本文選題：上市銀行 + 公司治理��； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)銀行業(yè)改革是中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的重要組成部分，商業(yè)銀行的改革將對(duì)未來經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融發(fā)展產(chǎn)生全局性影響，對(duì)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融安全具有決定性作用。近年來國(guó)際金融業(yè)處于劇烈的動(dòng)蕩與分化之中，各國(guó)金融機(jī)構(gòu)都在進(jìn)行重組融合，國(guó)際金融競(jìng)爭(zhēng)出現(xiàn)了新的格局。國(guó)內(nèi)外的這些因素都對(duì)中國(guó)金融業(yè)提出了嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)，特別是我國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)完全對(duì)外開放后，國(guó)內(nèi)外銀行之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇。這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，實(shí)質(zhì)上是現(xiàn)代銀行制度的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，，而現(xiàn)代銀行制度的核心就是現(xiàn)代銀行公司治理機(jī)制。因此，治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化是提高我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的必由之路。 商業(yè)銀行作為一類特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性。在當(dāng)前對(duì)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題的研究成果中，國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界更為關(guān)注的是企業(yè)，特別是上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)，而對(duì)商業(yè)銀行治理的論述相對(duì)較少。有鑒于此，本文在對(duì)銀行公司治理進(jìn)行理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)我國(guó)上市銀行公司治理問題進(jìn)行了研究。 本文在充分考慮銀行業(yè)特殊性的基礎(chǔ)上，通過建立一組包括單方程和聯(lián)立方程在內(nèi)的模型，實(shí)證分析了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果顯示，較大的第一大股東的持股比例、控制能力以及較高的股權(quán)集中度阻礙了銀行績(jī)效的提高，而境外戰(zhàn)略投資者和實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)是銀行績(jī)效的促進(jìn)劑。此外，研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)，董事會(huì)規(guī)模對(duì)績(jī)效有一定的負(fù)面影響，而獨(dú)立董事占董事會(huì)的比例以及銀行兩職分離情況對(duì)績(jī)效有促進(jìn)作用。 中國(guó)上市銀行越來越多地通過引入戰(zhàn)略投資者特別是境外戰(zhàn)略投資者來完善公司治理機(jī)制，提高銀行績(jī)效。本文以我國(guó)上市銀行為樣本，采用面板數(shù)據(jù)（Panel Data）計(jì)量方法從上市銀行治理指標(biāo)、安全性、盈利性、成長(zhǎng)性四個(gè)方面，對(duì)上市銀行引進(jìn)境外戰(zhàn)略投資者前后的效果進(jìn)行比較分析和定量研究。研究結(jié)果表明，引入境外戰(zhàn)略投資者能有效完善中國(guó)上市銀行的公司治理機(jī)制。上市銀行績(jī)效的改善說明引入境外戰(zhàn)略投資者的銀行在一定程度上復(fù)制了境外戰(zhàn)略投資者較為成熟的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),先進(jìn)的經(jīng)營(yíng)理念和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制技術(shù)，基本達(dá)到了引進(jìn)境外戰(zhàn)略投資者的最初目的。 本文通過收集我國(guó)上市的國(guó)有大型股份制商業(yè)銀行及其他已上市銀行的數(shù)據(jù)，實(shí)證分析了銀行信息披露與公司治理績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系。實(shí)證研究表明，一般公司治理的研究結(jié)論不適用于銀行業(yè)。中國(guó)上市銀行內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響較小，僅發(fā)現(xiàn)兩職分離的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及分散的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠提高會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量，沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會(huì)、債權(quán)人以及經(jīng)理人激勵(lì)合約等治理機(jī)制對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量的影響。在產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的強(qiáng)烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)公司治理控制機(jī)制形成約束之后的統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果顯示，對(duì)于內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善的中國(guó)上市銀行，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)的強(qiáng)烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)進(jìn)一步降低內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量的提高。 本文還采用了上市股份制商業(yè)銀行數(shù)據(jù)，實(shí)證分析了董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性對(duì)銀行績(jī)效的促進(jìn)作用并不明顯。銀行績(jī)效的提升除了改善治理結(jié)構(gòu)、完善銀行內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制等外，增加網(wǎng)點(diǎn)數(shù)量，擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)份額也有重要作用。最后，論文提出了引進(jìn)戰(zhàn)略投資者、完善銀行內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制等政策性建議。
[Abstract]:The reform of China's banking industry is an important part of the reform of China's economic system. The reform of the commercial banks will have a global impact on the future economic and financial development, and will play a decisive role in the economic and financial security of the country. In recent years, the international financial industry is in a violent turmoil and division, and the financial institutions of all countries are being reorganized and melted. In addition, the international financial competition has emerged a new pattern. These factors both at home and abroad have put forward a severe challenge to the Chinese financial industry. Especially, after the financial market is completely open to the outside world, the competition between domestic and foreign banks is intensifying. This competition is essentially the competition of modern banking system, and the core of modern banking system is modern silver. Therefore, the optimization of governance structure is the only way to improve the competitiveness of China's commercial banks.
As a special kind of company, commercial banks have the universality and particularity of the general company. In the current research results of the corporate governance structure, the domestic and foreign academics pay more attention to the enterprises, especially the governance structure of the listed companies, and the discussion on the governance of commercial banks is relatively small. Based on the theoretical analysis of corporate governance, this paper studies the corporate governance of listed banks in China.
On the basis of considering the particularity of the banking industry, this paper empirically analyses the relationship between stock ownership structure and performance by establishing a set of models including single equation and simultaneous equation. The results show that the proportion of the larger first largest shareholders, the control ability and the higher equity concentration have hindered the performance of the bank. In addition, the size of the board of directors has a negative impact on performance, and the proportion of independent directors to the board of directors and the separation of the two position of the bank can promote the performance.
More and more Chinese listed banks improve the corporate governance mechanism by introducing strategic investors, especially foreign strategic investors, to improve the performance of banks. This paper takes China listed banks as samples and uses panel data (Panel Data) measurement method from four aspects of listed bank governance indicators, security, profitability and growth. The results show that the introduction of foreign strategic investors can effectively improve the corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed banks. The improvement of the performance of listed banks shows that the banks that introduce overseas strategic investors have replicated overseas strategic investors to a certain extent. More mature corporate governance structure, advanced business philosophy and risk control technology have basically reached the initial purpose of introducing foreign strategic investors.
This paper empirically analyses the relationship between bank information disclosure and corporate governance performance by collecting the data of large state-owned commercial banks and other listed banks listed in China. The empirical study shows that the research conclusions of general corporate governance are not applicable to the banking industry. The effect of the exposure quality is small. Only the two separation of the leadership structure and the decentralized ownership structure can improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. There is no impact on the quality of accounting information disclosure by the governing mechanism of the board of directors, creditors and managers incentive contracts. The strong competition in the product market has the shape of corporate governance control mechanism. The statistical results after the constraint show that the strong competition in the product market will further reduce the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure by the strong competition in the product market for the listed Chinese banks with imperfect internal governance structure.
This paper also uses the data of listed joint-stock commercial banks to analyze the relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the performance of bank management. The results show that the role of board independence in promoting the performance of banks is not obvious. The promotion of bank performance is to improve the governance structure and improve the internal control mechanism of the bank and increase the network. Quantity and expanding market share also play an important role. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy recommendations such as introducing strategic investors and perfecting the internal control mechanism of banks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 張嬌嬌;關(guān)聯(lián)貸款對(duì)我國(guó)城市商業(yè)銀行績(jī)效的影響研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2014年

2 孫永濤;中國(guó)交通建設(shè)股份有限公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)研究[D];蘭州商學(xué)院;2014年

3 杜丹;我國(guó)家族上市企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)與績(jī)效關(guān)系研究[D];景德鎮(zhèn)陶瓷學(xué)院;2014年

本文編號(hào)：1991237