶貴的經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)。但是，在眾多有關(guān)公司治理的文獻中，涉及公司治理通過何種途徑影響經(jīng)濟后果的文獻較少，似乎在公司治理與經(jīng)濟后果之間形成了黑箱。我們基于“治理機制—行為—經(jīng)濟后果”的研究范式，以公司投資行為為視角，期望在公司治理與公司績效之間架起橋梁，研究公司治理對公司績效產(chǎn)生影響的可能作用機理，揭開公司治理與公司績效之間的黑箱。 我們在現(xiàn)有文獻研究的基礎(chǔ)上首先對公司治理水平進行量化，接著進一步研究公司治理水平與公司績效的關(guān)系以及公司投資行為與公司績效的關(guān)系，結(jié)合公司治理的相關(guān)理論，采用中介變量方法研究了公司投資行為通過公司治理機制作用于公司績效的情況，并對這種中介效應(yīng)的大小進行了量化。我們的實證結(jié)果顯示：第一，我國公司治理水平參差不齊，但是總體而言公司治理得到了逐步提高；第二，我國投資不足的公司多于過度投資的公司，但是從程度而言，上市公司過度投資比投資不足嚴重；第三，公司治理指數(shù)與公司績效顯著正相關(guān)，公司治理水平的提高有助于公司績效的提高；第四，良好的公司治理能夠通過信息權(quán)配置緩解管理層與外部投資者之間的代理問題，降低公司的非效率投資行為，從效果上看，公司治理對過度投資的抑制效果要好于對投資不足的抑制效果；第五，公司治理與公司投資行為都是公司績效的影響因素，在影響公司績效的過程中，公司投資行為作為中介變量影響公司績效，并且公司投資行為在公司治理與公司績效之間只是起著部分中介傳導效應(yīng)，是連接公司治理與公司績效的紐帶之一。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy, enterprises play a more and more important role in the whole social and economic system, which is actually the result of interaction. In the aspect of enterprise development, corporate governance is an institutional arrangement to ensure the return on investment of corporate capital investors. The research on corporate governance has important reference value for the healthy development of enterprises. Therefore, this research has aroused the great attention of the theoretical and practical circles, and promoted our research on corporate governance, including the structure of the board of directors, the participation of shareholders, and the compensation of independent directors. The study of a particular aspect of corporate governance, such as investor protection, and the economic consequences of corporate governance. These research results provide valuable empirical data for further improvement of corporate governance in China. However, among the many literatures about corporate governance, there are few documents about how corporate governance affects the economic consequences, which seems to form a black box between corporate governance and economic consequences. Based on the paradigm of "governance mechanism, behavior and economic consequences", we hope to build a bridge between corporate governance and corporate performance from the perspective of corporate investment behavior, and study the possible mechanism of corporate governance's impact on corporate performance. To uncover the black box between corporate governance and corporate performance, we first quantify the level of corporate governance on the basis of existing literature. Then it further studies the relationship between corporate governance level and corporate performance, as well as the relationship between corporate investment behavior and corporate performance, combining with the relevant theory of corporate governance. This paper studies the effect of corporate investment behavior on corporate performance through corporate governance mechanism by using the method of intermediary variables, and quantifies the magnitude of this intermediary effect. Our empirical results show that: first, the level of corporate governance in China is uneven, but overall corporate governance has been gradually improved; second, there are more underinvested companies than overinvested companies in China, but in terms of degree, The overinvestment of listed companies is more serious than the underinvestment. Thirdly, the corporate governance index is positively correlated with corporate performance, and the improvement of corporate governance level contributes to the improvement of corporate performance. Good corporate governance can alleviate the agency problem between management and external investors through the allocation of information rights, and reduce the inefficient investment behavior of the company. The inhibition effect of corporate governance on overinvestment is better than that on underinvestment. Fifth, corporate governance and corporate investment behavior are both factors affecting corporate performance, and in the process of affecting corporate performance, Corporate investment behavior as an intermediary variable affects corporate performance, and corporate investment behavior only plays a part of the intermediary conduction effect between corporate governance and corporate performance, which is one of the links between corporate governance and corporate performance.
【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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