本文選題：Stackelberg博弈 + 雙渠道銷售結(jié)構(gòu)�。� 參考：《統(tǒng)計與決策》2017年15期

【摘要】：文章以Stackelberg博弈模型為研究工具,分析電商企業(yè)雙渠道銷售結(jié)構(gòu)路徑優(yōu)化問題。將電商企業(yè)的雙渠道銷售結(jié)構(gòu)設(shè)計成銷售結(jié)構(gòu)Ⅰ、Ⅱ、Ⅲ三類。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):相對于零售單渠道結(jié)構(gòu),銷售結(jié)構(gòu)Ⅰ提高了渠道密度,增加了總電商利潤,提高了供應鏈的整體效率;銷售結(jié)構(gòu)Ⅱ促進了供應鏈總利潤的增加,但總電商利潤能否增加關(guān)鍵取決于總電商與二級電商的利潤分成;銷售結(jié)構(gòu)Ⅲ下非授權(quán)批發(fā)渠道的引入,造成了非效率競爭局面的形成,降低了整個供應鏈利潤。雙渠道模式為供應鏈引入了競爭機制,但是這種競爭機制有無效率取決于雙渠道的布局。
[Abstract]:In this paper, Stackelberg game model is used as a research tool to analyze the path optimization of the dual channel sales structure of e-commerce enterprises. The dual channel sales structure of e-commerce enterprises is designed as three types of sales structure: I, II, III. It is found that the sales structure I increases the channel density, increases the total ecommerce profit and improves the overall efficiency of the supply chain, and the sales structure II promotes the increase of the total profit of the supply chain. However, the key to increase the total ecommerce profit depends on the profit sharing between the general ecommerce and the secondary ecommerce, and the introduction of the non-authorized wholesale channel under the sales structure 鈪，

本文編號：2001830