【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化、信息化的不斷發(fā)展，市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模式由傳統(tǒng)的企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)化為供應(yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間整體實(shí)力的對(duì)抗。企業(yè)僅依靠自身的能力已經(jīng)很難在市場(chǎng)中占有一席之地，企業(yè)必須與上下游企業(yè)形成聯(lián)盟，組成一個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)來(lái)共同面對(duì)復(fù)雜的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)并實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)市場(chǎng)需求快速響應(yīng)，實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的整體效應(yīng)最大化，從而使供應(yīng)鏈的各企業(yè)達(dá)到共贏的局面。由此可以說(shuō)明，，供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)同在供應(yīng)鏈管理中起著關(guān)鍵性的作用。本文以一個(gè)二階供應(yīng)鏈為基礎(chǔ)，研究了供應(yīng)鏈顯性契約和隱性契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同的影響。文章首先介紹了研究的背景、意義，綜述了當(dāng)前的研究現(xiàn)狀，并概述了本文內(nèi)容所涉及到的相關(guān)概念，為后文關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同的研究做了理論鋪墊。文章對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同主要進(jìn)行了以下三個(gè)方面的研究。 （1）以一個(gè)二階供應(yīng)鏈為基礎(chǔ)，求得供應(yīng)商和銷(xiāo)售商各自的收益函數(shù)，并根據(jù)收益函數(shù)和供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)Ｓ嗬碚搶?duì)回購(gòu)契約、收益共享契約兩種契約進(jìn)行了價(jià)值分析。得出結(jié)論為回購(gòu)契約、收益共享契約可以達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)同。 （2）研究了供應(yīng)鏈關(guān)系和隱性契約之間的聯(lián)系，通過(guò)關(guān)系資本來(lái)度量隱性契約的實(shí)現(xiàn)，并以此為基礎(chǔ)構(gòu)建了一個(gè)影響關(guān)系資本因素的供應(yīng)鏈隱性契約博弈模型，對(duì)所建立的博弈模型進(jìn)行了企業(yè)間關(guān)系決策博弈分析。最后基于隱性契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同進(jìn)行了價(jià)值分析，得出隱性契約對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)同主要體現(xiàn)在促進(jìn)長(zhǎng)期合作、降低運(yùn)作成本、知識(shí)共享和解決供應(yīng)鏈上各成員企業(yè)的沖突四個(gè)方面。 （3）構(gòu)建了一個(gè)基于顯隱性契約的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同進(jìn)化博弈模型，運(yùn)用進(jìn)化博弈理論分析了顯隱性契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同的影響。說(shuō)明了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)合作過(guò)程中，必須同時(shí)發(fā)揮顯性契約和隱性契約的共同作用，只有當(dāng)兩者實(shí)現(xiàn)某種程度的有機(jī)結(jié)合時(shí)，供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間的這種契約關(guān)系才會(huì)獲得長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展，有效的促進(jìn)了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)間的協(xié)同，使得供應(yīng)鏈上各節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)共贏和供應(yīng)鏈整體效益最大化。 最后概括了文中的主要結(jié)論，并對(duì)本文的課題研究作了進(jìn)一步的展望。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization and information technology, the mode of market competition has changed from the traditional competition between enterprises to the confrontation between supply chain and supply chain. It is very difficult for enterprises to have a place in the market only by their own ability. Enterprises must form an alliance with upstream and downstream enterprises to form a supply chain system to face the complex market competition and realize the rapid response to the market demand. The overall effect of the supply chain is maximized, so that the enterprises in the supply chain can achieve a win-win situation. Therefore, the coordination of supply chain plays a key role in supply chain management. Based on a second order supply chain, this paper studies the effects of the dominant contract and the implicit contract on the supply chain coordination. This paper first introduces the background and significance of the research, summarizes the current research situation, and summarizes the related concepts involved in the content of this paper, which provides a theoretical basis for the later research on supply chain collaboration. In this paper, supply chain collaboration is studied in the following three aspects. The main contents are as follows: (1) based on a second-order supply chain, the profit functions of suppliers and sellers are obtained, and the value analysis of repurchase contracts and revenue-sharing contracts is carried out according to the income function and supply chain surplus theory. The conclusion is that the repurchase contract can achieve the coordination of the supply chain. (2) this paper studies the relationship between supply chain relationship and recessive contract, measures the realization of recessive contract through relational capital, and constructs a game model of supply chain recessive contract which affects the factors of relational capital. The game model is analyzed. Finally, based on the value analysis of supply chain collaboration based on implicit contract, it is concluded that implicit contract is mainly reflected in promoting long-term cooperation and reducing operating costs. Knowledge sharing and resolving the conflicts of member enterprises in supply chain. (3) A cooperative evolutionary game model of supply chain based on explicit implicit contract is constructed, and the influence of explicit implicit contract on supply chain coordination is analyzed by evolutionary game theory. It shows that in the process of cooperation of supply chain enterprises, both explicit contract and implicit contract must be brought into play, only when the two achieve a certain degree of organic combination, Only this kind of contract relationship between supply chain enterprises can obtain long-term stable development, effectively promote the cooperation between supply chain enterprises, make the enterprises in the supply chain realize win-win and maximize the overall benefit of the supply chain. Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are summarized, and the future research of this paper is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津職業(yè)技術(shù)師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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