發(fā)布時間：2018-12-08 14:20

【摘要】：如今,經(jīng)濟全球化的快速發(fā)展,越來越多企業(yè)通過擴大生產(chǎn)規(guī)模,擴寬銷售渠道,加大對技術投入等手段來搶占市場份額。但從企業(yè)自身來看,這一系列措施都需要大量資金投入,一旦出現(xiàn)資金鏈斷鏈,就會對整個供應鏈的穩(wěn)定性造成影響。目前,針對制造商資金不足的情況,主要有兩種解決途徑:一是下游零售商向制造商預付部分或全部貨款融資;二是通過金融機構或互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融提供的借貸融資。在只考慮制造商和零售商組成的兩級供應鏈中,制造商為核心企業(yè)且因搶占市場份額存在資金約束,導致無法生產(chǎn)出最優(yōu)訂貨量。在此背景下,本文充分考慮在基本供應鏈模型基礎上,根據(jù)供應鏈利潤最大化建立了目標利潤函數(shù),運用Stackelberg博弈模型,發(fā)現(xiàn)當制造商資金不足時,會造成下游供貨鏈斷裂,影響供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)。于是,從兩種不同渠道融資補償模式進行分析:一是向零售商融資,即通過給予零售商相應批發(fā)價折扣,以及分擔因市場隨機需求不確定性帶來的損失,補償零售商放棄市場投資的回報。二是借助P2P借貸平臺融資,及通過給予P2P借貸平臺融資利率以及分擔因平臺貸款所帶來的風險損失,作為補償P2P借貸平臺貸款的回報。首先,在零售商融資補償模式下,主要是在基本供應鏈模型上,考慮損失分擔比以及批發(fā)價折扣補償兩個參數(shù),通過研究這兩個參數(shù)之間的關系,做出最優(yōu)決策。研究表明,當兩個參數(shù)之間滿足某種關系時,制造商能夠有充足的資金保證生產(chǎn),供應鏈達到協(xié)調(diào),利潤達到帕累托最優(yōu)。其次,在P2P借貸平臺融資模式下,在無擔保無抵押的P2P借貸平臺融資中,先引入制造商違約率、貸款損失率以及融資利率三個參數(shù),構建P2P借貸平臺融資決策模型,在根據(jù)違約率考慮制造商承擔貸款風險損失比補償參數(shù),進一步優(yōu)化模型。研究表明,當參數(shù)之間滿足某種關系時,制造商資金問題得到解決,供應鏈達到協(xié)調(diào)。然后,通過對比分析兩種融資補償模式發(fā)現(xiàn),都能實現(xiàn)供應鏈協(xié)調(diào),但融資模式選擇主要取決于零售商融資補償中損失分擔比和P2P借貸平臺貸款風險損失率。最后,通過算例對文章中的兩種融資契約參數(shù)模型進行了驗證,并分析了對供應鏈各成員利潤的影響。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, with the rapid development of economic globalization, more and more enterprises seize market share by expanding production scale, broadening sales channels and increasing investment in technology. However, from the point of view of the enterprise itself, this series of measures need a large amount of capital investment, once the chain of funds broken, it will affect the stability of the entire supply chain. At present, there are mainly two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of capital for manufacturers: first, the downstream retailers provide partial or full loan financing to the manufacturers; the other is the loan financing provided by financial institutions or Internet finance. In a two-tier supply chain consisting only of manufacturer and retailer, the manufacturer is the core enterprise and has financial constraints because of preemption of market share, which leads to the inability to produce the optimal order quantity. Under this background, based on the basic supply chain model, the objective profit function is established according to the profit maximization of the supply chain, and the Stackelberg game model is used to find that when the manufacturer is short of funds, the downstream supply chain will break. Affect supply chain coordination. Therefore, this paper analyzes two different ways of financing compensation: one is financing to retailers, that is, by giving retailers corresponding wholesale price discounts, and sharing the losses caused by the uncertainty of random demand in the market. Compensate retailers for giving up market investments. The other is to make use of P2P lending platform to raise funds, and to compensate P2P loan platform by giving P2P loan interest rate and sharing the risk loss caused by the loan. First of all, in the retail financing compensation model, mainly in the basic supply chain model, considering the loss sharing ratio and wholesale discount compensation two parameters, through the study of the relationship between the two parameters to make the optimal decision. The results show that when the relationship between the two parameters is satisfied, the manufacturer can have sufficient funds to ensure production, supply chain coordination, and profit to Pareto optimal. Secondly, in the P2P lending platform financing mode, in the unsecured and unsecured P2P lending platform financing, the manufacturer default rate, loan loss rate and financing interest rate are first introduced to construct the P2P lending platform financing decision-making model. According to the default rate, the risk loss ratio compensation parameter is considered, and the model is further optimized. The results show that when the parameters satisfy a certain relationship, the manufacturer's capital problem is solved and the supply chain is coordinated. Then, through the comparative analysis of the two financing compensation models, it is found that both can achieve supply chain coordination, but the choice of financing model mainly depends on the loss sharing ratio in the financing compensation of retailers and the loan risk loss rate of P2P lending platform. Finally, the two financing contract parameter models in this paper are verified by an example, and the influence on the profit of each member of the supply chain is analyzed.
【學位授予單位】：重慶交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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4 周婧s，

本文編號：2368505