【摘要】：能力分配決策是供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略中最重要的決策之一。面對(duì)多個(gè)物流服務(wù)提供商時(shí)，物流服務(wù)集成商如何進(jìn)行需求訂單任務(wù)的合理分配是保證物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定運(yùn)作的關(guān)鍵。目前對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配的研究主要集中在產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈，對(duì)服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的研究較少，而且在任務(wù)分配模型構(gòu)建的過程中，僅僅考慮時(shí)間、成本等目標(biāo)。特別是在以往的供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配研究中，參與任務(wù)分配的企業(yè)往往都是被動(dòng)地接受訂單。但是在實(shí)際的訂單分配中，參與企業(yè)具有戰(zhàn)略行為，他們會(huì)從自身的利潤、滿意度等角度出發(fā)，以決定是否參與任務(wù)分配。而這種行為對(duì)任務(wù)分配結(jié)果具有重要影響。因此，本文以物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈為研究背景，將行為運(yùn)營理論運(yùn)用到供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配中，在任務(wù)分配過程中考慮提供商的各種戰(zhàn)略行為，基于理性預(yù)期均衡理論，以集成商總成本、提供商滿意度、能力匹配程度為目標(biāo)函數(shù)，構(gòu)建物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配模型，為物流企業(yè)在實(shí)際的物流實(shí)踐運(yùn)營中制定科學(xué)的決策提供必要的理論參考依據(jù)。 本文首先給出了研究背景和研究現(xiàn)狀，分析了物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)理論的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀，之后梳理了供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配、理性預(yù)期均衡、供應(yīng)商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等方面的理論成果，對(duì)現(xiàn)有參考文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行總結(jié)，指出其研究的不足之處，為全文的研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。之后，本文從任務(wù)分配參與者的戰(zhàn)略行為出發(fā)，進(jìn)行了四個(gè)方面的研究，分別是：（1）論文首先在物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈任務(wù)分配中考慮提供商的預(yù)估行為，將這種行為用數(shù)學(xué)語言在模型中進(jìn)行體現(xiàn)，并分析了不確定程度、預(yù)期折扣系數(shù)、提供商商譽(yù)等因素對(duì)分配結(jié)果的影響。（2）論文在之前研究的基礎(chǔ)上，進(jìn)一步考慮競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境下任務(wù)分配模型的構(gòu)建，并通過數(shù)值分析探究了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈程度、增加不同類型提供商對(duì)任務(wù)分配的影響規(guī)律。（3）論文在預(yù)估行為存在的情況下，又引入提供商報(bào)價(jià)博弈這一行為，并假設(shè)集成商以提供商的報(bào)價(jià)為依據(jù)進(jìn)行任務(wù)分配，構(gòu)建了多目標(biāo)動(dòng)態(tài)規(guī)劃模型。通過數(shù)值分析，比較了四種不同情況下（考慮預(yù)估行為、考慮報(bào)價(jià)博弈、既考慮預(yù)估行為又考慮報(bào)價(jià)博弈、都不考慮）任務(wù)分配的變化，更加深入地揭示了預(yù)估行為和報(bào)價(jià)博弈的作用。（4）論文研究了當(dāng)集成商自身具有提供物流服務(wù)能力時(shí)，，任務(wù)分配模型的變化，并研究了集成商自有服務(wù)能力的數(shù)量和價(jià)格對(duì)任務(wù)分配的影響，為集成商更好地管理物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈提出建議。最后，本文給出了研究結(jié)論和未來展望。
[Abstract]:Ability allocation decision is one of the most important decisions in supply chain strategy. In the face of multiple logistics service providers, it is the key to ensure the long-term stable operation of the logistics service supply chain that how the logistics service integrators carry out the reasonable assignment of demand order tasks. At present, the research on task allocation of supply chain is mainly focused on product supply chain, but less on service supply chain. In the process of constructing task assignment model, only time, cost and other objectives are considered. Especially in the previous research of supply chain task assignment, enterprises involved in task assignment often passively accept orders. However, in the actual order allocation, the participating enterprises have strategic behavior, they will start from their own profit, satisfaction and other aspects to decide whether to participate in task allocation. This behavior has an important impact on the outcome of task allocation. Therefore, this paper takes logistics service supply chain as the research background, applies the behavior operation theory to the supply chain task allocation, considers various strategic behaviors of the provider in the task assignment process, based on the rational expectation equilibrium theory. Taking the total cost of the integrator, the satisfaction degree of the provider and the ability matching degree as the objective function, the task assignment model of the logistics service supply chain is constructed. It provides the necessary theoretical reference for logistics enterprises to make scientific decision in the actual logistics practice operation. This paper first gives the research background and research status, analyzes the development of logistics service supply chain theory, then combs the supply chain task allocation, rational expectation equilibrium, supplier competition and other theoretical results. This paper summarizes the existing references, points out the shortcomings of the research, and lays a theoretical foundation for the full study. Then, from the strategic behavior of task allocation participants, this paper studies four aspects: (1) in the first part of the thesis, we consider the expected behavior of providers in the task allocation of logistics service supply chain. This behavior is represented by mathematical language in the model, and the influence of uncertainty, expected discount coefficient and provider goodwill on the distribution results is analyzed. (2) based on the previous research, the paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty, expected discount coefficient, and provider goodwill on the distribution results. (2) on the basis of previous studies, Further consider the construction of task assignment model in competitive environment, and through numerical analysis to explore the intensity of competition, increase the impact of different types of providers on task allocation. (3) in the case of prediction behavior, Furthermore, the behavior of provider bidding game is introduced, and the multi-objective dynamic programming model is constructed on the assumption that the integrator allocates tasks based on the provider's quotation. Through numerical analysis, we compare the changes of task allocation in four different situations (considering the behavior of prediction, considering the game of quotation, considering both the behavior of estimate and the game of quotation, all of which do not take into account). (4) this paper studies the change of task allocation model when the integrator has the ability to provide logistics services. The influence of the quantity and price of the integrator's own service capacity on the task assignment is studied, and some suggestions are put forward for the integrator to manage the logistics service supply chain better. Finally, the conclusion and future prospect are given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F259.2;F274

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本文編號(hào)：2377302