本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國(guó)上市公司CEO更替的理論與實(shí)證研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 公司治理 CEO更替政策 監(jiān)管強(qiáng)度 決策模型

【摘要】：CEO更替是董事會(huì)做出的最重要決策之一,目前是公司治理機(jī)制與治理結(jié)構(gòu)研究的核心課題。同時(shí),更替問(wèn)題也是約束CEO行為、保持企業(yè)健康發(fā)展的主要方式。就國(guó)內(nèi)上市公司目前的情況看,自上世界90年代以來(lái),國(guó)有企業(yè)進(jìn)行大規(guī)模的公司制改革,逐步上市,成為產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)相對(duì)明晰的,具有一定競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的企業(yè),CEO的更替在這一過(guò)程中發(fā)揮了較大的作用。CEO的管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)或企業(yè)家才能往往能夠決定一個(gè)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的空間。一旦CEO更替事件發(fā)生,企業(yè)的股東、董事、客戶、供應(yīng)商、員工、公眾等內(nèi)外部利益相關(guān)方都會(huì)受到影響。 本文研究主要基于東京大學(xué)Sato教授(Meg A. Sato,2008)的一個(gè)理論模型。論文論證了當(dāng)CEO更替即將發(fā)生時(shí),董事會(huì)做出兩個(gè)重要的決定：監(jiān)管強(qiáng)度與CEO繼任來(lái)源的選擇(也就是繼任政策)。經(jīng)過(guò)理論的推導(dǎo)可知,董事會(huì)不愿意進(jìn)行CEO的更替是有內(nèi)在理由的。董事會(huì)的成員主要包括：CEO,外部董事,內(nèi)部董事。盡管兩類董事對(duì)于成為下任CEO有各自不同的動(dòng)機(jī)或誘因,當(dāng)所有在職的董事共同決定誰(shuí)將成為下任CEO時(shí),他們都贊成最小化新任者的報(bào)酬,因?yàn)樾氯握叩念A(yù)期報(bào)酬越少,現(xiàn)任董事會(huì)成員的未來(lái)收益越多。理論模型推導(dǎo)過(guò)程,能夠解釋為何外部有更出色的候選者,董事會(huì)仍然將不是最有才能的內(nèi)部董事任命為CEO。同時(shí),也能夠解釋為何董事會(huì)傾向于弱化監(jiān)管并且?guī)缀醪粫?huì)雇傭新CEO。在理論模型推導(dǎo)之后,筆者依據(jù)現(xiàn)有的國(guó)泰安CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)理論模型的推導(dǎo)結(jié)論進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 本文的主要從兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵決策進(jìn)行了推導(dǎo)與實(shí)證：董事會(huì)決定的繼任政策與監(jiān)管強(qiáng)度。在此之前,假定董事會(huì)決策的依據(jù)為預(yù)期報(bào)酬或損失。所以在第三章的第一節(jié)開(kāi)始推導(dǎo)了損失的定義與模型的估計(jì),并在節(jié)最后分析了損失模型的結(jié)果、探討了模型的意義；隨后將董事會(huì)的決策過(guò)程依據(jù)納什談判進(jìn)行求解,得到了董事會(huì)各種角色的預(yù)期目標(biāo)與報(bào)酬的表達(dá)式,分析了決策的制定過(guò)程,初步得到Sato教授的模型推導(dǎo)的結(jié)論。隨后在第四章,對(duì)模型得到的定理與推論進(jìn)行了探索性的驗(yàn)證,獲得了這些結(jié)論在我國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)踐過(guò)程中的實(shí)證結(jié)果,對(duì)比理論模型的定理與推論,分析了理論與實(shí)踐的差異。 本文主要采用了實(shí)證研究的方法,針對(duì)董事會(huì)繼任來(lái)源選擇、繼任政策之內(nèi)部提升傾向性的檢驗(yàn)、監(jiān)管強(qiáng)度的分析、董事會(huì)規(guī)模假設(shè)的驗(yàn)證等重要議題進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),獲得了目前我國(guó)上市公司CEO更替過(guò)程中的實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)。針對(duì)理論模型的構(gòu)建過(guò)程,指出模型應(yīng)用時(shí)的不足,甚至可以為模型的改善提供一些實(shí)證依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The replacement of CEO is one of the most important decisions made by the board of directors. At present, it is the core topic of the research on corporate governance mechanism and governance structure. At the same time, the replacement problem is also the behavior of restricting CEO. The main way to maintain the healthy development of enterprises. From the current situation of domestic listed companies, since 90s, state-owned enterprises have carried out large-scale corporate system reform, gradually listed, become the structure of property rights. Corporate governance structure is relatively clear, with a certain degree of competitiveness of enterprises. The replacement of CEO plays a great role in this process. The CEO's management experience or entrepreneur's ability can often determine the space of an enterprise's growth. Once the CEO replacement event occurs, the shareholders of the enterprise. Directors, customers, suppliers, employees, the public and other internal and external stakeholders will be affected. This paper is mainly based on a theoretical model developed by Sato Professor, University of Tokyo, China (2008). The paper demonstrates that when CEO turnover is about to take place. The board makes two important decisions: the intensity of regulation and the choice of CEO succession sources (that is, succession policy). There is an inherent reason why the board of directors is unwilling to replace the CEO. The main members of the board include: CEO, external director. Internal directors. Although the two categories of directors have different motivations or incentives to become the next CEO, when all serving directors jointly decide who will become the next CEO, they are in favour of minimizing the remuneration of the new entrants. Because the lower the expected remuneration of the new, the more the future benefits of the current board members. The theoretical modeling process can explain why there are better candidates from the outside. Boards still appoint not the most talented internal directors as CEOs. It can also explain why boards tend to weaken regulation and almost never hire new CEOs. After the theoretical model has been derived. Based on the existing data of Cathay Pacific CSMAR database, the author empirically tests the conclusion of the theoretical model. This paper mainly deduces and proves from two key decisions: succession policy and regulatory intensity decided by the board of directors. Assuming that the decision of the board is based on expected reward or loss, the definition of loss and the estimation of the model are derived in the first section of chapter 3, and the results of the loss model are analyzed at the end of the section. The significance of the model is discussed. Then, the decision-making process of the board of directors is solved according to Nash negotiation, and the expressions of the expected goals and rewards of the various roles of the board of directors are obtained, and the decision-making process is analyzed. The conclusion of the model derivation by Professor Sato is preliminarily obtained, and then in Chapter 4th, the theorems and corollaries obtained from the model are proved. The empirical results of these conclusions in the practice of listed companies in China are obtained, and the differences between theory and practice are analyzed by comparing the theorems and corollaries of theoretical models. This article mainly adopts the empirical research method, aiming at the board of directors succession source choice, the succession policy internal promotion tendency test, the supervision intensity analysis. Some important issues, such as the verification of board size hypothesis, are tested empirically, and the actual data of the CEO turnover process of listed companies in China are obtained, aiming at the construction process of the theoretical model. The deficiency of model application can even provide some empirical evidence for the improvement of the model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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