【摘要】：基于國(guó)內(nèi)外閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理研究最新進(jìn)展，針對(duì)世界各國(guó)環(huán)保立法中生產(chǎn)者責(zé)任延伸制度的廣泛應(yīng)用，特別是我國(guó)頒布了《廢棄電器電子產(chǎn)品回收處理管理?xiàng)l例》，鼓勵(lì)電器電子產(chǎn)品制造者自行或者委托其它市場(chǎng)參與者回收廢棄電器電子產(chǎn)品，國(guó)家設(shè)立廢棄電器電子產(chǎn)品處理基金對(duì)回收處理進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼的現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)，研究了政府對(duì)制造商回收再制造實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲干涉情況下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)與協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制等問(wèn)題。 （1）研究了政府干涉下制造商回收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策機(jī)制。分別構(gòu)建了兩個(gè)制造商都不回收，一個(gè)制造商回收、另一個(gè)不回收，兩個(gè)制造商都回收三種情況下的模型，對(duì)三種模型進(jìn)行了比較分析；并對(duì)制造商之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度、政府獎(jiǎng)懲力度和回收節(jié)約的成本對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)決策結(jié)果的影響進(jìn)行了分析；最后進(jìn)行了算例分析。 （2）研究了政府干涉下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道選擇問(wèn)題。分別構(gòu)建了政府干涉下制造商回收模型、零售商回收模型、制造商和零售商混合回收模型，對(duì)三種模型進(jìn)行了比較分析；并對(duì)政府獎(jiǎng)懲力度、回收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)系數(shù)對(duì)回收渠道選擇的影響進(jìn)行了分析；最后進(jìn)行了算例分析。 （3）研究了政府干涉下零售商負(fù)責(zé)回收閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)與協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。分別構(gòu)建了政府干涉前后的分散決策模型，，對(duì)模型的銷售價(jià)格、回收價(jià)格和利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行了比較分析；并以集中決策下的結(jié)果作為基準(zhǔn)，將收入費(fèi)用共享契約應(yīng)用到閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)中去，實(shí)現(xiàn)了再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)；最后進(jìn)行了算例分析。 （4）研究了政府干涉下制造商負(fù)責(zé)回收的雙營(yíng)銷渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)與協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。分別構(gòu)建了政府干涉前后的分散決策模型，對(duì)模型的銷售價(jià)格、廢舊產(chǎn)品回收率、利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行了比較分析；以集中決策下的結(jié)果作為基準(zhǔn)，提出了改進(jìn)的二部定價(jià)契約實(shí)現(xiàn)了再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)；最后，對(duì)系統(tǒng)中主要參數(shù)進(jìn)行了靈敏度分析，并給出了數(shù)值算例。 （5）研究了政府干涉下第三方負(fù)責(zé)回收的雙營(yíng)銷渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)與協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。分別構(gòu)建了政府干涉前后的分散決策模型，對(duì)模型的銷售價(jià)格、廢舊產(chǎn)品回收率、利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行比較分析；并以集中決策下的結(jié)果作為基準(zhǔn)，提出在制造商和零售商、制造商和第三方回收商之間分別使用改進(jìn)的二部定價(jià)契約實(shí)現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)；最后，對(duì)系統(tǒng)主要參數(shù)進(jìn)行了靈敏度分析，并給出了數(shù)值算例。
[Abstract]:Based on the latest development of closed-loop supply chain management at home and abroad, aiming at the extensive application of the extended producer responsibility system in the environmental protection legislation of various countries in the world, In particular, China has promulgated the regulations on the Administration of Recycling and disposal of waste Electrical and Electronic products, encouraging electrical and electronic product makers to recycle waste electrical and electronic products on their own or by entrusting other market participants. The realistic basis on which the State establishes a fund for the treatment of waste electrical and electronic products to subsidize recycling, This paper studies the pricing and coordination mechanism of the closed-loop supply chain in the case of government reward and punishment intervention on manufacturer recycling and remanufacturing. (1) the closed-loop supply chain pricing decision-making mechanism of manufacturer recovery competition under government intervention is studied. The models of two manufacturers without recycling, one manufacturer recycling, the other non-recycling, two manufacturers recycling three cases are constructed, the three models are compared and analyzed, and the degree of competition between the manufacturers is analyzed. The influence of government reward and punishment and cost saving on the result of competitive decision is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example is given. (2) the selection of recovery channel in closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is studied. The models of manufacturer recovery under government intervention, retailer recovery model, manufacturer and retailer mixed recovery model are constructed, and the three models are compared and analyzed, and the government rewards and punishments are analyzed. The influence of recovery competition coefficient on the selection of recovery channel is analyzed. Finally, an example is given. (3) the pricing and coordination mechanism of retailer responsible for recycling closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery price and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results of centralized decision-making are taken as the benchmark. The revenue-cost sharing contract is applied to the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain, and the coordination of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system is realized. Finally, an example is given. (4) the closed-loop supply chain pricing and coordination mechanism in which the manufacturer is responsible for recovery under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after the government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery rate and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results under the centralized decision are taken as the benchmark. An improved two-part pricing contract is proposed to coordinate the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system. Finally, the sensitivity of the main parameters in the system is analyzed. A numerical example is given. (5) the pricing and coordination mechanism of the closed-loop supply chain with the third party responsible for recovery under government intervention is studied. The decentralized decision-making model before and after government intervention is constructed, and the sales price, recovery rate and profit of the model are compared and analyzed, and the results under the centralized decision are taken as the benchmark, which is put forward to manufacturers and retailers. The coordination of the system is realized by using the improved two-part pricing contract between the manufacturer and the third-party recycler. Finally, the sensitivity of the main parameters of the system is analyzed, and a numerical example is given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 邱若臻;黃小原;;具有產(chǎn)品回收的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型[J];東北大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(自然科學(xué)版);2007年06期

2 黃永;達(dá)慶利;;基于制造商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和產(chǎn)品差異的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)選擇[J];東南大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(自然科學(xué)版);2012年03期

3 楊廣芬;;由零售商負(fù)責(zé)回收的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈超網(wǎng)絡(luò)優(yōu)化[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2009年06期

4 張漢江;廖家旭;;基于數(shù)量?jī)r(jià)格折扣的非對(duì)稱信息供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2009年12期

5 韓小花;;基于制造商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道的決策分析[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2010年05期

6 韓小花;董振寧;;雙邊競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道的決策分析[J];工業(yè)工程;2010年04期

7 張克勇;周國(guó)華;;第三方負(fù)責(zé)回收的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈差別定價(jià)協(xié)調(diào)契約設(shè)計(jì)[J];工業(yè)工程;2011年01期

8 但斌;徐廣業(yè);張旭梅;;電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的補(bǔ)償策略研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2012年01期

9 葛靜燕;黃培清;李娟;;社會(huì)環(huán)保意識(shí)和閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)策略——基于縱向差異模型的研究[J];工業(yè)工程與管理;2007年04期

10 晏妮娜;黃小原;徐家旺;;具有產(chǎn)品再制造的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈動(dòng)態(tài)運(yùn)作模型[J];工業(yè)工程與管理;2007年05期

本文編號(hào)：2134709