基于合作博弈的供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間利益分配的研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-01 09:22
【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟和科技的迅速發(fā)展，企業(yè)要想進一步的發(fā)展，就必須擁有更多的資源、更強的競爭力，但是僅僅憑企業(yè)的一己之力是很難實現(xiàn)這個目標的，因此，現(xiàn)在的企業(yè)都越來越注重合作，接踵而來的是企業(yè)之間相互合作，形成供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟。但是隨著越來越多的供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟的悄然興起，又存在著許多問題困擾著供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟。企業(yè)之間相互合作，形成聯(lián)盟，能夠降低生產(chǎn)成本，提高運作的效率，創(chuàng)造更多的利潤。而對于創(chuàng)造的利潤，只有公平、合理的分配才能保證供應(yīng)鏈運作的高效，形成一個良性循環(huán)，從而為合作聯(lián)盟創(chuàng)造更多的利潤。 本文的主題就是用合作博弈理論解決合作企業(yè)聯(lián)盟的利益分配問題，主要做了以下工作： 首先對供應(yīng)鏈理論以及企業(yè)利益合作理論進行了一定的闡述，介紹了企業(yè)必須按照一定的原則對收益進行分配，還對風險決策和合作博弈的基本概念以及相關(guān)內(nèi)容進行了一定的了解。 然后，本文介紹了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間的合作博弈，并分析了影響整個供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟利益的因素，以及利益分配的特點、方法，并對一些方法的不足之處進行概括，引出利用合作博弈理論對聯(lián)盟利益進行分配，分析了合作博弈Shapley值法的優(yōu)點以及存在的不足之處。正因為Shapley值法存在的問題，，考慮了包含影響利益因素的改進的Shapley值模型，并提出了一些方法計算這些影響因素的系數(shù)。 再次，建立了一個風險決策模型，對模型進行求解，得到每個企業(yè)的收益作為聯(lián)盟博弈的特征函數(shù)，然后運用Shapley值法對利益進行分配，得到各個企業(yè)的一個利益分配，再計算出各種影響利益的因素的系數(shù)，考慮其對Shapley模型的影響，并進行模型求解。 最后，文章對所有情況下企業(yè)分配到的利益進行比較，分析其原因。并對全文所做的工作進行總結(jié)和概括，找出存在的不足之處，分析其出現(xiàn)的原因，提出未來的展望。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and science and technology, enterprises must have more resources and stronger competitiveness if they want to further develop. However, it is very difficult to achieve this goal on their own. Nowadays, enterprises pay more and more attention to cooperation, and then they cooperate with each other to form supply chain alliance. But with more and more supply chain alliance rising quietly, there are many problems puzzling supply chain alliance. Cooperation and alliance between enterprises can reduce production cost, improve operation efficiency and create more profits. For the profit created, only fair and reasonable distribution can guarantee the efficiency of the supply chain operation and form a virtuous circle, thus creating more profits for the cooperative alliance. The theme of this paper is to use cooperative game theory to solve the benefit distribution problem of cooperative enterprise alliance. The main work is as follows: firstly, the supply chain theory and enterprise benefit cooperation theory are expounded. This paper introduces that enterprises must distribute the income according to certain principles, and also has a certain understanding of the basic concepts and related contents of risk decision and cooperative game. Then, this paper introduces the cooperative game between supply chain enterprises, and analyzes the factors that affect the benefit of the whole supply chain alliance, as well as the characteristics and methods of benefit distribution, and summarizes the shortcomings of some methods. The advantages and disadvantages of the cooperative game Shapley value method are analyzed by using the cooperative game theory to distribute the benefits of the alliance. Because of the problem of Shapley value method, the improved Shapley value model which includes the factors affecting interests is considered, and some methods are proposed to calculate the coefficients of these factors. Thirdly, we establish a risk decision model, solve the model, get the income of each enterprise as the characteristic function of the alliance game, then use the Shapley value method to distribute the benefit, and get a benefit distribution of each enterprise. The coefficients of various factors affecting interest are calculated, and the influence of the factors on Shapley model is considered, and the model is solved. Finally, the article compares the benefits of the enterprise distribution under all circumstances, and analyzes the reasons. The paper summarizes and generalizes the work done in this paper, finds out the shortcomings, analyzes the reasons for its appearance, and puts forward the future prospect.
【學位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224.32;F274
本文編號：2157117
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and science and technology, enterprises must have more resources and stronger competitiveness if they want to further develop. However, it is very difficult to achieve this goal on their own. Nowadays, enterprises pay more and more attention to cooperation, and then they cooperate with each other to form supply chain alliance. But with more and more supply chain alliance rising quietly, there are many problems puzzling supply chain alliance. Cooperation and alliance between enterprises can reduce production cost, improve operation efficiency and create more profits. For the profit created, only fair and reasonable distribution can guarantee the efficiency of the supply chain operation and form a virtuous circle, thus creating more profits for the cooperative alliance. The theme of this paper is to use cooperative game theory to solve the benefit distribution problem of cooperative enterprise alliance. The main work is as follows: firstly, the supply chain theory and enterprise benefit cooperation theory are expounded. This paper introduces that enterprises must distribute the income according to certain principles, and also has a certain understanding of the basic concepts and related contents of risk decision and cooperative game. Then, this paper introduces the cooperative game between supply chain enterprises, and analyzes the factors that affect the benefit of the whole supply chain alliance, as well as the characteristics and methods of benefit distribution, and summarizes the shortcomings of some methods. The advantages and disadvantages of the cooperative game Shapley value method are analyzed by using the cooperative game theory to distribute the benefits of the alliance. Because of the problem of Shapley value method, the improved Shapley value model which includes the factors affecting interests is considered, and some methods are proposed to calculate the coefficients of these factors. Thirdly, we establish a risk decision model, solve the model, get the income of each enterprise as the characteristic function of the alliance game, then use the Shapley value method to distribute the benefit, and get a benefit distribution of each enterprise. The coefficients of various factors affecting interest are calculated, and the influence of the factors on Shapley model is considered, and the model is solved. Finally, the article compares the benefits of the enterprise distribution under all circumstances, and analyzes the reasons. The paper summarizes and generalizes the work done in this paper, finds out the shortcomings, analyzes the reasons for its appearance, and puts forward the future prospect.
【學位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224.32;F274
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