本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 + 政府獎(jiǎng)懲　； 參考：《大連理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的高速發(fā)展,人類面臨的環(huán)境污染、資源稀缺現(xiàn)象愈加嚴(yán)重,為提高資源利用率、實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展,各國(guó)政府均采取積極措施推進(jìn)逆向物流活動(dòng),從而促進(jìn)了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理理論的產(chǎn)生及發(fā)展,使其受到了社會(huì)各界的廣泛關(guān)注,并使定量化研究政府對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈影響的問(wèn)題成為了研究熱點(diǎn)。但已有研究多以政府對(duì)制造商再制造活動(dòng)進(jìn)行干涉的模型為研究對(duì)象,較少考慮政府對(duì)零售商廢舊品回收活動(dòng)進(jìn)行干涉的模型,且對(duì)政府干涉下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題鮮有研究,為此,本文進(jìn)行了以下研究： 首先,基于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理相關(guān)理論,使用定量化建模方法構(gòu)建了無(wú)政府獎(jiǎng)懲下零售商負(fù)責(zé)回收的集中式和分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型,并使用博弈論中的K-T條件、逆向歸納法等對(duì)其進(jìn)行求解。通過(guò)對(duì)比分析指出分散式?jīng)Q策中存在的“雙重邊際效應(yīng)”問(wèn)題,結(jié)合閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策、契約協(xié)調(diào)相關(guān)理論,基于可協(xié)調(diào)傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈的數(shù)量折扣契約的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)理,設(shè)計(jì)了數(shù)量折扣契約用以協(xié)調(diào)無(wú)政府干涉下的分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型,并運(yùn)用算例仿真方法進(jìn)行了數(shù)值算例分析,驗(yàn)證了相關(guān)結(jié)論的正確性。 其次,基于以上無(wú)政府獎(jiǎng)懲下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型的構(gòu)建及求解方法,構(gòu)建求解了政府對(duì)零售商實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲的集中式和分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型,并設(shè)計(jì)數(shù)量折扣契約對(duì)分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型進(jìn)行了協(xié)調(diào),并運(yùn)用算例仿真方法對(duì)以上結(jié)果進(jìn)行了數(shù)值算例分析。 最后,通過(guò)將無(wú)政府獎(jiǎng)懲及政府獎(jiǎng)懲下各模型的求解結(jié)果進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,指出對(duì)于不同范圍內(nèi)的政府獎(jiǎng)懲力度和政府設(shè)定的最低回收率,隨著政府獎(jiǎng)懲力度及最低回收率的變化,閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型中各決策變量及各成員利潤(rùn)的增減趨勢(shì)不同。 研究表明,數(shù)量折扣契約對(duì)無(wú)政府獎(jiǎng)懲及政府獎(jiǎng)懲下的分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈均具有較好的協(xié)調(diào)性。另外,政府對(duì)零售商實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲時(shí),只有通過(guò)設(shè)定合理的最低回收率和獎(jiǎng)懲力度,使得政府獎(jiǎng)懲下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈及各成員的利潤(rùn)均高于無(wú)政府獎(jiǎng)懲下的相應(yīng)結(jié)果,才能對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中的各成員產(chǎn)生激勵(lì)作用,有效促進(jìn)逆向供應(yīng)鏈中的廢舊品回收再制造活動(dòng),從而提高資源利用率,實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)發(fā)展和生態(tài)效益獲得雙贏的目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and society, the environmental pollution and the scarcity of resources are becoming more and more serious. In order to improve the utilization of resources and realize the sustainable development of economy, the governments of all countries have taken active measures to promote reverse logistics activities. Thus, it promotes the emergence and development of closed-loop supply chain management theory, makes it widely concerned by all walks of life, and makes the quantitative study of government influence on closed-loop supply chain become a research hotspot. However, many studies have focused on the model of government intervention in manufacturers' remanufacturing activities, and less on the model of government intervention in retailers' recycling activities. And the contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain under government intervention is rarely studied. Therefore, this paper makes the following research: firstly, based on the theory of closed-loop supply chain management, In this paper, a centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain model of retailers responsible for recovery under anarchic rewards and punishments is constructed by using quantitative modeling method. The K-T condition and reverse induction method are used to solve the model. By comparing and analyzing the problem of "double marginal effect" in decentralized decision making, combined with the pricing decision of closed-loop supply chain and the relevant theory of contract coordination, the coordination mechanism of quantity discount contract in traditional supply chain can be coordinated. The quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain model under anarchic interference. The numerical examples are used to verify the correctness of the relevant conclusions. Secondly, based on the above construction and solution method of closed-loop supply chain model under anarchic reward and punishment, the centralized and decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain model of government reward and punishment for retailers is constructed. A quantity discount contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chain model, and numerical examples are used to analyze the above results. Finally, through the comparison and analysis of the results of the models under the anarchic rewards and punishments and the government rewards and punishments, it is pointed out that the government rewards and punishments and the minimum recovery rates set by the government are different. With the change of government rewards and penalties and the lowest recovery rate, the trend of each decision variable and the profit of each member in the closed-loop supply chain model is different. The research shows that the quantity discount contract has a good coordination for the decentralized closed-loop supply chain under the anarchic rewards and penalties and the government rewards and punishments. In addition, when the government implements rewards and punishments to retailers, only by setting a reasonable minimum recovery rate and the degree of rewards and punishments, the closed-loop supply chain and the profits of each member under the government rewards and punishments are higher than the corresponding results under the anarchic rewards and punishments. In order to stimulate the members of the closed-loop supply chain, it can effectively promote the recycling and remanufacturing activities of waste products in the reverse supply chain, thus improve the utilization of resources and achieve the goal of win-win for economic and social development and ecological benefits.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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