本文關(guān)鍵詞：地方官員治理與城市商業(yè)銀行的貸款行為　出處：《南開大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 政治觀 地方官員治理 城市商業(yè)銀行 貸款行為

【摘要】：政府對銀行的所有權(quán)在世界范圍內(nèi)廣泛存在，由此導(dǎo)致了作為股東的政府對銀行貸款的干預(yù)行為。對政府股東經(jīng)濟后果的研究也由早期的“發(fā)展觀”演進至目前引起廣泛關(guān)注的“政治觀”，即認為政治家會基于自身的政治動機而非社會福利控制銀行信貸的配置，從而不利于銀行和金融體系的發(fā)展。大量的研究從政府股東的宏觀影響、個體效應(yīng)以及銀行行為等方面考察了這一問題，也得出了較為豐富和一致的成果。然而需要指出的是，目前對此問題的研究仍將政府看做一個整體，試圖從政府的層面探討其對銀行貸款的作用來證實政府股東的“政治觀”。而我們認為政府行為只是一種表面結(jié)果，更深層次的則是官員行為。政府本身是一個抽象的“黑箱”，其所表現(xiàn)出來的各種特征其實是作為實體的官員動機的體現(xiàn)，正是官員將自身的政治目的嵌入到作為股東的政府之中，才使得政府股東表現(xiàn)出“政治性”。從這個意義上講，目前的研究事實上只見政府不見官員，未能將政府行為推進到背后的實質(zhì)性個體——官員，并沒有提供“政治觀”的直接證據(jù)。因此對政府股東“政治觀”的研究需要從“政府與銀行”深入到“官員與銀行”，這有助于我們從根源上理解政府與銀行的關(guān)系。 而我國的城市商業(yè)銀行（以下簡稱為城商行）是檢驗這一問題的合適樣本，因為一方面，在我國的行政型治理體制下，地方政府不僅擁有城商行的控股權(quán)，而且也控制著城商行高管人員的任免，這使得作為地方政府實質(zhì)性個體的官員有足夠的能力來干預(yù)城商行的貸款行為。另一方面，在我國地方官員圍繞GDP增長為主的晉升錦標賽體制下，地方官員的治理特征會影響地方經(jīng)濟增長，而作為推動經(jīng)濟增長的重要資金來源，地方官員有強烈的動力來干預(yù)銀行貸款；特別是在目前地方政府投資來源受限的情況下，城商行就進一步成為地方官員推動經(jīng)濟增長、實現(xiàn)政治晉升的重要手段�；谝陨线壿�，本文將視角從政府拓展到官員，探討了地方官員治理特征對城商行貸款行為的影響，以期為政府股東的“政治觀”提供直接而有力的證據(jù)。 論文的研究思路和框架遵循從規(guī)范到實證的研究范式。在第一章的引言中介紹了論文的研究問題、研究方法等之后，第二章分別從政府股東的經(jīng)濟后果以及地方政府激勵與經(jīng)濟增長兩個方面對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究進行了評述，在此基礎(chǔ)上通過對我國地方政府與銀行關(guān)系制度演進的分析，從理論上闡述了本文的邏輯框架。第三章開始進入了實證分析部分，本文的樣本為我國2006-2009年城商行及所在城市市委書記的對應(yīng)樣本，我們手工收集了相關(guān)的城商行年報及官員的個體特征資料，從地方官員治理特征包括晉升激勵、來源、任期、去向、更替等角度考察了其對銀行貸款的影響。 第三章研究了地方官員晉升壓力的作用，結(jié)果表明晉升壓力會顯著影響城商行的貸款行為，而官員任期也會對二者關(guān)系有顯著作用。同時，晉升壓力也會通過特定的貸款行為引致不良貸款，且在官員考核體系中增加環(huán)境、民生指標的比重能夠有效抑制不良貸款的累積�；诠賳T異質(zhì)性和激勵異質(zhì)性的分析，第四章從地方官員來源、任期、去向等特征而第五章從官員更替視角研究了其對城商行貸款的影響。結(jié)果表明不同來源、任期、去向官員轄內(nèi)的城商行信貸投放存在較大差異；而官員的更替會導(dǎo)致城商行較快的貸款增長，且這種效應(yīng)會因官員和城市特征而有所差異。第六章則進一步考察了銀行內(nèi)部治理機制對官員任期與貸款關(guān)系的作用，結(jié)果表明官員任期與城商行貸款投放顯著正相關(guān)，且官員董事這一特殊的政治關(guān)聯(lián)方式會強化官員任期與貸款投放的關(guān)系。最后第七章為全文的結(jié)論。 總體而言，本文突破了以往對政府與銀行關(guān)系的研究，從官員與銀行的視角考察了地方官員治理特征對城商行貸款的影響，表明官員的各種治理特征會對銀行貸款產(chǎn)生重要而顯著的影響，為政府股東的“政治觀”提供了直接證據(jù)。同時本文創(chuàng)新性的將已有對省級官員的研究拓展到地市級，并且將對官員治理的研究從影響經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的宏觀層面深入到企業(yè)行為的微觀視角。本文的研究意味著，在理論上對政府股東和政府行為的研究需要從官員這一全新且本質(zhì)的視角出發(fā)，而在實踐上實現(xiàn)城商行的可持續(xù)發(fā)展應(yīng)主要從增加地方官員的干預(yù)難度和弱化干預(yù)動力兩個方面著手。
[Abstract]:Government ownership of banks is widespread in the world, which leads to the behavior of government intervention as a shareholder of bank loans to the government. The shareholders the economic consequences of the research from the early "development" evolution to the present caused widespread concern of the "political concept", namely that politicians will own political motivation based on the non allocation of social welfare control of bank credit, which is not conducive to the development of the banking and financial system. A large number of studies from the macro effects of government shareholders, individual effect and bank behavior were investigated this problem, also have a more rich and consistent results. However, it is necessary to point out that the current study of this issue will the government as a whole, to explore its effect on bank loans from the government level to confirm the government shareholder "political view." but we think the government behavior is just a The surface, the deeper is the official behavior. The government itself is an abstract of the "black box", the characters shown is reflected as the entity of the official motivation, it is their own political officials will be embedded into the government as a shareholder, the government shareholders demonstrate "political". In this sense, the present study actually saw no government officials, failed to advance to the government behavior behind the substantial individual officials did not provide direct evidence of political views. So the research on government shareholders "political concept" from "government and bank" deeply "officials and bank", which helps us to understand the relationship between the government and from the root of the bank.
China's City Commercial Bank (hereinafter referred to as the city firm) is to test the appropriate samples of this issue, because on the one hand, the administrative governance system of our country, holding power to the local government not only has the city firm, but also control the appointment and removal of the city firm executives, which makes the loan behavior as the place government officials of the individual's ability to intervene in the city firm. On the other hand, in the promotion tournament system of China's local officials around the GDP growth mainly under the governance characteristics of local officials will affect local economic growth, and as an important source of funds to promote economic growth, local officials have a strong incentive to the intervention of bank loans; especially in the current local government investment limited, the city firm will further become the local officials to promote economic growth, an important means to realize the political promotion based on. From the perspective of logic, this paper extends the perspective from the government to the officials, and explores the influence of local officials' governance characteristics on the loan behavior of city commercial banks, in order to provide direct and powerful evidence for the government shareholders' "political outlook".
The research ideas and the framework follows from specification to empirical research paradigm. In the first chapter, the introduction introduces the research questions, research methods, the second chapter respectively from the economic consequences of the government shareholder and local government incentives and economic growth on the two aspects of domestic and international related research were reviewed, on the basis of through the analysis of the evolution of the relationship between the local government and the bank system of our country, the framework of this paper. The third chapter in the part of empirical analysis, the sample for our 2006-2009 City firm and city party secretary of the corresponding sample, we collect the data of annual report and the individual characteristics of the city firm officials the manual, from local officials governance characteristics including promotion incentive, source term, whereabouts, replacement and studied the impact on bank loans.
The third chapter studies the role of local officials' promotion pressure. The results show that the promotion pressure will significantly affect the lending behavior of city commercial banks, and the official term will have significant effect on the relationship between the two. At the same time, the pressure will be promoted through the specific loan behavior caused by bad loans, and the increase of environment in the official assessment system, the cumulative livelihood index the proportion of non-performing loans can effectively inhibit. Analysis of heterogeneity and heterogeneity of official incentive based on the fourth chapter, from the source to local officials, term, and characteristics such as the fifth chapter from the perspective of officials change to study their impact on city commercial loans. The results show that the different source term, to the jurisdiction of the city commercial bank credit officers there is a big difference; and the officials of the replacement will lead the city firm rapid loan growth, and the effect for officials and city characteristics vary. The sixth chapter further The effects of bank internal governance mechanism on the relationship between officials and the results show that the loan term, officials tenure and city commercial lending was a significant positive correlation, and official board of this special political association will strengthen the relationship between tenure and official lending. Finally, the seventh chapter is the conclusion of this paper.
Overall, this paper breaks the previous research on the relationship between government and banks, the influence of local officials on governance characteristics of city commercial loans from officials and bank angle, shows that all officials will affect the governance characteristics of important and significant for bank loans, providing direct evidence for government shareholders "political view." at the same time this paper will research on provincial officials to expand the micro perspective and Research on, officials from the macro level of economic development into the enterprise behavior. This study means that the theoretical research of government shareholder and government behavior need to proceed from this new and essential from the perspective of officials, and realize the sustainable development of city commercial banks should be mainly from the two aspects of increasing difficulty and weakening power intervention of local officials to intervene in practice.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D630;F832.4

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 南星星;城市商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對信貸資產(chǎn)配置行為的影響研究[D];蘭州大學(xué);2014年

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本文編號：1425394