【摘要】：對于分銷鏈中處于中間位置的分銷商而言,其上游廠家和下游客戶都是實力雄厚的大企業(yè),為了合作分銷商常常要接受對自身不利的條件。例如核心企業(yè)為實現(xiàn)自己的財務(wù)經(jīng)濟(jì)性往往加快把庫存轉(zhuǎn)移給分銷商或推遲向供應(yīng)商付款,擠壓上下游資金,迫使分銷商延遲結(jié)算或高成本借款、供應(yīng)商延遲采購原材料。這對議價能力弱的小分銷商而言,在上游企業(yè)先款后貨和下游企業(yè)先貨后款的雙重壓力下,其大部分資產(chǎn)都是預(yù)付賬款、存貨和應(yīng)收賬款的形式,占用了大量流動資金,以往穩(wěn)定的模式卻帶來了企業(yè)的資金困境。分銷商若以自身的實力和信譽基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行融資不僅效率低而且成本高,其資金流動性不足勢必成為核心企業(yè)的銷售瓶頸。本文建立了核心企業(yè)及其分銷商和下游客戶組成的三級分銷鏈,通過引入供應(yīng)鏈金融,研究如何改善處于中游位置并受到上下游企業(yè)雙重資金擠壓的分銷商的現(xiàn)金流狀況。首先,從分銷鏈視角,分析應(yīng)收賬款延遲支付方式帶給分銷商的現(xiàn)金流風(fēng)險。基于現(xiàn)金循環(huán)周期理論,建立分銷商的現(xiàn)金流風(fēng)險模型。研究應(yīng)收賬款每期付款比例、現(xiàn)金折扣和貼現(xiàn)率及其變化關(guān)系對凈現(xiàn)金流入風(fēng)險的影響。其次,基于應(yīng)收賬款質(zhì)押進(jìn)行分銷鏈的融資分析。建立供應(yīng)鏈金融下的應(yīng)收賬款融資和傳統(tǒng)應(yīng)收賬款融資的博弈模型。指出供應(yīng)鏈金融思路下的應(yīng)收賬款融資更具帕累托效率。然后考慮債務(wù)人的還款意愿,根據(jù)債務(wù)人對應(yīng)收賬款的還款比例與質(zhì)押率關(guān)系,建立銀行、分銷商、零售商三方的期望收益矩陣,從銀行為代表的金融機(jī)構(gòu)和分銷鏈上的節(jié)點企業(yè)兩個角度作了深入探討。最后進(jìn)行了實例分析。論文主要研究結(jié)論有:提出企業(yè)管理應(yīng)收賬款的最優(yōu)收賬政策組合,以便減小延遲支付方式帶來的現(xiàn)金流風(fēng)險;給出銀行開展應(yīng)收賬款質(zhì)押融資業(yè)務(wù)可參照的質(zhì)押率公式。并就開展應(yīng)收賬款質(zhì)押貸款為分銷商和銀行分別提供相關(guān)建議。
[Abstract]:For the distributor in the middle position in the distribution chain, the upstream manufacturer and downstream customer are both powerful large enterprises, in order to cooperate the distributors often have to accept the unfavorable conditions to their own. For example, in order to achieve their own financial economy, core enterprises often speed up the transfer of inventory to distributors or delay payment to suppliers, squeeze upstream and downstream funds, force distributors to delay settlement or high cost loans, and suppliers delay purchasing raw materials. For small distributors with weak bargaining power, most of their assets are in the form of prepaid accounts, inventory and accounts receivable, taking up a large amount of liquid capital under the dual pressure of upstream and downstream enterprises. The past stable mode has brought the enterprise's capital predicament. If distributors rely on their own strength and credibility to finance not only low efficiency but also high cost, the lack of liquidity is bound to become the sales bottleneck of core enterprises. In this paper, a three-level distribution chain of core enterprises, their distributors and downstream customers is established. By introducing supply chain finance, this paper studies how to improve the cash flow of distributors who are in the middle position and are squeezed by the double capital of upstream and downstream enterprises. First of all, from the perspective of distribution chain, the paper analyzes the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment of accounts receivable to distributors. Based on the cash cycle theory, the cash flow risk model of distributors is established. This paper studies the effect of payment ratio of accounts receivable, discount rate and discount rate on net cash inflow risk. Secondly, the financing analysis of distribution chain based on the pledge of accounts receivable. The game model of accounts receivable financing and traditional accounts receivable financing under supply chain finance is established. It is pointed out that the accounts receivable financing in supply chain finance is more efficient than Pareto. Then considering the debtor's willingness to repay, according to the relationship between the debtor's repayment ratio and the pledge rate, the expected income matrix of banks, distributors and retailers is established. This paper probes into the financial institutions represented by the banks and the nodal enterprises in the distribution chain from two angles: one is the bank and the other is the node enterprise in the distribution chain. Finally, an example is given. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: the optimal collection policy combination of enterprise management accounts receivable is put forward in order to reduce the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment, and the pledge rate formula for banks to carry out accounts receivable pledge financing is given. And the development of accounts receivable pledge loans for distributors and banks to provide relevant advice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F832.4

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本文編號：2411224