考慮公平關(guān)切與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的三級供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-06-13 06:55
本文選題:三級供應(yīng)鏈 + 質(zhì)量控制。 參考:《東北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:供應(yīng)鏈管理雖然可以提高生產(chǎn)效率、降低生產(chǎn)成本、使生產(chǎn)分工愈加明確,但是近年來在各個(gè)領(lǐng)域卻頻繁發(fā)生“質(zhì)量門”事件,因此,供應(yīng)鏈管理的多級性、分散性可能會加重產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量問題,那么就有必要對供應(yīng)鏈中的質(zhì)量控制問題進(jìn)行研究,分析供應(yīng)鏈中產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)生、形成到實(shí)現(xiàn)的過程,在提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的同時(shí),也能同時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)同與雙贏的局面則是一種更加理想的結(jié)果。供應(yīng)鏈模式使得最終產(chǎn)品需要由多家企業(yè)共同合作生產(chǎn)完成,個(gè)體間由于利潤分配不均等因素,使得個(gè)別企業(yè)可能會生產(chǎn)不合格產(chǎn)品,而供應(yīng)鏈這樣一種一環(huán)扣一環(huán)的生產(chǎn)模式,也就注定了如果一環(huán)出現(xiàn)質(zhì)量問題,那么整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈就都有可能會出現(xiàn)質(zhì)量問題,因此本文在研究供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制問題時(shí)更加關(guān)注行為人的因素對供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量的影響。本文對考慮行為特征的三級供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制的研究,主要完成了以下工作:(1)分析了對供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制進(jìn)行研究的可行性及必要性,以及考慮各行為人主體的行為特征的可行性及必要性,在對行為人主體的行為特征選取時(shí),通過閱讀大量相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)后,選擇了公平關(guān)切和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避,兩種比較重要又十分貼近現(xiàn)實(shí)的行為;(2)對供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制、考慮公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈管理、考慮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的供應(yīng)鏈管理的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了綜述,分析了已有文獻(xiàn)對本文的貢獻(xiàn),以及現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的一些不足;(3)構(gòu)建了三級供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制的基本模型、考慮行為特征(公平關(guān)切與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避)的三級供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制模型,應(yīng)用Stackelberg博弈的方法對各模型進(jìn)行了求解,求解的過程也證明了Stackelberg博弈最優(yōu)解的存在性,并進(jìn)行了算例分析;(4)在基本模型以及考慮行為特征的模型基礎(chǔ)之上,又構(gòu)建了考慮雙方利潤(效用)及最終產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平的多目標(biāo)優(yōu)化與仿真分析,并對多目標(biāo)優(yōu)化的結(jié)果進(jìn)行了一定的分析,得出了在考慮的行為因素過多時(shí),多目標(biāo)無法實(shí)現(xiàn)進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化的重要結(jié)論;由于模型的結(jié)果過于復(fù)雜,因此本文采用了仿真的方式研究了決策變量等對目標(biāo)函數(shù)的影響,并對仿真的結(jié)果進(jìn)行了細(xì)致的分析。最后總結(jié)了本文的相關(guān)結(jié)論,說明了本文考慮的因素和相關(guān)結(jié)論對供應(yīng)商和制造商制定決策時(shí)的意義和幫助,同時(shí)分析了本文的研究局限和研究展望。
[Abstract]:Although supply chain management can improve production efficiency, reduce production cost and make production division more clear, in recent years, "quality gate" events occur frequently in various fields. Therefore, supply chain management is multilevel. Dispersion may aggravate the quality problem of products, so it is necessary to study the problem of quality control in supply chain, analyze the production of product quality in supply chain, form to the process of realization, and improve the quality of products at the same time. It is a more ideal result to realize the cooperation and win-win of the supply chain at the same time. The supply chain model makes the final product need to be produced jointly by many enterprises, and individual enterprises may produce unqualified products because of the unequal profit distribution. And the supply chain is such a production model with one link and one link, it is doomed that if there is a quality problem in one link, then the whole supply chain may have a quality problem. Therefore, in the study of supply chain quality control, this paper pays more attention to the influence of actors on supply chain quality. In this paper, the quality control of three-level supply chain considering behavior characteristics is studied. The following work is accomplished: 1) the feasibility and necessity of research on supply chain quality control are analyzed. And considering the feasibility and necessity of the behavior characteristics of the main actors, after reading a large number of relevant documents, the author chooses fair concern and risk aversion. Two important and realistic behaviors are summarized on supply chain quality control, supply chain management with fair concern and risk aversion. The contribution of existing literatures to this paper is analyzed. The basic model of three-level supply chain quality control is constructed, and the three-level supply chain quality control model considering behavior characteristics (fairness concern and risk aversion) is constructed. The Stackelberg game method is used to solve each model, and the existence of the optimal solution of Stackelberg game is proved, and an example is given to analyze the model based on the basic model and the model considering the behavior characteristics. The multi-objective optimization and simulation analysis considering the profit (utility) of both sides and the level of final product quality are constructed, and the results of multi-objective optimization are analyzed to a certain extent. Because the results of the model are too complex, this paper studies the influence of decision variables on the objective function by simulation, and makes a detailed analysis of the simulation results. Finally, this paper summarizes the relevant conclusions of this paper, explains the factors considered in this paper and the significance and help of the relevant conclusions for suppliers and manufacturers to make decisions. At the same time, it analyzes the research limitations and research prospects of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F274
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