本文選題：高管的政府背景 + 盈余質(zhì)量　； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：近10多年來國外文獻(xiàn)研究中一大熱點(diǎn)便是“政治聯(lián)系”,而以高管的特征為基礎(chǔ)的研究方法被廣泛運(yùn)用于此領(lǐng)域。現(xiàn)存的文獻(xiàn)主要從代理成本和公司治理視角研究盈余質(zhì)量問題,關(guān)于高管的政府背景對盈余質(zhì)量的影響研究還相當(dāng)不充分。本文認(rèn)為,在中國這一特定的經(jīng)濟(jì)與政治制度背景下,研究高管的政府背景對公司會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,特別是盈余質(zhì)量的影響顯得尤為重要。 在國內(nèi),較少研究關(guān)注公司高管政府背景對公司會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,特別是盈余質(zhì)量的影響。本文從董事長和總經(jīng)理這兩個對公司盈余質(zhì)量起著關(guān)鍵影響作用的特殊職位出發(fā),選取了兩種度量盈余質(zhì)量的視角,來研究董事長或總經(jīng)理的政府背景對我國民營上市公司盈余質(zhì)量的影響。通過對2008-2010年的我國A股民營上市公司樣本的研究,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)董事長或總經(jīng)理具有政府背景的民營上市公司的盈余質(zhì)量比這兩個關(guān)鍵職位沒有政府背景的民營上市公司的盈余質(zhì)量要差。 在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文借鑒吳文鋒等(2008)和杜興強(qiáng)等(2009)的研究方法將高管的政府背景作了兩種分類,來分別考察不同類別的政府背景對我國民營上市公司盈余質(zhì)量的影響差異。研究表明,將政府背景區(qū)分為中央政府背景與地方政府背景之后,有地方政府背景的民營上市公司要比有中央政府背景的民營上市公司盈余質(zhì)量差；同時,將政府背景(廣義的政府概念)區(qū)分為政府官員類背景與代表委員類背景之后,董事長或總經(jīng)理有代表委員類背景的民營上市公司要比沒有任何政府背景的民營上市公司有更差的盈余質(zhì)量；而董事長或總經(jīng)理有政府官員類背景的民營上市公司與其沒有任何政府背景的民營上市公司相比盈余質(zhì)量并沒有顯著差異。 最后,本文還發(fā)現(xiàn),地區(qū)的市場化程度顯著調(diào)節(jié)董事長或總經(jīng)理的地方政府背景與其所在民營上市公司的盈余質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系：一個地區(qū)的市場化程度越低,董事長或總經(jīng)理具有地方政府背景的民營上市公司的盈余質(zhì)量越差。 本文的研究豐富和拓展了民營企業(yè)政治聯(lián)系的相關(guān)研究,而且通過開拓高管的政府背景這一新的研究領(lǐng)域豐富了盈余質(zhì)量的相關(guān)研究。本文從高管政府背景影響公司盈余質(zhì)量,進(jìn)而影響公司價值這一路徑為前人研究中政治聯(lián)系不一定能改善公司績效和提升公司價值,甚至給公司價值帶來負(fù)面影響的結(jié)論提供了一個合理的解釋。
[Abstract]:In recent 10 years, a hot topic in foreign literature research is "political connection", and the research method based on the characteristics of executives has been widely used in this field. The existing literature mainly studies earnings quality from the perspective of agency cost and corporate governance. This paper argues that under the background of China's specific economic and political system, it is particularly important to study the influence of executive government background on the quality of corporate accounting information, especially the quality of earnings. In China, few studies focus on the influence of government background on the quality of corporate accounting information, especially earnings quality. Based on two special positions, chairman and general manager, which play a key role in earnings quality, this paper selects two kinds of perspectives to measure earnings quality. To study the impact of the government background of chairman or general manager on the earnings quality of private listed companies. Through the study of the sample of China's A-share private listed companies from 2008 to 2010, This paper finds that the earnings quality of private listed companies with government background is worse than that of private listed companies with no government background in these two key positions. On this basis, this paper uses the research methods of Wu Wenfeng et al. (2008) and du Xingqiang et al. (2009) to classify the government background of senior executives into two categories to examine the influence of different government backgrounds on the earnings quality of private listed companies in China. The research shows that after the government background is divided into the central government background and the local government background, the private listed companies with the local government background have worse earnings quality than the private listed companies with the central government background. After dividing the government background (the broad concept of government) into the background of government officials and the background of representative committee, Private listed companies with representative committee background of chairman or general manager have worse earnings quality than private listed companies with no government background; However, there is no significant difference in earnings quality between the private listed companies with the background of chairman or general manager and the private listed companies with no government background. Finally, the paper also finds that the degree of regional marketization significantly regulates the relationship between the local government background of the chairman or general manager and the earnings quality of the private listed companies in which they belong: the lower the degree of marketization in a region, the lower the degree of marketization. The worse the earnings quality of private listed companies with local government background, the chairman or general manager. The research in this paper enriches and expands the relevant research on the political relationship of private enterprises, and enriches the relevant research on earnings quality by exploring the government background of executives. This paper, from the perspective of executive government background, influences the quality of corporate earnings and then the value of the company. In previous studies, political connections do not necessarily improve corporate performance and enhance corporate value. It even provides a reasonable explanation for the conclusion of negative impact on the value of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F276.5;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1985118