本文選題：股權(quán)激勵　切入點：要素設(shè)計　出處：《鄭州大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前,股權(quán)激勵機制正在受到理論界、政府、企業(yè)、機構(gòu)投資者等多方面的關(guān)注。股權(quán)激勵在歐美等發(fā)達(dá)資本主義市場已經(jīng)廣泛運用并得到了良好的效果。在我國股權(quán)激勵起步較晚,目前并沒有完全得到充分的運用。但是近3年來已經(jīng)有越來越多的企業(yè)開始嘗試這一新的激勵機制,特別是進入到2010年以后,公布股權(quán)激勵計劃草案的上市公司大量涌現(xiàn),這說明股權(quán)激勵正在逐漸受到我國企業(yè)的重視�？梢哉f,股權(quán)激勵在我國的發(fā)展正處在一個關(guān)鍵時期,今后的幾年內(nèi),上市公司推行高管股權(quán)激勵計劃必將成為一個趨勢。本文正是在這一宏觀環(huán)境下研究我國上市公司經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵的效應(yīng),以期能為股權(quán)激勵在我國的發(fā)展提供一些參考價值。 本文從股權(quán)激勵的要素設(shè)計和企業(yè)股權(quán)特征兩個方面共同研究經(jīng)理人股權(quán)激勵的實施效果這一課題。文章主要分為五大部分：第一部分對前人的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進行了梳理和總結(jié)。第二部分闡述了股權(quán)激勵的理論基礎(chǔ),原理機制和相關(guān)概念。第三部分對從2006年到2010年所有實施股權(quán)激勵的144家上市公司的激勵方案進行數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計和處理,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了股權(quán)激勵在我國上市公司的實施現(xiàn)狀；分析了實施股權(quán)激勵的上市公司的特點。第四部分運用上述數(shù)據(jù)采用實證分析的方法驗證了各個因素與上市公司股權(quán)激勵之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,并檢驗了上市公司股權(quán)激勵的效果。第五部分在前幾章節(jié)的研究基礎(chǔ)上得出結(jié)論。 本文的結(jié)論主要有：1.要素設(shè)計方面：(1)企業(yè)績效和激勵比例是一種倒U型關(guān)系；代理成本則會隨著激勵比例的增加而減少。(2)股權(quán)激勵設(shè)計中有效期的設(shè)計會對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生影響,企業(yè)績效隨著有效期的增加是先下降后上升而后又下降,兩者呈現(xiàn)三次方對應(yīng)關(guān)系。(3)股權(quán)激勵的行權(quán)價格的設(shè)計會對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生影響,但是這一因素需要通過上市企業(yè)的股票價值共同體現(xiàn)。(4)不同的股權(quán)激勵模式對激勵效果的影響不同。2.企業(yè)股權(quán)特征方面：(1)股權(quán)集中度對激勵效果的影響是顯著的,越高的股權(quán)集中度越能降低企業(yè)的代理成本,提高企業(yè)的績效。(2)民營企業(yè)實施股權(quán)激勵比國有企業(yè)的效果更佳。 針對上述結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為要使股權(quán)激勵在我國充分發(fā)揮其作用,就應(yīng)該有針對性的合理設(shè)置股權(quán)激勵要素,完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),從而使股權(quán)激勵在我國的上市企業(yè)中更好的發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用。
[Abstract]:At present, the equity incentive mechanism is being received by the theorists, the government, the enterprises, Institutional investors and other aspects of concern. Equity incentive has been widely used in developed capitalist markets, such as Europe and the United States, and has achieved good results. But in the past three years, more and more enterprises have begun to try this new incentive mechanism, especially after 2010, a large number of listed companies published the draft equity incentive plan emerged. This shows that equity incentives are gradually being valued by Chinese enterprises. It can be said that the development of equity incentives in China is in a critical period, in the next few years, It will be a trend for listed companies to carry out executive equity incentive plan. This paper studies the effect of manager equity incentive in this macro environment in order to provide some reference value for the development of equity incentive in our country. This paper studies the effect of executive equity incentive from two aspects: the design of the elements of equity incentive and the characteristics of enterprise equity. The article is divided into five parts: the first part is related to the previous literature. The second part expounds the theoretical basis of equity incentive. The third part makes statistics and processing of the incentive schemes of 144 listed companies from 2006 to 2010, and then analyzes the actualization of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies. This paper analyzes the characteristics of listed companies that implement equity incentive. Part 4th uses the above data to verify the internal relationship between the various factors and equity incentive of listed companies. The effect of equity incentive of listed companies is tested. Part 5th draws a conclusion on the basis of the previous chapters. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) the relationship between enterprise performance and incentive ratio is an inverted U type. Agency cost will decrease with the increase of incentive ratio.) the design of validity period in equity incentive design will have an impact on enterprise performance. With the increase of validity period, enterprise performance will first decrease and then rise and then decline. The design of the exercise price of the equity incentive will have an impact on the performance of the enterprise. However, this factor needs to reflect the stock value of listed enterprises. (4) different equity incentive models have different effects on the incentive effect. 2.The influence of ownership concentration on the incentive effect is significant in the aspect of enterprise equity characteristics. The higher the degree of ownership concentration is, the lower the agency cost is, and the better the performance is. 2) the effect of equity incentive in private enterprises is better than that in state-owned enterprises. In view of the above conclusions, this paper thinks that in order to give full play to the role of equity incentive in our country, we should set up the equity incentive elements reasonably and perfect the corporate governance structure. So that equity incentive in China's listed enterprises better play its due role.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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