【摘要】：隨著零售商在規(guī)模、信息獲取和貼近消費市場的優(yōu)勢地位不斷凸顯,加之信息技術(shù)的高速發(fā)展及市場環(huán)境的日益變化推動了供應鏈相關(guān)經(jīng)濟力量的巨大變革,導致市場的抗衡勢力優(yōu)勢從制造商轉(zhuǎn)向了零售商。市場勢力向下游轉(zhuǎn)移主要體現(xiàn)在出現(xiàn)了制造商主導、權(quán)力對等及零售商主導的三種不同權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)供應鏈。而零售業(yè)頻繁打折促銷活動把顧客訓練的日趨理性及戰(zhàn)略性,增大了直接面對消費者的零售商的抗衡勢力,加劇了零售商與制造商的利益沖突與渠道爭奪,使得供應鏈成員企業(yè)和整體均較難達到帕累托均衡,亟須提出新的應對決策以最大化成員企業(yè)的效益。 本文的研究考慮存在戰(zhàn)略顧客跨期購買行為的條件下,基于渠道優(yōu)勢地位由制造商向零售商轉(zhuǎn)移的動態(tài)過程,通過比較制造商主導、權(quán)力對等、零售商主導的博弈均衡以分析戰(zhàn)略顧客的延遲購買行為對供應鏈成員企業(yè)最優(yōu)決策以及供應鏈績效的影響。本論文研究結(jié)論表明：供應鏈成員企業(yè)若正視戰(zhàn)略顧客存在,制定合理的決策,能達到互利共贏的局面。不同權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)供應鏈績效的優(yōu)劣情況取決于顧客戰(zhàn)略行為程度的大小,當顧客戰(zhàn)略行為程度小于臨界值時,零售商主導下供應鏈占優(yōu),反之,制造商主導下供應鏈占優(yōu),且高比例的戰(zhàn)略顧客會持續(xù)惡化零售商主導的供應鏈績效。顧客會傾向于零售商主導的市場結(jié)構(gòu),因為該權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)的銷售價格最低,消費者更能享受到低價帶來的好處。本論文所得結(jié)論為存在戰(zhàn)略顧客的行業(yè)提供理論基礎(chǔ)與方法指導。
[Abstract]:With the retailers in the scale, access to information and close to the consumer market advantage status constantly prominent, coupled with the rapid development of information technology and the changing market environment, the supply chain related economic forces have been greatly changed. As a result, the market's competitive advantage shifted from manufacturers to retailers. The transfer of market power to downstream is mainly reflected in the emergence of three different power structure supply chains: manufacturer-led, power-equal and retailer-led. And the frequent discount promotion activities in retail industry make the training of customers more rational and strategic, increase the counterweight of retailers facing consumers directly, and aggravate the conflicts of interests between retailers and manufacturers and the competition for channels. It is difficult to achieve Pareto equilibrium for supply chain member enterprises and the whole, so it is urgent to put forward new countermeasures to maximize the benefits of member enterprises. In this paper, considering the existence of strategic customers' intertemporal purchasing behavior, based on the dynamic process of channel dominance transferring from manufacturer to retailer, the author compares manufacturers' dominance and power equivalence. The game equilibrium led by retailers is used to analyze the influence of strategic customers' delayed purchase behavior on the optimal decision and supply chain performance of supply chain member enterprises. The conclusion of this paper shows that if supply chain member enterprises face up to the existence of strategic customers and make reasonable decisions, they can achieve the situation of mutual benefit and win-win situation. The performance of supply chain with different power structure depends on the degree of customer strategic behavior. When the level of customer strategic behavior is less than the critical value, the retailer dominates the supply chain, whereas the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. And a high proportion of strategic customers will continue to deteriorate the retailer-led supply chain performance. Customers tend to prefer a retailer-dominated market structure because the power structure has the lowest sales price and consumers are more likely to enjoy the benefits of low prices. The conclusions of this paper provide theoretical basis and method guidance for industries with strategic customers.
【學位授予單位】：廈門大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：2413447