本文選題：渠道沖突 + 沖突分析矩陣形式��； 參考：《南京航空航天大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)越來越普及的今天，，電子商務(wù)在企業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈渠道中的地位也顯示出其獨(dú)有的優(yōu)勢。很多企業(yè)建立了自己的電子商務(wù)渠道，即使某些沒有自己網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺的企業(yè)也會與網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商合作來拓寬自己的銷售渠道，然而由此帶來的渠道沖突問題也愈演愈烈。在渠道中，如果制造商的產(chǎn)品在同類產(chǎn)品中具有競爭優(yōu)勢或者制造商掌握了生產(chǎn)技術(shù)，此時制造商在供應(yīng)鏈中就可能處于主導(dǎo)地位，可以通過自己的行為選擇影響供應(yīng)鏈中其他成員的行動方案；若零售商擁有大量忠實(shí)的顧客或者控制制造商的主要銷售途徑，則零售商就可能擁有話語權(quán)，在供應(yīng)鏈中處于主導(dǎo)地位，這種存在主從關(guān)系的沖突問題時常發(fā)生。雖然傳統(tǒng)的博弈論可以解決這種沖突，但需要大量準(zhǔn)確的數(shù)據(jù)支持。在現(xiàn)代社會中，由于外部環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性和不確定性，再加上社會處于高速發(fā)展中，決策者很難獲得大量量化的精確信息；同時，也有許多定性沖突問題是傳統(tǒng)Stackelberg博弈無法解決的�；跊_突分析的Stackelberg邏輯表達(dá)雖然能夠解決這種數(shù)據(jù)匱乏的沖突問題，但是由于它是一種遞推形式的表達(dá)式，算法很難開發(fā)，因此該理論很難應(yīng)用于實(shí)際。本文結(jié)合圖論與Stackelberg均衡的邏輯表達(dá)，就Stackelberg均衡的矩陣表達(dá)展開研究，以期將復(fù)雜的邏輯表達(dá)式轉(zhuǎn)化為矩陣形式，為算法的實(shí)現(xiàn)提供理論依據(jù)，從而用以解決存在主從關(guān)系的供應(yīng)鏈渠道沖突問題。 首先，本論文定義嚴(yán)格有序偏好和一般偏好情況下兩決策者多步移動（Limited-Move）穩(wěn)定的矩陣表示，并證明其正確性。在此基礎(chǔ)上運(yùn)用LM穩(wěn)定性定義Stackelberg均衡的矩陣表示，并證明其與邏輯表達(dá)的一致性。兩決策者的LM穩(wěn)定與Stackelberg均衡的矩陣表示不僅豐富了基于矩陣形式的穩(wěn)定性的定義，而且為Stackelberg問題的解決提供了科學(xué)、有效的方法。 其次，將兩決策者的矩陣表示拓展到多決策者的情況，在給出LM穩(wěn)定和Stackelberg均衡的矩陣表示的基礎(chǔ)上，利用GUI設(shè)計(jì)決策支持，解決兩決策者和三決策者的Stackelberg問題。這一系統(tǒng)的開發(fā)將增加現(xiàn)有沖突分析決策支持系統(tǒng)的功能，擴(kuò)大現(xiàn)有系統(tǒng)的應(yīng)用領(lǐng)域。 最后，將沖突分析Stackelberg矩陣模型應(yīng)用到供應(yīng)鏈銷售渠道沖突案例中。通過對沖突問題的建模、分析并利用開發(fā)的決策支持系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行穩(wěn)定性求解，提出了解決該問題的均衡方案。從案例分析可知，當(dāng)決策者中存在有較強(qiáng)控制力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者時，由于他們本身的出發(fā)點(diǎn)不同，決策依據(jù)不同，所產(chǎn)生的解決方案與Nash均衡是不盡相同的。 本論文提出的矩陣形式的Stackelberg沖突分析方法將拓展基于圖模型的沖突分析理論矩陣表示的理論框架；促進(jìn)Stackelberg均衡算法的實(shí)現(xiàn)；開發(fā)的決策支持系統(tǒng)為企業(yè)從全局高度解決供應(yīng)鏈渠道中存在主從關(guān)系的沖突提供一種科學(xué)的工具。
[Abstract]:With the increasing popularity of the Internet, the status of electronic commerce in enterprise supply chain channels also shows its unique advantages. Many enterprises have established their own e-commerce channels, even some enterprises without their own network platform will cooperate with online retailers to broaden their own sales channels, but the resulting channel conflicts are also intensified. In the channel, if the manufacturer's product has a competitive advantage in the same product or the manufacturer has mastered the production technology, then the manufacturer may be in the dominant position in the supply chain. Action options for other members of the supply chain can be influenced by their own behavior; retailers may have a say if they have a large number of loyal customers or control over the manufacturer's main sales routes. In the supply chain, this kind of conflict between master and slave often occurs. Although traditional game theory can solve this conflict, it needs a lot of accurate data. In modern society, due to the complexity and uncertainty of the external environment, coupled with the rapid development of society, it is difficult for decision makers to obtain a large amount of quantitative and accurate information; at the same time, There are also many qualitative conflicts that cannot be solved by traditional Stackelberg games. Stackelberg logical expression based on conflict analysis can solve the conflict problem of data scarcity, but because it is a recursive expression, the algorithm is difficult to develop, so it is difficult to apply the theory to practice. Based on the logical expression of graph theory and Stackelberg equilibrium, this paper studies the matrix representation of Stackelberg equilibrium, in order to transform the complex logical expression into matrix form and provide the theoretical basis for the realization of the algorithm. In order to solve the problem of supply chain channel conflict with master-slave relationship, this paper defines and proves the stability matrix representation of two decision-makers' multi-step moving limited-Moveve. in the case of strictly ordered preference and general preference. On this basis, the matrix representation of Stackelberg equilibrium is defined by LM stability, and its consistency with logical expression is proved. The matrix representation of LM stability and Stackelberg equilibrium of two decision makers not only enriches the definition of stability based on matrix form, but also provides a scientific and effective method for solving Stackelberg problem. The matrix representation of two decision makers is extended to the case of multiple decision makers. On the basis of the matrix representation of LM stability and Stackelberg equilibrium, the Stackelberg problem of two and three decision makers is solved by using GUI design decision support. The development of this system will increase the function of the existing conflict analysis decision support system and expand the application field of the existing system. Finally, the Stackelberg matrix model of conflict analysis will be applied to the conflict case of supply chain sales channel. By modeling the conflict problem and analyzing and using the developed decision support system (DSS) to solve the stability problem, a balanced scheme is proposed to solve the problem. According to the case study, when there are leaders with strong control among the decision-makers, because of their different starting points, the decision basis is different. The solution is different from Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg conflict analysis method proposed in this paper will extend the theoretical framework of matrix representation of conflict analysis theory based on graph model and promote the realization of Stackelberg equilibrium algorithm. The developed decision support system (DSS) provides a scientific tool for enterprises to resolve the conflicts between master and slave in supply chain from a global perspective.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京航空航天大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F713.36

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