【摘要】：時(shí)代在發(fā)展,科技在進(jìn)步,電子產(chǎn)品已經(jīng)成為生活中必不可少的一部分,它們的出現(xiàn)為生活帶來了很多便利。人們對產(chǎn)品性能需求的多樣化,加快了電子產(chǎn)品的研發(fā)速度,同時(shí)也帶來了大量廢棄電子產(chǎn)品。大量的“電子垃圾”,會(huì)給人類賴以生存的環(huán)境造成污染,若進(jìn)行回收再利用,就可減少污染,并能高效的利用這些資源。制造企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)制造產(chǎn)品的同時(shí),若對廢棄電子產(chǎn)品積極回收并加以利用,不但能夠降低制造成本,還能為企業(yè)進(jìn)行品牌宣傳,提高知名度。因此,本文將廢棄電子產(chǎn)品引入到閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中并進(jìn)行相關(guān)的研究具有重要的意義。本文基于私人信息維度的差異,對擁有多銷售或多回收渠道的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈決策模型進(jìn)行研究,構(gòu)建了三種模型:制造商與零售商共同銷售,并委托回收商進(jìn)行回收;制造商與回收商共同回收,并委托零售商進(jìn)行銷售;制造商與零售商、回收商三者共同回收,并委托零售商進(jìn)行銷售�；厥丈袒蛄闶凵探邮芪�,作為代理人,擁有私人信息,包括回收(銷售)能力信息和回收(銷售)努力程度信息。委托人制造商作為信息劣勢方,根據(jù)委托代理理論和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論等方式,設(shè)計(jì)契約促使代理方如實(shí)匯報(bào)自己的能力信息,并激勵(lì)其付出最大的努力程度。本文針對每個(gè)模型,分別考慮了代理人的努力程度信息單一不對稱和代理人的能力信息和努力程度信息雙重不對稱兩種情形。根據(jù)不同的情形建立相應(yīng)的模型,求解分析并進(jìn)行仿真,對不同的結(jié)果和參數(shù)進(jìn)行分析。通過比較和分析決策結(jié)果后總結(jié)出以下結(jié)論:隨著信息不對稱維度的增加,委托人制造商獲得的期望利潤降低,具備高能力的代理商能夠付出的努力水平不變,獲得的單位報(bào)酬不變,期望利潤增加,而能力為低類型的代理商付出的努力程度降低,得到的單位報(bào)酬降低,得到的期望利潤不變;隨著閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中回收渠道的增多,回收總量增大,回收商可得到的期望利潤降低,制造商可得到的期望利潤增加;隨著大眾環(huán)保意識(shí)的增強(qiáng),回收數(shù)量增多,制造商獲得的期望利潤增大;隨著市場中高能力代理商的增多,高能力者獲得的利潤呈現(xiàn)遞減的趨勢,低能力者獲得的利潤為保留收益,制造商獲得的利潤增加。因此,委托人制造商設(shè)計(jì)契約甄別代理商的信息能夠增加委托人的收益,渠道的增多同樣能提高制造商的利潤,兩種方式在不同的角度提高了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤。
[Abstract]:With the development of the times and the progress of science and technology, electronic products have become an indispensable part of life, and their appearance has brought a lot of convenience to life. The diversification of demand for product performance speeds up the research and development of electronic products, but also brings a large number of abandoned electronic products. A large amount of "electronic waste" will cause pollution to the environment on which human beings rely for survival. If recycling is carried out, pollution can be reduced and these resources can be used efficiently. When manufacturing enterprises produce and manufacture products, if waste electronic products are recovered and utilized actively, it can not only reduce the cost of manufacturing, but also promote the brand and raise the visibility for the enterprises. Therefore, it is of great significance to introduce abandoned electronic products into closed-loop supply chain. Based on the difference of private information dimension, this paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision model with multiple sales or multiple recovery channels, and constructs three models: manufacturer and retailer sell together and entrust recycler to recycle; Manufacturers and recyclers reclaim together and entrust retailers to sell; manufacturers, retailers and recyclers reclaim together and entrust retailers to sell. A recycler or retailer is entrusted to act as an agent and has private information, including recovery (sales) capability information and recovery (sales) effort information. The principal manufacturer, as the information inferior party, according to the principal-agent theory and the mechanism design theory, designs the contract to urge the agent to report his ability information truthfully, and to encourage him to pay the best effort. In this paper, for each model, we consider the single asymmetry of agent's effort degree information and the double asymmetry of agent's ability information and effort degree information. According to different cases, the corresponding model is established, the solution is analyzed and simulated, and the different results and parameters are analyzed. After comparing and analyzing the decision results, the following conclusions are concluded: with the increase of information asymmetry dimension, the expected profit of the principal manufacturer decreases, and the level of effort that the agent with high capability can pay remains unchanged. The unit reward obtained is constant, the expected profit increases, while the ability to pay for the low type of agent is reduced, the unit reward is reduced, and the expected profit is not changed; With the increase of recovery channels in closed-loop supply chain, the total amount of recovery increases, the expected profit of recycler decreases, and the expected profit of manufacturer increases. As the public awareness of environmental protection increases, the amount of recycling increases, and the expected profits of manufacturers increase; With the increase of the high capacity agents in the market, the profit of the high ability person is decreasing, the profit of the low ability person is the reserved profit, and the profit of the manufacturer is increasing. Therefore, the information of client manufacturer designing contract screening agent can increase the profit of client, the increase of channels can also increase the profit of manufacturer, and the profit of closed-loop supply chain can be improved by two different ways.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：2400035