【摘要】：分散式供應(yīng)鏈下各成員企業(yè)常常以自身利益最大化為目標(biāo)進(jìn)行決策,從而導(dǎo)致整條供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效不能夠達(dá)到集中式供應(yīng)鏈下的最優(yōu)狀態(tài)。為消除“雙重邊際化效應(yīng)”,供應(yīng)鏈主導(dǎo)企業(yè)可能會(huì)選擇供應(yīng)鏈契約來協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈各成員的行為。因此,對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)的研究具有重要的意義。本文針對(duì)由單一制造商和單一零售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,研究了含有兩類產(chǎn)品情形的供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)問題。其中,兩類產(chǎn)品是指銷售期末零售商期望剩余產(chǎn)品和顧客無缺陷退貨產(chǎn)品。本文的主要研究工作如下。(1)在顧客無缺陷退貨率為外生給定、市場(chǎng)需求具有隨機(jī)性且需求依賴于零售價(jià)格的條件下,考慮零售商對(duì)顧客無缺陷退貨產(chǎn)品需付出一定的處理成本、零售商承擔(dān)缺貨損失,銷售期結(jié)束后兩類產(chǎn)品殘值不同；制造商提供退貨政策時(shí),其對(duì)兩類產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行差別回購(gòu)且對(duì)顧客無缺陷退貨產(chǎn)品也需付出處理成本等因素。通過引入擴(kuò)展的報(bào)童模型,采用Stackelberg博弈方法,探討了制造商提供退貨政策下的差別回購(gòu)契約和基于回饋與懲罰策略的差別回購(gòu)契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的有效性問題。最后,給出數(shù)值算例并對(duì)相關(guān)參數(shù)進(jìn)行靈敏度分析。研究表明：與集中式供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)決策相比,基于回饋與懲罰策略的差別回購(gòu)契約能夠協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈；與批發(fā)價(jià)格契約相比,該聯(lián)合契約能夠降低產(chǎn)品零售價(jià)格,增加產(chǎn)品訂購(gòu)量和供應(yīng)鏈總利潤(rùn)。(2)在上述研究的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步考慮加入零售商提供銷售努力水平這一因素,零售商的銷售努力水平影響顧客無缺陷退貨率,市場(chǎng)需求具有隨機(jī)性且需求同時(shí)依賴于零售價(jià)格和零售商的銷售努力水平。文章同樣探討了上述契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的有效性問題,并給出數(shù)值算例及相關(guān)參數(shù)的靈敏度分析。研究表明：與集中式供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)決策相比,只有基于回饋與懲罰策略的差別回購(gòu)契約能夠協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈；與批發(fā)價(jià)格契約相比,該聯(lián)合契約能夠降低產(chǎn)品零售價(jià)格,提高零售商銷售努力水平,增加產(chǎn)品訂購(gòu)量和供應(yīng)鏈總利潤(rùn)。
[Abstract]:In decentralized supply chain, each member enterprise often makes decision with the goal of maximizing its own interests, which results in the performance of the whole supply chain being unable to reach the optimal state under the centralized supply chain. In order to eliminate the "double marginalization effect", supply chain leading enterprises may choose supply chain contract to coordinate the behavior of supply chain members. Therefore, the study of supply chain contract coordination is of great significance. In this paper, a supply chain contract coordination problem with two types of products is studied for a two-stage supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Among them, two kinds of products refer to the end-of-sale retailers expect surplus products and customer-free return products. The main research work of this paper is as follows: (1) under the condition that the customer's no-defect return rate is exogenous, the market demand is random and the demand depends on the retail price, the retailer has to pay a certain amount of processing cost to the customer's non-defective return product. The retailer bears the loss of stock and the residual value of the two kinds of products is different after the end of the sales period. When the manufacturer provides the return policy, he has to pay the cost of handling the two kinds of products. By introducing the extended newsboy model and using the Stackelberg game method, this paper discusses the effectiveness of the differential repurchase contract under the manufacturer's return policy and the differential repurchase contract based on the feedback and punishment strategy. Finally, a numerical example is given and sensitivity analysis of related parameters is carried out. The results show that: compared with the centralized supply chain optimal decision, the differentiated repurchase contract based on feedback and punishment strategy can coordinate the supply chain, and compared with the wholesale price contract, the combined contract can reduce the retail price of the product. (2) on the basis of the above research, further consideration is given to adding the retailer's level of sales effort, which affects the customer's rate of non-defective return, and increases the quantity of products ordered and the total profit of the supply chain. (2) on the basis of the above research, we further consider the factor of adding retailers' level of sales effort. Market demand is random and demand depends on both retail price and retailer's sales effort. This paper also discusses the effectiveness of the above contract for supply chain coordination, and gives a numerical example and sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The research shows that compared with centralized supply chain optimal decision, only the differentiated repurchase contract based on feedback and punishment strategy can coordinate the supply chain, and compared with the wholesale price contract, the combined contract can reduce the retail price of the product. Improve the retailers'sales efforts, increase the quantity of products ordered and the total profit of the supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：2164994