信息不對(duì)稱條件下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2019-06-24 15:48
【摘要】:隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的迅速發(fā)展,越來越多的企業(yè)在傳統(tǒng)零售渠道分銷商品的同時(shí),開辟了網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道.雙渠道銷售模式已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)代制造企業(yè)最主流的銷售模式.然而雙渠道銷售模式的建立使制造商和零售商間的競爭日益加劇,雙方的利益沖突也愈加明顯,導(dǎo)致信息不對(duì)稱的情況時(shí)常存在,例如成本信息不對(duì)稱、需求信息不對(duì)稱.因此關(guān)于雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題就成了大家普遍關(guān)注的問題. 本文在回顧國內(nèi)外關(guān)于雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,運(yùn)用Stackelberg博弈理論和概率統(tǒng)計(jì)的相關(guān)理論和方法,在成本信息不對(duì)稱和需求信息不對(duì)稱條件下,分別建立了Stackelberg博弈模型,設(shè)計(jì)了批發(fā)價(jià)契約和雙方收益共享契約,分析了零售商成本信息不對(duì)稱和市場(chǎng)需求信息不對(duì)稱對(duì)價(jià)格、利潤及生產(chǎn)決策的影響,評(píng)估了本文設(shè)計(jì)的批發(fā)價(jià)契約和雙方收益共享契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的作用,并通過數(shù)值算例驗(yàn)證了所設(shè)計(jì)契約的有效性.
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, more and more enterprises have opened up the channel of direct sales in the traditional retail channels. The dual-channel sales model has become the most mainstream sales model in modern manufacturing enterprises. However, the establishment of the dual-channel sales model makes the competition between the manufacturer and the retailer become more and more obvious, and the conflict of interest between the two parties is more obvious, resulting in the information asymmetry, such as the asymmetry of the cost information and the asymmetry of the demand information. Therefore, the problem of the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain has become a common concern. Based on the review of the relevant research of the dual-channel supply chain at home and abroad, the Stackelberg game model is established by using the theory and method of Stackelberg game theory and probability statistics. The paper analyzes the influence of the asymmetry of the retailer's cost information and the asymmetry of the market demand information on the price, the profit and the production decision-making, and evaluates the effect of the wholesale price contract and the two-party income-sharing contract on the supply chain coordination. The validity of the proposed contract is verified by numerical examples.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F274
本文編號(hào):2505182
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, more and more enterprises have opened up the channel of direct sales in the traditional retail channels. The dual-channel sales model has become the most mainstream sales model in modern manufacturing enterprises. However, the establishment of the dual-channel sales model makes the competition between the manufacturer and the retailer become more and more obvious, and the conflict of interest between the two parties is more obvious, resulting in the information asymmetry, such as the asymmetry of the cost information and the asymmetry of the demand information. Therefore, the problem of the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain has become a common concern. Based on the review of the relevant research of the dual-channel supply chain at home and abroad, the Stackelberg game model is established by using the theory and method of Stackelberg game theory and probability statistics. The paper analyzes the influence of the asymmetry of the retailer's cost information and the asymmetry of the market demand information on the price, the profit and the production decision-making, and evaluates the effect of the wholesale price contract and the two-party income-sharing contract on the supply chain coordination. The validity of the proposed contract is verified by numerical examples.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F274
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 陳樹楨;熊中楷;李根道;文海鴻;;考慮創(chuàng)新補(bǔ)償?shù)碾p渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2011年02期
,本文編號(hào):2505182
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