【摘要】：本文從企業(yè)利潤最大化角度出發(fā),對再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈中的收益與成本因素進行充分分析,并在政府補貼及碳稅機制的基礎上,對再制造產品市場進行細分,有針對性地在再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈中采用差別定價策略,最大化地發(fā)掘再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈的獲利能力。本文的主要研究內容如下:第一部分:針對由單一再制造商、單一零售商和單一第三方組成的再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈,基于政府碳稅及補貼機制,利用博弈論,研究了三類產品在集中決策和分散決策模式下的定價策略。研究表明:政府碳稅及補貼機制下,再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈的分散決策效率低于集中決策,因此,針對分散決策中的雙重邊際效應,設計契約機制實現(xiàn)了再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈的協(xié)調,最后,利用筆記本電腦企業(yè)算例驗證所得結論,并分析了在三種決策模式下,政府補貼力度及碳稅稅率對再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈的定價策略與利潤的影響。第二部分:在第一部分的基礎上,在分散決策下,建立了政府與再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈成員系統(tǒng)的博弈定價模型,并構建以社會福利最大化為目標的數(shù)學模型,得出了最優(yōu)補貼力度與碳稅稅率,然后通過數(shù)值仿真分析了不同廢舊品等級比例對補貼力度、碳稅稅率、廢舊品回收策略以及成員利潤的影響。第三部分:通過對消費者購買新產品、再制造品及二手品這三類異質產品的需求分析,構建了由再制造商與消費者組成的再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈,并以再制造商利潤最大化為目標得出了三類產品的定價策略,進而以筆記本電腦產品回收再制造為例進行算例分析,研究分析了消費者的購買意愿對碳稅機制的影響機理,以及廢舊品等級對補貼機制的影響機理。為再制造商實施有效的回收定價策略以及提升整個再制造供應鏈效益起著一定的指導意義。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of profit maximization, this paper fully analyzes the factors of income and cost in remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, and on the basis of government subsidy and carbon tax mechanism, subdivides the market of remanufactured products. In order to maximize the profitability of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, the differential pricing strategy is adopted in the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. The main contents of this paper are as follows: the first part: aiming at the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain composed of single remanufacturer, single retailer and single third party, based on the mechanism of government carbon tax and subsidy, using game theory. The pricing strategies of three kinds of products under centralized and decentralized decision models are studied. The research shows that the decentralized decision-making efficiency of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is lower than that of the centralized decision under the government carbon tax and subsidy mechanism. Therefore, aiming at the double marginal effect in the decentralized decision-making, the contract mechanism is designed to realize the coordination of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. Finally, the conclusion is verified by the example of notebook computer enterprise, and the influence of government subsidy and carbon tax rate on the pricing strategy and profit of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain is analyzed under three decision modes. The second part: on the basis of the first part, the game pricing model of government and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain member system is established under the decentralized decision, and the mathematical model aiming at maximizing social welfare is constructed. The optimal subsidy intensity and carbon tax rate are obtained, and then the effects of different scrap grade ratio on subsidy intensity, carbon tax rate, recycling strategy and profits of members are analyzed by numerical simulation. The third part: through the demand analysis of three kinds of heterogeneous products, which are new products, remanufactured products and second-hand products, a remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain composed of re-manufacturers and consumers is constructed. With the goal of maximizing the profit of the re-manufacturer, the pricing strategies of three kinds of products are obtained, and then the example of recycling and remanufacturing of notebook computer products is analyzed, and the influence mechanism of consumers' willingness to purchase on the carbon tax mechanism is analyzed. And the influence mechanism of waste grade on subsidy mechanism. It is of guiding significance to implement effective recycling pricing strategy for re-manufacturers and to improve the efficiency of the whole remanufacturing supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：2416845