本文關(guān)鍵詞： 限薪令 金融行業(yè) 高管貨幣薪酬 高管貨幣薪酬外部公平性 在職消費 公司業(yè)績　出處：《山東大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著2007年年報中高管年薪的公布,中國平安保險董事長馬明哲年薪超過6000萬,此信息一披露,更引起了社會公眾對金融行業(yè)高管“天價薪酬”的廣泛關(guān)注。金融行業(yè)高管高薪問題不只是公司代理成本問題,而已經(jīng)上升為社會公平問題。根據(jù)新浪網(wǎng)站的調(diào)查“2010年全國兩會,你最關(guān)注什么話題”的調(diào)查結(jié)果,公眾對“收入差距及收入分配改革問題”的關(guān)注程度位居榜首。 跟據(jù)近幾年的中國企業(yè)高管薪酬調(diào)查報告,金融行業(yè)一直穩(wěn)居榜首。Wind數(shù)據(jù)顯示,2010年,金融行業(yè)高管薪酬最高,農(nóng)林牧漁業(yè)行業(yè)高管薪酬最低。如果將金融行業(yè)支付高管團隊的平均總薪酬與非金融行業(yè)相比較,前者的每家公司高管平均總薪酬為2483萬元,后者平均為368萬元,前者是后者的7倍。 在2010年的政府工作報告中表明,我國的經(jīng)濟社會發(fā)展指導思想已從“效率優(yōu)先、兼顧公平”過渡到“注重社會公平”階段。而引起社會公眾共同關(guān)注的金融行業(yè)高管高薪問題正是與此文件精神相悖,針對這種現(xiàn)狀,自2009年2月份開始,財政部便連續(xù)下發(fā)《金融類國有及國有控股企業(yè)績效評價暫行辦法》、《關(guān)于金融類國有和國有控股企業(yè)負責人薪酬管理有關(guān)問題的通知》、《金融類國有及國有控股企業(yè)負責人薪酬管理辦法(征求意見稿)》和《規(guī)范國有金融機構(gòu)高管人員薪酬分配秩序》等多個文件。2010年3月,為實施更為嚴格的薪酬管制,銀監(jiān)會發(fā)布實施《商業(yè)銀行穩(wěn)健薪酬監(jiān)管指引》。在金融危機的背景下,對于金融行業(yè)的薪酬管制不只是我國的特例,在美國、法國等世界各國都已開始頒布適合各自國情的金融行業(yè)“限薪令”。 在國內(nèi)外“限薪令”的制度背景下,本文研究我國金融企業(yè)高管貨幣薪酬及其外部公平性的現(xiàn)狀,并通過建立模型分析二者與在職消費的關(guān)系,以探究貨幣薪酬的限制效果是否通過在職消費這類隱性收入所化解。在此基礎(chǔ)上,進一步研究高管薪酬及其外部公平性、在職消費三者與公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系,從公司利益的角度,探究薪酬管制對金融企業(yè)的影響。通過數(shù)據(jù)收集、模型建立以及數(shù)據(jù)分析,得出以下結(jié)論： (一)高管貨幣薪酬與在職消費之間存在同增同減的關(guān)系,支持所有者虛位理論。 (二)雖然高管貨幣薪酬影響在職消費,但是高管貨幣薪酬外部公平性與在職消費之間不存在顯著性關(guān)系。 (三)雖然2010年銀監(jiān)會出臺了《商業(yè)銀行穩(wěn)健薪酬監(jiān)管指引》,將績效工資與風險控制指標相掛鉤,但高管薪酬與財務(wù)杠桿之間并不存在顯著性關(guān)系。 (四)我國金融行業(yè)高管持股比例低甚至普遍為零持股,這表明了我國高管薪酬激勵方式的單一性,缺乏股權(quán)激勵這種長期激勵方式的運用。 (五)高管貨幣薪酬水平與公司業(yè)績存在雙向的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。 (六)高管薪酬的外部公平性與公司績效之間存在顯著負相關(guān)關(guān)系,這一現(xiàn)象是由金融行業(yè)的薪酬管制現(xiàn)狀的特殊性造成的。 (七)在職消費與公司業(yè)績存在不顯著的負相關(guān)關(guān)系,從一定程度上說明了在職消費對公司績效存在負面影響。 最后,本文在數(shù)據(jù)分析結(jié)果與實證結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,分別從公司層面和制度層面,對金融行業(yè)高管薪酬激勵體制的設(shè)計與政府薪酬管制的現(xiàn)狀提出了具有針對性的七條建議。同時,指出了本文研究的不足以及未來研究方向的展望。
[Abstract]:As executives announced the 2007 annual report of the annual salary, chairman of Ping An insurance China Ma Mingzhe annual salary of more than 60 million, the disclosure of this information, the more aroused public attention to the financial industry executives "salary". The financial industry executives paid not only agency cost problem, and has given rise to the problem of social equity. According to the 2010 national NPC and CPPCC investigation of sina, the results of the survey what you most concerned about the topic, the public attention to the income gap and income distribution reform "topped the list.
According to the investigation report of Chinese executive compensation in recent years, the financial industry has been ranked in the top.Wind data show that in 2010, the highest executive pay in the financial industry, animal husbandry and fishery industry executive compensation. If the minimum average total pay in the financial industry to pay the team compared with the non financial sector, the average total compensation of each company executives of the former the latter is 24 million 830 thousand yuan, an average of 3 million 680 thousand yuan, the former is 7 times of the latter.
Show that in 2010 the government work report, economic and social development concept to guide our country has changed from "efficiency first, fairness" to "social justice". The financial industry executives paid problem caused by the common concern of the public is contrary to the spirit of the document, in view of this situation, since the beginning of 2009 February then, the Ministry of Finance for the state-owned and state-controlled financial enterprises issued "Interim Measures for performance evaluation of < >, state-owned and state-controlled financial enterprises who pay management issues related to notice", "financial state-owned and state holding enterprises responsible for salary management approach (Draft)" and "national norms financial institution executives salary distribution order > multiple file.2010 in March, for the implementation of more stringent regulation, the CBRC issued the" Commercial Bank Supervisory Guidelines on sound compensation in the financial crisis. Under the background of the machine, the salary regulation for the financial industry is not only a special case of our country, but also in the US, France and other countries all over the world has begun to promulgate the financial industry "salary limit order" which is suitable for their respective national conditions.
At home and abroad the institutional background of salary under the situation of executive monetary and financial enterprises in China compensation and external equity of this paper, and through the establishment of model to analyze the relationship between the two and on-the-job consumption, to limit the effect on monetary compensation through on-the-job consumption this kind of hidden income resolve. On this basis, further research on the executive compensation and external equity, the relationship between consumption three and the performance of the company, the company from the perspective of interests, explore the impact of compensation regulation on financial enterprises. Through data collection, data modeling and analysis, draw the following conclusions:
(a) between executive monetary compensation and perquisite consumption have the same relationship increase with the decrease of the support of owners phantom theory.
(two) although executive monetary compensation affects on-the-job consumption, there is no significant relationship between executive monetary compensation external equity and on-the-job consumption.
(three) although the CBRC issued the guidelines for the stable remuneration of commercial banks in 2010, it linked the performance pay with risk control indicators, but there was no significant relationship between executive pay and financial leverage.
(four) the shareholding ratio of Chinese financial industry executives is low or even zero shareholding. This indicates the singleness of executive compensation incentive mode in China, and the lack of long-term incentive mode of equity incentive.
(five) there is a two-way positive correlation between the level of executive monetary remuneration and the performance of the company.
(six) there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation external equity and company performance. This phenomenon is caused by the particularity of the salary regulation status in the financial industry.
(seven) there is an insignificant negative correlation between on-the-job consumption and company performance, to a certain extent, the negative impact of on-the-job consumption on corporate performance is shown to a certain extent.
Finally, this paper based on the data analysis and empirical results on separately from the company level and system level design, status of financial industry executive compensation incentive system and government compensation regulation proposed seven suggestions. At the same time, pointed out the shortcomings of this study and future research directions.

【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.2;F272;F224

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