【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)和科技的不斷發(fā)展,人們期望獲得更高水平的生活質(zhì)量,因而產(chǎn)生了越來越多的具有很高再利用價值的廢舊產(chǎn)品。廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收不僅可以有效地對資源進(jìn)行重復(fù)利用,為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造更多的附加值,還能更好地保護(hù)環(huán)境,利于資源和環(huán)境的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。文章在循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)的大背景下,建立了由一個制造商和兩個零售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型,分析了回收價格和回收服務(wù)雙決策變量的動態(tài)博弈分析。文章分析了動態(tài)博弈模型均衡解的局部穩(wěn)定性,并且使用Matlab等數(shù)學(xué)工具對動態(tài)系統(tǒng)的演化特征進(jìn)行了模擬分析,分析了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收價格和服務(wù)的博弈分析的復(fù)雜性和混沌特性。詳細(xì)介紹了混沌狀態(tài)的危害后,文章給出了混沌控制方法,并且給出了混沌控制的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)解釋。本文的主要內(nèi)容和創(chuàng)新點如下:1.文章構(gòu)建了一個既有競爭關(guān)系又同時存在合作關(guān)系的由一個制造商與兩個零售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),分析了制造商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收系統(tǒng)的定價博弈。文章求出了博弈三方的均衡回收價格,探討了均衡解的局部穩(wěn)定性。對于不同回收廠商差異化的市場規(guī)模,文章分析了不同水平的市場規(guī)模對各方利潤的影響。2.基于回收廠商往往會加入如“咨詢”、“上門取貨”等服務(wù)的情況,在考察回收價格博弈的基礎(chǔ)上,文章還考慮零售商加入回收服務(wù),從而組成了一個價格與服務(wù)的混合博弈模型。在求出均衡回收價格和服務(wù)水平后,文章分析了均衡解的局部穩(wěn)定性。對于加入回收服務(wù)能否獲利的問題,文章給出了詳細(xì)的分析和論證,得出了加入回收服務(wù)能夠獲得更多回收利潤。3.文章將復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)理論應(yīng)用于對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的動態(tài)博弈的研究之中。三個廠商不斷對決策變量進(jìn)行調(diào)整的過程可以看做一個動力系統(tǒng),文章詳細(xì)闡述了參數(shù)造成的系統(tǒng)混沌狀態(tài),以及混沌狀態(tài)造成的如“決策變量分岔”、“利潤分岔”、“利潤時間序列波動”、“初值敏感性”等不良影響。對此,文章通過延遲反饋控制法對混沌狀態(tài)進(jìn)行控制,這對廢舊產(chǎn)品回收市場的高校穩(wěn)定發(fā)展具有了理論和現(xiàn)實意義。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of economy and science and technology, people expect to obtain a higher standard of quality of life, so more and more waste products with high reuse value have been produced. The recovery of waste products can not only effectively reuse resources, create more added value for enterprises, but also better protect the environment, which is conducive to the sustainable development of resources and environment. Under the background of circular economy, this paper establishes a closed-loop supply chain model composed of one manufacturer and two retailers, and analyzes the dynamic game analysis of double decision variables of recovery price and recovery service. In this paper, the local stability of the equilibrium solution of the dynamic game model is analyzed, and the evolution characteristics of the dynamic system are simulated and analyzed by using Matlab and other mathematical tools, and the complexity and chaotic characteristics of the game analysis of the recovery price and service in the closed-loop supply chain are analyzed. After introducing the harm of chaotic state in detail, the method of chaos control is given in this paper, and the economic explanation of chaos control is given. The main contents and innovations of this paper are as follows: 1. In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and two retailers is constructed, and the pricing game of the closed-loop supply chain recovery system led by the manufacturer is analyzed. In this paper, the equilibrium recovery price of the three parties of the game is obtained, and the local stability of the equilibrium solution is discussed. For the differentiated market size of different recycling manufacturers, this paper analyzes the influence of different levels of market size on the profits of all parties. 2. Based on the fact that recycling manufacturers often join services such as "consultation" and "door-to-door pick-up", on the basis of investigating the game of recovery price, this paper also considers retailers joining recycling service, thus forming a mixed game model of price and service. After calculating the equilibrium recovery price and service level, the local stability of the equilibrium solution is analyzed in this paper. For the problem of whether the recovery service can be profitable, this paper gives a detailed analysis and demonstration, and concludes that more recovery profits can be obtained by adding the recovery service. In this paper, the complex system theory is applied to the study of dynamic game of closed-loop supply chain. The process of continuously adjusting decision variables by three manufacturers can be regarded as a dynamic system. This paper expounds in detail the chaotic state of the system caused by parameters, as well as the adverse effects caused by chaotic state, such as "decision variable bifurcation", "profit time series fluctuation", "initial value sensitivity" and so on. In this paper, the chaotic state is controlled by delayed feedback control method, which is of theoretical and practical significance to the stable development of colleges and universities in the recycling market of waste products.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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