本文選題：低碳經(jīng)濟(jì) + 市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)的碳排放總量限制及碳交易機(jī)制已蓄勢(shì)待發(fā)，研究此情境下的企業(yè)減排決策問題將對(duì)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)下的企業(yè)行為及政府的政策引導(dǎo)都具有一定的參考價(jià)值。且經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化下市場(chǎng)中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已是供應(yīng)鏈間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，因此本文的研究對(duì)象是供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)，具有強(qiáng)烈的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 以往的低碳研究中有些將消費(fèi)者低碳偏好對(duì)需求的影響加入了模型中，但卻缺乏對(duì)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)下的需求函數(shù)的深入分析。本文作者進(jìn)行了思考，認(rèn)為不同的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下企業(yè)及消費(fèi)者對(duì)應(yīng)對(duì)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)方式不同，從而產(chǎn)生了需求函數(shù)的變化，也就改變了利潤(rùn)函數(shù)。因此，本文以市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)為框架，探討企業(yè)的低碳決策問題。同時(shí)，研究供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)的決策問題就要涉及到供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)的博弈行為，所以本文采用了博弈理論研究了不同市場(chǎng)的博弈策略，并按相應(yīng)方法進(jìn)行求解。 最終本文得出了不同市場(chǎng)中供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的最優(yōu)單位產(chǎn)品減排量，產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)量以及產(chǎn)品價(jià)格。并運(yùn)用解析分析和數(shù)值分析說明了模型在實(shí)際供應(yīng)鏈生產(chǎn)中的應(yīng)用及參數(shù)靈敏度的情況。最后，本文考慮了目前低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)下應(yīng)運(yùn)而生的新合作模式——合同能源管理，并對(duì)這種新模式下的供應(yīng)鏈集中決策進(jìn)行了初步探討。 主要結(jié)論如下：1.供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的最優(yōu)減排量決策是使自身的邊際減排成本稍大于從市場(chǎng)上購(gòu)買對(duì)應(yīng)數(shù)量的排放權(quán)的邊際成本，提升幅度根據(jù)所處市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的不同而不同。2.在同一市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下，與雙方力量對(duì)等的納什博弈相比，當(dāng)供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)時(shí)，其單位產(chǎn)品減排量更大。但在兩種情況下，制造的單位產(chǎn)品減排量與產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)量間的關(guān)系是不變的。3.在含有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性質(zhì)的市場(chǎng)中，，供應(yīng)鏈中一方企業(yè)的減排可以帶動(dòng)另一方的減排。而在完全壟斷市場(chǎng)中，供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的單位產(chǎn)品減排量彼此獨(dú)立，不存在相互影響。4.合同能源管理以及供應(yīng)鏈集中決策均能促進(jìn)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的減排力度，也會(huì)帶來利潤(rùn)提升，同時(shí)提升了經(jīng)濟(jì)效益及環(huán)境效益。
[Abstract]:China's total carbon emission limitation and carbon trading mechanism are ready for development. The study of enterprise emission reduction decision-making in this context will have certain reference value for enterprise behavior and government policy guidance under the low carbon economy. The competition in the market under the economic globalization is already the competition among the supply chains, so the research object of this paper is the supply chain enterprises, which has strong practical significance. Some of the previous low-carbon studies have added the influence of consumers' low-carbon preference to demand, but they lack in-depth analysis of the demand function in a low-carbon economy. The author thinks that under different market structure, enterprises and consumers have different ways of dealing with low-carbon economy, so the change of demand function will change the profit function. Therefore, this paper takes the market structure as the framework, discusses the low-carbon decision-making problem of the enterprise. At the same time, the decision problem of the enterprise in the supply chain is related to the game behavior of the enterprise in the supply chain. Therefore, the game theory is used to study the game strategy of different markets, and the corresponding solution is given. Finally, the optimal unit product emission reduction, product output and product price of supply chain enterprises in different markets are obtained. The application of the model in the actual supply chain production and the sensitivity of the parameters are illustrated by analytic analysis and numerical analysis. Finally, this paper considers the new cooperative mode, contract energy management, which comes into being in the low carbon economy, and makes a preliminary discussion on the centralized decision of supply chain under this new mode. The main conclusions are as follows: 1. The optimal emission reduction decision of supply chain enterprises is to make their marginal emission reduction cost slightly larger than the marginal cost of purchasing corresponding emission rights from the market, and the range of enhancement varies according to the market structure. In the same market structure, compared with the Nash game, when the supplier is dominant, the emission reduction per unit product is larger. In both cases, however, the relationship between the reduction of emissions per unit of manufactured products and the output of products is unchanged. In a competitive market, the reduction of emissions by one side of the supply chain can lead to emissions reduction on the other side. In the completely monopolized market, the unit product emission reduction of supply chain enterprises is independent of each other and does not affect each other. The contract energy management and the centralized decision of the supply chain can promote the emission reduction of the supply chain enterprises, also will bring about the increase of the profit, at the same time, the economic benefit and the environmental benefit will be improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：X322;F274;F224

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