基于供應鏈金融的分銷鏈融資研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-19 09:20
【摘要】：對于分銷鏈中處于中間位置的分銷商而言,其上游廠家和下游客戶都是實力雄厚的大企業(yè),為了合作分銷商常常要接受對自身不利的條件。例如核心企業(yè)為實現自己的財務經濟性往往加快把庫存轉移給分銷商或推遲向供應商付款,擠壓上下游資金,迫使分銷商延遲結算或高成本借款、供應商延遲采購原材料。這對議價能力弱的小分銷商而言,在上游企業(yè)先款后貨和下游企業(yè)先貨后款的雙重壓力下,其大部分資產都是預付賬款、存貨和應收賬款的形式,占用了大量流動資金,以往穩(wěn)定的模式卻帶來了企業(yè)的資金困境。分銷商若以自身的實力和信譽基礎進行融資不僅效率低而且成本高,其資金流動性不足勢必成為核心企業(yè)的銷售瓶頸。本文建立了核心企業(yè)及其分銷商和下游客戶組成的三級分銷鏈,通過引入供應鏈金融,研究如何改善處于中游位置并受到上下游企業(yè)雙重資金擠壓的分銷商的現金流狀況。首先,從分銷鏈視角,分析應收賬款延遲支付方式帶給分銷商的現金流風險�；诂F金循環(huán)周期理論,建立分銷商的現金流風險模型。研究應收賬款每期付款比例、現金折扣和貼現率及其變化關系對凈現金流入風險的影響。其次,基于應收賬款質押進行分銷鏈的融資分析。建立供應鏈金融下的應收賬款融資和傳統(tǒng)應收賬款融資的博弈模型。指出供應鏈金融思路下的應收賬款融資更具帕累托效率。然后考慮債務人的還款意愿,根據債務人對應收賬款的還款比例與質押率關系,建立銀行、分銷商、零售商三方的期望收益矩陣,從銀行為代表的金融機構和分銷鏈上的節(jié)點企業(yè)兩個角度作了深入探討。最后進行了實例分析。論文主要研究結論有:提出企業(yè)管理應收賬款的最優(yōu)收賬政策組合,以便減小延遲支付方式帶來的現金流風險;給出銀行開展應收賬款質押融資業(yè)務可參照的質押率公式。并就開展應收賬款質押貸款為分銷商和銀行分別提供相關建議。
[Abstract]:For the distributor in the middle position in the distribution chain, the upstream manufacturer and downstream customer are both powerful large enterprises, in order to cooperate the distributors often have to accept the unfavorable conditions to their own. For example, in order to achieve their own financial economy, core enterprises often speed up the transfer of inventory to distributors or delay payment to suppliers, squeeze upstream and downstream funds, force distributors to delay settlement or high cost loans, and suppliers delay purchasing raw materials. For small distributors with weak bargaining power, most of their assets are in the form of prepaid accounts, inventory and accounts receivable, taking up a large amount of liquid capital under the dual pressure of upstream and downstream enterprises. The past stable mode has brought the enterprise's capital predicament. If distributors rely on their own strength and credibility to finance not only low efficiency but also high cost, the lack of liquidity is bound to become the sales bottleneck of core enterprises. In this paper, a three-level distribution chain of core enterprises, their distributors and downstream customers is established. By introducing supply chain finance, this paper studies how to improve the cash flow of distributors who are in the middle position and are squeezed by the double capital of upstream and downstream enterprises. First of all, from the perspective of distribution chain, the paper analyzes the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment of accounts receivable to distributors. Based on the cash cycle theory, the cash flow risk model of distributors is established. This paper studies the effect of payment ratio of accounts receivable, discount rate and discount rate on net cash inflow risk. Secondly, the financing analysis of distribution chain based on the pledge of accounts receivable. The game model of accounts receivable financing and traditional accounts receivable financing under supply chain finance is established. It is pointed out that the accounts receivable financing in supply chain finance is more efficient than Pareto. Then considering the debtor's willingness to repay, according to the relationship between the debtor's repayment ratio and the pledge rate, the expected income matrix of banks, distributors and retailers is established. This paper probes into the financial institutions represented by the banks and the nodal enterprises in the distribution chain from two angles: one is the bank and the other is the node enterprise in the distribution chain. Finally, an example is given. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: the optimal collection policy combination of enterprise management accounts receivable is put forward in order to reduce the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment, and the pledge rate formula for banks to carry out accounts receivable pledge financing is given. And the development of accounts receivable pledge loans for distributors and banks to provide relevant advice.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F832.4
本文編號：2411224
[Abstract]:For the distributor in the middle position in the distribution chain, the upstream manufacturer and downstream customer are both powerful large enterprises, in order to cooperate the distributors often have to accept the unfavorable conditions to their own. For example, in order to achieve their own financial economy, core enterprises often speed up the transfer of inventory to distributors or delay payment to suppliers, squeeze upstream and downstream funds, force distributors to delay settlement or high cost loans, and suppliers delay purchasing raw materials. For small distributors with weak bargaining power, most of their assets are in the form of prepaid accounts, inventory and accounts receivable, taking up a large amount of liquid capital under the dual pressure of upstream and downstream enterprises. The past stable mode has brought the enterprise's capital predicament. If distributors rely on their own strength and credibility to finance not only low efficiency but also high cost, the lack of liquidity is bound to become the sales bottleneck of core enterprises. In this paper, a three-level distribution chain of core enterprises, their distributors and downstream customers is established. By introducing supply chain finance, this paper studies how to improve the cash flow of distributors who are in the middle position and are squeezed by the double capital of upstream and downstream enterprises. First of all, from the perspective of distribution chain, the paper analyzes the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment of accounts receivable to distributors. Based on the cash cycle theory, the cash flow risk model of distributors is established. This paper studies the effect of payment ratio of accounts receivable, discount rate and discount rate on net cash inflow risk. Secondly, the financing analysis of distribution chain based on the pledge of accounts receivable. The game model of accounts receivable financing and traditional accounts receivable financing under supply chain finance is established. It is pointed out that the accounts receivable financing in supply chain finance is more efficient than Pareto. Then considering the debtor's willingness to repay, according to the relationship between the debtor's repayment ratio and the pledge rate, the expected income matrix of banks, distributors and retailers is established. This paper probes into the financial institutions represented by the banks and the nodal enterprises in the distribution chain from two angles: one is the bank and the other is the node enterprise in the distribution chain. Finally, an example is given. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: the optimal collection policy combination of enterprise management accounts receivable is put forward in order to reduce the cash flow risk brought by delayed payment, and the pledge rate formula for banks to carry out accounts receivable pledge financing is given. And the development of accounts receivable pledge loans for distributors and banks to provide relevant advice.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F832.4
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