本文選題：上市金融機(jī)構(gòu) + 公司治理��； 參考：《中南民族大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：截止到目前，我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)共有41家，其中銀行類(lèi)16家、證券類(lèi)18家、保險(xiǎn)類(lèi)4家、信托類(lèi)3家。我國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)化的進(jìn)程還不算很久，金融機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)還未達(dá)到足夠重視的程度，我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)中還不同程度的存在公司治理缺陷。近年來(lái)，，上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)量的快速增多加大了金融業(yè)板塊在整個(gè)上市公司的比重，也彰顯了專(zhuān)門(mén)研究上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)公司治理的重要性。而由于金融行業(yè)具有不同于其他一般行業(yè)的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、高杠桿與關(guān)聯(lián)性的特點(diǎn)，其公司治理更特殊。如果金融機(jī)構(gòu)治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)累積到一定程度，一旦釋放，對(duì)整個(gè)行業(yè)甚至整個(gè)資本市場(chǎng)帶來(lái)的災(zāi)難性將無(wú)法想象。穩(wěn)健的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，對(duì)于維持金融行業(yè)持續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)和整個(gè)金融體系安全與穩(wěn)定非常重要。因此，對(duì)我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)公司治理進(jìn)行研究十分必要。 本文正文分為四個(gè)部分，第一部分為導(dǎo)論，主要從控股股東與小股東之間的利益沖突、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理效率、董事會(huì)治理問(wèn)題、高層管理人員的激勵(lì)研究、國(guó)家控制與公司治理等五個(gè)方面對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究進(jìn)行綜述，但是學(xué)界尚未形成統(tǒng)一的、讓人滿(mǎn)意的結(jié)論。 文章的第二部分為我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)概況和上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)相對(duì)于上市非金融機(jī)構(gòu)治理的特殊性。從總股本、總市值、已流通比例、第一大股東及持股比例等幾方面介紹了我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)的基本情況。上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)公司治理不同于上市非金融機(jī)構(gòu)，主要體現(xiàn)在對(duì)債權(quán)人等利益相關(guān)者利益的保護(hù)、內(nèi)部控制和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理、治理結(jié)構(gòu)和財(cái)務(wù)信息的透明度要求程度、治理目標(biāo)、監(jiān)管治理等幾方面。 文章的第三部分重點(diǎn)分析了我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)治理的情況及其面臨的問(wèn)題。本文根據(jù)我國(guó)41家上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)布的年報(bào)和披露的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)，從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)及高管薪酬激勵(lì)四個(gè)方面著手分析。股權(quán)機(jī)構(gòu)方面，通過(guò)對(duì)41家上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)第一大股東的持股情況以及公司股權(quán)制衡情況分析得出，其他股東無(wú)法對(duì)第一大股東形成實(shí)質(zhì)性制約。董事會(huì)方面，通過(guò)總結(jié)對(duì)比分析董事會(huì)的構(gòu)成、人數(shù)分布、會(huì)議次數(shù)分布、各專(zhuān)門(mén)委員會(huì)和獨(dú)立董事的情況，得出董事會(huì)的情況總的來(lái)說(shuō)要好于往年，但仍存在一些不足。監(jiān)事會(huì)方面，通過(guò)對(duì)比分析得出結(jié)論，我國(guó)上市金融機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)事會(huì)正在朝著獨(dú)立于公司內(nèi)部人員的方向發(fā)展演變，但是獨(dú)立性和其監(jiān)督功能有待進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)。薪酬激勵(lì)方面，主要以短期激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的現(xiàn)金為主，很少有機(jī)構(gòu)存在股票獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)和股票期權(quán)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)等薪酬方式。在2010年度金融行業(yè)高管的薪酬平均值在所有行業(yè)中最高，達(dá)到人均280.82萬(wàn)元，但是差距比較明顯。在上述分析的基礎(chǔ)上，針對(duì)分析的結(jié)果提出問(wèn)題。 文章的第四部分主要針對(duì)文章第三部分分析的問(wèn)題提出改善建議，認(rèn)為應(yīng)該從以下幾點(diǎn)進(jìn)行改善：相對(duì)集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是最優(yōu)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、健全獨(dú)立董事制度、加強(qiáng)監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督功能、健全經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制和改革金融機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管體制。
[Abstract]:Up to now, there are 41 listed financial institutions in China, including 16 banks, 18 securities, 4 Insurance and 3 trust. The process of financial marketization of our country has not been long, the financial institutions have not enough attention to the corporate governance structure, and the listed financial institutions of our country have different degree of corporate governance defects. In recent years, the rapid increase in the number of listed financial institutions has increased the proportion of the financial sector in the whole listed company, and also highlighted the importance of the study of the governance of the listed financial Institutional Firms. The risk of governance in financial institutions is accumulated to a certain extent. Once released, the disastrous effect on the whole industry and the whole capital market will not be imagined. A robust corporate governance structure is very important for maintaining the sustainable management of the financial industry and the security and stability of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, the governance of the listed financial Institutional Firms in China is taken into account. It is necessary to do research.
The text of this article is divided into four parts. The first part is an introduction, which is mainly from five aspects, such as the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the small shareholders, the ownership structure and the efficiency of the corporate governance, the governance of the board of directors, the incentive research of the senior managers, the state control and the corporate governance, but the academic circles have not yet formed. A unified, satisfactory conclusion.
The second part of the article is the general situation of the listed financial institutions in China and the particularity of the listed financial institutions' governance relative to the listed non-financial institutions. The basic situation of the listed financial institutions is introduced from the total share capital, the total market value, the circulation ratio, the first big shareholders and the share proportion. The listed financial Institutional Firms governance is different from the listed financial institutions. Non financial institutions are mainly reflected in the protection of the interests of the creditors and other stakeholders, the internal control and risk management, the transparency requirements of the governance structure and financial information, the objectives of governance, and supervision and governance.
The third part of the article focuses on the analysis of the governance of the listed financial institutions in China and the problems facing them. According to the annual reports issued by 41 listed financial institutions in China and the relevant data disclosed, this paper analyzes the ownership structure, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the Executive compensation incentive in four aspects. The equity institutions, through the listing of 41 listed companies, are listed. It is concluded that the other shareholders are unable to form substantial restrictions on the first major shareholders. The board of directors, through a summary and comparison of the composition of the board of directors, the distribution of the number of people, the distribution of the number of meetings, the situation of the special committees and independent directors, draws the situation of the board of directors. The general situation is better than that in the past, but there are still some shortcomings. On the supervisory board, through comparative analysis, it is concluded that the board of supervisors of the listed financial institutions of our country is developing towards the independent of the internal personnel of the company, but the independence and its supervisory function need to be enhanced. The salary incentive is mainly short-term incentive effect. In 2010, the average salary of executives in the financial industry is the highest in all industries, reaching 2 million 808 thousand and 200 yuan per person, but the gap is obvious. On the basis of the above analysis, a question is raised on the basis of the analysis.
The fourth part of the article puts forward some suggestions on improving the analysis of the third part of the article. It is believed that the following points should be improved: the relatively centralized ownership structure is the best ownership structure, the independent director system, the supervision function of the supervisory board, the long-term incentive and constraint mechanism of management and the reform of financial institutions. The supervision system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南民族大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.3

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