本文選題：隨機需求 + 三級供應(yīng)鏈�。� 參考：《長沙理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟全球化和科學(xué)技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展,導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)品從研發(fā)開始的壽命周期不斷縮短,以消費者個性化與多樣化需求為導(dǎo)向的企業(yè)間競爭日益加劇,企業(yè)所面臨的市場形勢越來越嚴峻。因此,企業(yè)通過締結(jié)供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟來增強競爭力、鞏固市場地位成為必然選擇之一。由于供應(yīng)鏈各節(jié)點企業(yè)有著相對的獨立性,往往因利益的博弈而造成供應(yīng)鏈不能發(fā)揮應(yīng)有作用。因此,研究科學(xué)合理的供應(yīng)鏈契約來改善和制約節(jié)點企業(yè)合作關(guān)系、促使供應(yīng)鏈的有效運行,是供應(yīng)鏈管理的重要內(nèi)容,具有十分重要的理論和實踐意義。本文以隨機需求的三級供應(yīng)鏈為研究對象,研究數(shù)量折扣-價格補貼雙契約機制下供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題。本文在闡述研究背景、目的及意義的基礎(chǔ)上,綜述國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究現(xiàn)狀,分析三級供應(yīng)鏈的結(jié)構(gòu)與特點、供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)相關(guān)理論及常見的供應(yīng)鏈契約形式與收益分配手段；在隨機市場需求條件下,比較分散無協(xié)調(diào)控制與集中控制下的供應(yīng)鏈收益狀況,分析分散無協(xié)調(diào)決策下系統(tǒng)訂購量與收益難以實現(xiàn)最優(yōu)化；采用數(shù)量折扣和價格補貼雙契約機制設(shè)計供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型,利用聯(lián)合契約實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈整體目標的最優(yōu)。并運用博弈理論進行供應(yīng)鏈收益分配參數(shù)的設(shè)計,然后結(jié)合層次分析法和遺傳算法對模型進行求解；最后通過算例分析,驗證模型的合理性和可行性。本論文的目的,旨在通過對隨機需求條件下三級供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型及利益分配的研究,從而找出供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的優(yōu)化模型和方法,為促進供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)管理效率與有序運行提供方法上的借鑒和理論指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:With the economic globalization and the rapid development of science and technology, the life cycle of products from the beginning of R & D has been shortened, and the competition between enterprises, which is guided by consumers' individualized and diversified needs, is becoming more and more serious. The market situation faced by enterprises is becoming more and more severe. Therefore, it is an inevitable choice for enterprises to strengthen their competitiveness and consolidate their market position through strategic alliance of supply chain. Because of the relative independence of each node enterprise in the supply chain, the supply chain is often unable to play its due role because of the game of interests. Therefore, it is an important content of supply chain management to study the scientific and reasonable supply chain contract to improve and restrict the cooperative relationship of node enterprises and to promote the effective operation of supply chain, which has very important theoretical and practical significance. In this paper, the supply chain coordination problem under the double contract mechanism of quantity discounting and price subsidy is studied by taking the three-level supply chain with random demand as the research object. Based on the background, purpose and significance of the research, this paper summarizes the current research situation at home and abroad, analyzes the structure and characteristics of three-level supply chain, the relevant theory of supply chain coordination, and the common forms of supply chain contract and the means of income distribution. Under the condition of stochastic market demand, the supply chain income under decentralized uncoordinated control and centralized control is compared, and it is difficult to optimize the system order quantity and income under decentralized uncoordinated decision. The coordination model of supply chain is designed by double contract mechanism of quantity discount and price subsidy, and the overall goal of supply chain is optimized by using joint contract. Then the model is solved by using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and genetic algorithm. Finally, the rationality and feasibility of the model are verified by the example analysis. The purpose of this paper is to find out the optimization model and method of supply chain coordination by studying the coordination model and benefit distribution of three-level supply chain under the condition of random demand. In order to promote the efficiency and orderly operation of supply chain coordination management to provide the method of reference and theoretical guidance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：2020090