本文選題：易逝品 + 回購契約�。� 參考：《蘭州交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展，人們需求的差異化、個性化和不確定性迅速凸顯。產(chǎn)品技術(shù)不斷提高、產(chǎn)品更新速度日益加快、產(chǎn)品的生命周期不斷縮短。在這種形勢下，易逝品應(yīng)運(yùn)而生并得到快速發(fā)展。同時，經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化和全球化加劇了企業(yè)之間的競爭，企業(yè)之間的競爭逐步轉(zhuǎn)換為供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭，協(xié)調(diào)的供應(yīng)鏈能夠使供應(yīng)鏈上各主體達(dá)到最佳的收益狀態(tài)，并增強(qiáng)企業(yè)之間的凝聚力，從而達(dá)到雙贏或多贏。對于易逝品行業(yè)而言，由于其產(chǎn)品的特點(diǎn)，供應(yīng)鏈管理就顯得尤為重要。基于此，，本文對易逝品供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行研究，從回購契約的角度分析供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題。 (1)分析零售商與供應(yīng)商關(guān)于批發(fā)價格的博弈問題。首先介紹雙向報價拍賣機(jī)制，分析交易模式。在考慮零售商和供應(yīng)商的議價能力基礎(chǔ)上利用雙向報價拍賣機(jī)制和不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈給出每種交易模式下達(dá)成的批發(fā)價格。然后通過建立的集中決策下和分散決策下的收益模型，分析供應(yīng)鏈在分散決策下的彈性收益空間，并根據(jù)供應(yīng)商和零售商對彈性收益空間的貢獻(xiàn)比例確定雙方的議價能力。最后分析議價能力與其它契約參數(shù)的關(guān)系。 (2)利用協(xié)調(diào)理論討論銷售期內(nèi)零售商降價銷售的情形。首先建立集中決策下降價銷售的收益模型，討論供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)決策變量。其次建立集中決策下不降價銷售時的收益模型，討論并給出最優(yōu)決策變量。通過比較分析兩種情形下最優(yōu)決策變量的關(guān)系，得出供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)施降價銷售的原因。最后建立分散決策下降價銷售時的收益模型，與集中決策下降價銷售收益模型比較分析給出此時供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的條件。 (3)利用協(xié)調(diào)理論討論零售商努力促銷時的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題。首先建立集中決策下供應(yīng)鏈的收益模型，討論最優(yōu)決策變量。其次建立分散決策下無回購契約的收益模型，分析最優(yōu)決策變量，通過與集中決策下的最優(yōu)決策變量比較分析得出供應(yīng)鏈不能協(xié)調(diào)的原因。再次建立分散決策下回購契約收益模型，討論最優(yōu)決策變量，通過與集中決策下的最優(yōu)決策變量比較分析得出供應(yīng)鏈不能協(xié)調(diào)的原因。然后建立分散決策下努力成本分擔(dān)回購契約收益模型，通過此時的最優(yōu)決策變量與集中決策下的最優(yōu)決策變量相比，得出契約協(xié)調(diào)條件。最后考慮努力促銷影響市場需求的情形。 (4)將努力促銷回購契約模型運(yùn)用于快速食品供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題，以此驗(yàn)證模型的可行性與有效性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the differentiation, personalization and uncertainty of people's demand are becoming more and more obvious. Product technology continues to improve, product update speed is accelerating, product life cycle continues to shorten. In this situation, perishable products came into being and got rapid development. At the same time, economic integration and globalization have intensified the competition among enterprises. The competition among enterprises is gradually transformed into the competition between supply chains, and the coordinated supply chain can make the main bodies in the supply chain achieve the best return state. And enhance the cohesion between enterprises, so as to achieve a win-win or multi-win. For perishable products industry, supply chain management is particularly important because of its product characteristics. Based on this, this paper studies the supply chain of perishable goods, and analyzes the coordination of supply chain from the perspective of repurchase contract. First of all, it introduces the auction mechanism of two-way quotation and analyzes the transaction mode. On the basis of considering the bargaining power of retailers and suppliers, the wholesale price under each transaction mode is given by using the two-way bidding auction mechanism and the static game of incomplete information. Then, the elastic return space of supply chain under decentralized decision is analyzed by establishing the profit model under centralized decision and decentralized decision, and the bargaining power of both parties is determined according to the contribution ratio of supplier and retailer to elastic income space. Finally, the relationship between bargaining power and other contract parameters is analyzed. Firstly, the profit model of sale under centralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables of supply chain are discussed. Secondly, the income model is established and the optimal decision variables are given. By comparing and analyzing the relationship between the optimal decision variables in the two cases, the reasons for the supply chain to reduce the price of sales are obtained. Finally, the profit model of sale under decentralized decision is established, and the condition of supply chain coordination is given by comparing the profit model of price reduction with that of centralized decision. 3) using coordination theory to discuss the problem of supply chain coordination when retailers try to promote sales. Firstly, the profit model of supply chain under centralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are discussed. Secondly, the income model without repurchase contract under decentralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are analyzed. By comparing with the optimal decision variables under centralized decision, the reasons why supply chain can not be coordinated are obtained. Thirdly, the repurchase contract income model under decentralized decision is established, and the optimal decision variables are discussed. By comparing with the optimal decision variables under centralized decision, the reasons of supply chain disharmony are obtained. Then the model of effort cost sharing repurchase contract income under decentralized decision is established, and the contract coordination condition is obtained by comparing the optimal decision variable with the optimal decision variable under centralized decision. Finally, considering the situation that hard promotion affects the market demand. 4) apply the repurchase contract model to the coordination problem of fast food supply chain to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224;F274

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