本文選題：資本監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化發(fā)展到現(xiàn)階段,金融業(yè)與日俱增的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)使得銀行業(yè)金融體系的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理研究集中了大量的目光,其中一個(gè)視角是從銀行治理的角度發(fā)掘影響商業(yè)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況的因素和銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為模式。新穎的切入點(diǎn)和視角,對(duì)于我國(guó)銀行業(yè)治理改革的理論和實(shí)踐都有不小的借鑒和助益。經(jīng)過三十多年系統(tǒng)的努力,我國(guó)金融體系改革整體上取得了巨大的進(jìn)步,但是同樣遺留下一連串嚴(yán)重的問題需要進(jìn)一步去解決。雖然國(guó)內(nèi)諸多學(xué)者都對(duì)銀行治理改革的路徑提出了許多建議和主張,但是由于缺乏一個(gè)針對(duì)銀行業(yè)公司治理特殊性而建立的統(tǒng)一理論框架,大多數(shù)研究只能從一般企業(yè)公司治理理論出發(fā)去研究銀行治理機(jī)制導(dǎo)致研究的結(jié)果與我國(guó)實(shí)際情況不符。相比較而言國(guó)外的學(xué)者在銀行業(yè)治理理論方面的研究更為成功,也更有針對(duì)性,但是考慮到我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行有著不同于西方國(guó)家銀行的特殊性,如隱性存款保險(xiǎn)等等,單純的引入外國(guó)的理論成果而不做一些必要的本土化加工是行不通的。 有鑒于此,本文依據(jù)JeitschkoJeung(2005)的理論模型,考慮我國(guó)特有的銀行業(yè)從業(yè)環(huán)境,綜合外部監(jiān)管、投資者法律保護(hù)以及公司治理等多方面影響因素,建立一個(gè)一般性的多因素理論分析模型來探究管制環(huán)境和銀行治理對(duì)商業(yè)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響。本文將銀行關(guān)聯(lián)主體細(xì)分為股東,管理者以及外部監(jiān)管三部分,分析股東與管理者在外部監(jiān)管約束下各自的最優(yōu)化選擇,銀行最終的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為取決于各個(gè)主體之間的相互博弈。 理論模型的研究表明：在有隱性存款保險(xiǎn)的隱含前提下,無論資本金監(jiān)管存在與否,股東在銀行的經(jīng)營(yíng)行為中有很強(qiáng)的冒險(xiǎn)激勵(lì)和傾向,嚴(yán)格偏好高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)。杠桿率約束則可以相對(duì)有效的抑制股東的冒險(xiǎn)傾向；管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好,要視投資者法律保護(hù)程度而言。只有投資者法律保護(hù)的程度在臨界點(diǎn)以上,才能降低管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好。商業(yè)銀行整體的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平取決于外部監(jiān)管與內(nèi)部公司治理的共同作用。 在此理論基礎(chǔ)上本文采用14家上市銀行與12家非上市銀行6年的年度數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)相關(guān)假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)證結(jié)果大部分支持了理論模型的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:At the present stage of economic globalization, the increasing risks in the financial industry make the research on risk management in the banking financial system focus on a large number of eyes. One angle of view is to explore the factors that affect the risk situation of commercial banks and the behavior patterns of banks' risk-taking from the perspective of bank governance. After more than 30 years of systematic efforts, China's financial system reform as a whole has made great progress. But there are also a series of serious problems that need to be solved further. Although many domestic scholars have put forward many suggestions and opinions on the path of bank governance reform, However, due to the lack of a unified theoretical framework for the particularity of corporate governance in the banking sector, Most studies can only proceed from the general corporate governance theory to study the mechanism of bank governance. The results of the study are not consistent with the actual situation in China. Compared with the foreign scholars, the research on the theory of banking governance is more successful. Also more targeted, but considering that our commercial banks are different from western banks, such as recessive deposit insurance and so on, simply introducing foreign theoretical results without doing some necessary localization processing is not feasible. In view of this, according to the theory model of Jeitschko Jeungxi 2005), this paper considers the unique banking industry environment, comprehensive external supervision, investor legal protection and corporate governance, and so on. A general multi-factor theoretical analysis model is established to explore the impact of regulatory environment and bank governance on the risk assumption of commercial banks. By analyzing the optimal choices of shareholders and managers under the external supervision constraints, the ultimate risk-bearing behavior of banks depends on the mutual game between each other. The theoretical model shows that under the implicit premise of implicit deposit insurance, shareholders have a strong incentive and tendency to risk in the operation of banks, regardless of whether the capital supervision exists or not. Strict preference for high-risk assets. Leverage constraints can be relatively effective in restraining the risk appetite of shareholders. Managers' risk preference depends on the degree of legal protection of investors. Only the degree of legal protection of investors is above the critical point. The overall risk-taking level of commercial banks depends on the joint effect of external supervision and internal corporate governance. On the basis of this theory, this paper uses the annual data of 14 listed banks and 12 unlisted banks to test the relevant hypotheses. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33

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本文編號(hào)：1651513