本文選題：聯(lián)合體 + 總承包　； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前，，國內(nèi)工程企業(yè)大多只具備設(shè)計(jì)、施工、采購單一能力，因此通過組建聯(lián)合體實(shí)施項(xiàng)目總承包在大中型項(xiàng)目中得以廣泛運(yùn)用。但是聯(lián)合體各方在收益分配上難以達(dá)成一致，收益分配不當(dāng)就會(huì)損害參與企業(yè)的積極性，難以發(fā)揮總承包降低建設(shè)成本、縮短建設(shè)周期的優(yōu)勢(shì)，甚至導(dǎo)致合作失敗。論文借鑒聯(lián)盟領(lǐng)域、供應(yīng)鏈領(lǐng)域收益分配的研究思路，利用博弈理論對(duì)項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合體總承包模式的收益分配進(jìn)行了分析和研究。 首先，論文簡(jiǎn)要分析幾種主要總承包模式的特點(diǎn)，重點(diǎn)對(duì)總承包聯(lián)合體的法律特征、組織形式、成員權(quán)責(zé)、主要模式等進(jìn)行探討，并闡述項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合體總承包模式的優(yōu)越性及在實(shí)踐中出現(xiàn)的問題，提出收益分配研究的必要性。 其次，對(duì)聯(lián)合體總承包收益分配理論、原則、影響因素、構(gòu)成及形式進(jìn)行研究。分析收益分配的基本原則和主要影響因素，討論項(xiàng)目總利潤(rùn)的組成及來源，提出行業(yè)平均利潤(rùn)加一定比例總承包優(yōu)化收益的分配形式，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)聯(lián)合體成員的有效激勵(lì)。在此基礎(chǔ)上，建立基于成員實(shí)力、優(yōu)化貢獻(xiàn)能力兩種收益分配模型，構(gòu)建聯(lián)合體總承包模式收益分配的運(yùn)作流程。 最后，討論三種常用項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合體總承包模式的收益分配問題，建立相應(yīng)的收益分配模型，確定了聯(lián)合體各方的利潤(rùn)組成。同時(shí)從集體收益最大角度出發(fā)，運(yùn)用博弈理論對(duì)總承包優(yōu)化收益分配進(jìn)行討論，得到了項(xiàng)目總承包優(yōu)化收益在聯(lián)合體成員間的合理分配比例和付出的最優(yōu)努力水平，并用算例對(duì)結(jié)果進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。本文還針對(duì)項(xiàng)目實(shí)施時(shí)可能出現(xiàn)的個(gè)體理性行為，對(duì)個(gè)體收益最大、集體收益最大兩種優(yōu)化行動(dòng)策略博弈下的收益進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析，總結(jié)項(xiàng)目總承包優(yōu)化收益實(shí)現(xiàn)的影響因素，并初步分析確保優(yōu)化目標(biāo)實(shí)現(xiàn)的約束機(jī)制。 論文還結(jié)合工程實(shí)例，對(duì)收益分配模型的應(yīng)用進(jìn)行說明。在合理的收益分配下，聯(lián)合體成員企業(yè)獲得的優(yōu)化收益較為可觀，會(huì)積極參與優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì)，總承包優(yōu)化收益實(shí)現(xiàn)度較高，從而為項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合體總承包的收益分配提供實(shí)踐指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:At present, most of the domestic engineering enterprises only have a single capability of design, construction and procurement, so they can be widely used in large and medium-sized projects by setting up a consortium to carry out the project general contracting. However, it is difficult for all parties in the consortium to reach agreement on the distribution of income, which will damage the enthusiasm of the participating enterprises, reduce the construction cost, shorten the construction cycle and even lead to the failure of cooperation. Based on the research ideas of the alliance and supply chain, this paper analyzes and studies the income distribution of the general contracting mode of the project consortium by using the game theory. First of all, the paper briefly analyzes the characteristics of several major general contracting modes, focusing on the legal characteristics, organizational forms, members' rights and responsibilities, the main modes of the general contracting consortium, etc. The advantages of the general contracting mode of project association and the problems in practice are expounded, and the necessity of research on income distribution is put forward. Secondly, the theory, principle, influencing factors, constitution and form of general contract income distribution are studied. This paper analyzes the basic principles and main influencing factors of income distribution, discusses the composition and source of the total profit of the project, and puts forward the distribution form of the industry average profit plus a certain proportion of the profit optimized by the general contract so as to realize the effective incentive to the members of the association. On this basis, two models of income distribution based on member strength and contribution ability are established, and the operating process of income distribution in general contracting mode is constructed. Finally, this paper discusses the income distribution of three common project consortia, establishes the corresponding profit distribution model, and determines the profit composition of each side of the consortium. At the same time, from the point of view of maximum collective income, the optimal income distribution of general contracting is discussed by using the game theory, and the reasonable distribution ratio and the optimal level of effort among the members of the consortium are obtained. An example is used to test the results. This paper also aims at the individual rational behavior which may appear in the implementation of the project, carries on the comparative analysis to the income under the two kinds of optimization action strategy game of the biggest individual income and the biggest collective benefit, summarizes the influence factor of the project general contract optimization income realization. And the constraint mechanism to ensure the realization of optimization objectives is analyzed preliminarily. The paper also explains the application of income distribution model with engineering examples. Under the reasonable income distribution, the enterprise of the association member obtains the optimization income is quite considerable, will participate in the optimization design actively, the general contract optimization income realization degree is higher, thus provides the practical instruction for the project union general contract income distribution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F426.92

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