發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-30 17:16

  本文選題：技術(shù)創(chuàng)新 + 技術(shù)許可��； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：技術(shù)許可是企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新管理的重要組成部分,是專利制度下技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移的重要形式,也是專利擁有者通過(guò)技術(shù)市場(chǎng)獲得技術(shù)創(chuàng)新收益的一種重要途徑。技術(shù)許可作為當(dāng)今除自主創(chuàng)新以外最迅速和有效提高企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力的方式,對(duì)其進(jìn)行研究具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文通過(guò)對(duì)技術(shù)許可相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的回顧,發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)有研究存在以下不足：第一,大部分文獻(xiàn)都假定企業(yè)的研發(fā)結(jié)局是確定的,而事實(shí)上研發(fā)結(jié)局往往是不確定的,研發(fā)結(jié)局不確定情況下的技術(shù)許可策略問(wèn)題更值得研究；第二,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)還沒(méi)有涉及到對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和消費(fèi)者具有不同質(zhì)量偏好情況下的最優(yōu)許可策略問(wèn)題的研究；第三,從供應(yīng)鏈上下游的角度對(duì)技術(shù)許可問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究還未得到足夠的重視,這方面的研究也缺乏系統(tǒng)性。 本文首先在差異化的Stackelberg框架下研究了研發(fā)結(jié)局的不確定性對(duì)最優(yōu)許可策略選擇的影響。我們建立了一個(gè)三階段(即研發(fā)階段、許可階段和生產(chǎn)階段)雙寡頭博弈模型,分析了產(chǎn)品異質(zhì)性和技術(shù)溢出對(duì)隨機(jī)研發(fā)企業(yè)最優(yōu)許可策略的影響。研究表明：(1)固定費(fèi)許可和產(chǎn)量提成許可的優(yōu)劣與產(chǎn)品異質(zhì)性和技術(shù)溢出密切相關(guān)；(2)當(dāng)技術(shù)溢出程度較低時(shí),兩部制許可為最優(yōu)的許可策略；(3)產(chǎn)量提成許可和兩部制許可下,最優(yōu)的提成率取決于技術(shù)溢出的程度,且提成率有可能高于許可后受許可方成本降低的程度。 其次,在研發(fā)成功后的正常產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)上,本文在差異化的Stackelberg框架下對(duì)Wang (2002)的研究進(jìn)行了拓展。研究表明：(1)非顯著性創(chuàng)新下,產(chǎn)量提成許可總是優(yōu)于固定費(fèi)許可,顯著性創(chuàng)新下,當(dāng)產(chǎn)品差異程度較大時(shí)產(chǎn)量提成許可優(yōu)于固定費(fèi)許可,當(dāng)產(chǎn)品差異程度較小時(shí)固定費(fèi)許可和產(chǎn)量提成許可均不會(huì)發(fā)生。這一結(jié)論與Wang (2002)有很大的不同；(2)不管產(chǎn)品差異程度和創(chuàng)新規(guī)模如何,兩部制許可總是優(yōu)于固定費(fèi)許可；(3)非顯著性創(chuàng)新下,兩部制許可總是優(yōu)于產(chǎn)量提成許可,而顯著性創(chuàng)新下,根據(jù)產(chǎn)品替代程度的不同,最優(yōu)的許可策略可能是兩部制許可也可能是產(chǎn)量提成許可。此外,本文還從供應(yīng)鏈上下游市場(chǎng)的角度,研究了下游市場(chǎng)的技術(shù)許可決策。研究表明：(1)上游潛在進(jìn)入者的進(jìn)入決策受進(jìn)入成本、下游在位創(chuàng)新者的許可決策、下游企業(yè)間的技術(shù)差距和下游市場(chǎng)上產(chǎn)品間的替代程度的影響；(2)下游創(chuàng)新者是否實(shí)施許可與其創(chuàng)新規(guī)模、下游企業(yè)間的技術(shù)差距以及上游潛在進(jìn)入者的進(jìn)入決策有關(guān)。 最后,在研發(fā)成功后的網(wǎng)絡(luò)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)上,本文在考慮網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和消費(fèi)者質(zhì)量偏好差異的情況下,通過(guò)建立多階段Stackelberg博弈模型,對(duì)在位創(chuàng)新企業(yè)的最優(yōu)許可策略進(jìn)行了分析。研究表明：(1)對(duì)位創(chuàng)新者來(lái)說(shuō),無(wú)論網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)度如何,固定費(fèi)許可均不是最優(yōu)的許可策略,隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)度增加,最優(yōu)的許可策略由產(chǎn)量提成許可變?yōu)閮刹恐圃S可；(2)對(duì)消費(fèi)者來(lái)說(shuō),無(wú)論網(wǎng)絡(luò)強(qiáng)度和產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量差異如何不許可策略總是占優(yōu)策略；而在許可發(fā)生時(shí),固定費(fèi)許可下消費(fèi)者剩余最大,產(chǎn)量提成許可下消費(fèi)者剩余最小。(3)從提高社會(huì)福利的角度來(lái)說(shuō),無(wú)論網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)度如何,產(chǎn)量提成許可均不是最優(yōu)的許可策略。此外,本文還從供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的角度研究了供應(yīng)商的批發(fā)價(jià)格決策、網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)度、市場(chǎng)規(guī)模和潛在受許可方的研發(fā)投入對(duì)在位創(chuàng)新者最優(yōu)技術(shù)許可策略選擇的影響。研究結(jié)果表明：(1)對(duì)于在位創(chuàng)新者而言,不論市場(chǎng)規(guī)模、網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)強(qiáng)度和潛在受許可方的研發(fā)成本如何,兩部制許可為最優(yōu)的技術(shù)許可策略；(2)產(chǎn)量提成許可和兩部制許可可以有效降低因“雙重邊際效應(yīng)”給供應(yīng)鏈帶來(lái)的效率損失,從而在一定程度上實(shí)現(xiàn)了供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:Technology licensing is an important part of enterprise technological innovation management, an important form of technology transfer under the patent system, and an important way for patent owners to obtain technological innovation benefits through the technology market. Technology license is the most rapid and effective way to improve the technological innovation ability of enterprises, in addition to independent innovation. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to carry out the research. Through the review of relevant literature on technology licensing, this paper finds that the existing research has the following shortcomings: first, most of the literature assumes that the enterprise's R & D outcome is determined, and the fact that the R & D outcome is often uncertain and the technology licensing strategy under the uncertainty of the R & D outcome Second, the existing literature does not involve the study of the optimal licensing strategy for network externalities and consumers with different quality preferences. Third, the research on technical licensing from the angle of upstream and downstream of the supply chain has not been paid enough attention, and the research in this respect is also lack of systematic research. Sex.
This paper first studies the influence of the uncertainty of R & D outcome on the optimal licensing strategy under the differentiated Stackelberg framework. We establish a three stage duopoly game model (R & D stage, licensing stage and production stage), and analyze the optimal licensing strategy of product heterogeneity and technology spillover to stochastic R & D Enterprises. The study shows that: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of fixed fee licensing and production license licensing are closely related to product heterogeneity and technology spillover; (2) when technology spillovers are low, the two part license is the best licensing strategy; (3) the optimal rate of extraction depends on the degree of technology spillover and the rate of yield under the license of production and two parts. It is possible to reduce the cost of the licensee after licensing.
Secondly, in the normal product market after successful development, this paper expands the research of Wang (2002) under the different Stackelberg framework. The study shows that (1) under the non significant innovation, the production license is always superior to the fixed fee license. Under the significant innovation, the production license is superior to the fixed fee when the product difference is large. Permit, when the product difference is small, the fixed fee license and the yield license will not happen. This conclusion is very different from the Wang (2002). (2) no matter the degree of product difference and the scale of innovation, the two part license is always better than the fixed fee license; (3) under the non explicit innovation, the two department license is always better than the yield promotion permit. But under the significant innovation, according to the different degree of replacement of the product, the optimal licensing strategy may be the two part license and the production license. In addition, this paper also studies the technological licensing decision of the downstream market from the angle of the upstream and downstream markets of the supply chain. The study shows that (1) the entry decision of the upstream potential enters is entered into the decision. The licensing decisions of the downstream incumbent innovators, the technological gap between the downstream enterprises and the substitution degree between the downstream markets; (2) the implementation of the downstream innovators is related to their innovation scale, the technological gap between the downstream enterprises and the incoming decision of the upstream potential entrants.
Finally, in the network product market after research and development, this paper analyzes the optimal licensing strategy of an incumbent innovation enterprise by establishing a multi-stage Stackelberg game model under the consideration of the network externality and the difference of consumer quality preference. The study shows that: (1) how the network effect intensity is concerned to the counterpart innovators. Fixed fee license is not the best license policy. With the increase of network effect intensity, the optimal licensing strategy is changed from yield license to two part license. (2) for consumers, no matter how the network intensity and product quality difference are not permitted, the strategy is always dominant; and the fixed fee is allowed to leave the consumer at the time of licensing. The surplus is the biggest. (3) from the point of view of improving the social welfare, no matter how strong the network effect is, the yield licensing is not the best licensing strategy. In addition, this paper also studies the supplier's wholesale price decision, network effect intensity, market scale and potential acceptance from the perspective of supply chain coordination. The effect of Licensor's R & D investment on the choice of optimal technology licensing strategy of incumbent innovators. The results show: (1) for the incumbent, whether the market size, the network effect intensity and the potential licensee's R & D cost, the two system license as the best technical licensing strategy; (2) yield licensing and two licensing It can effectively reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the "double marginal effect" to the supply chain, thus achieving the coordination of supply chain to a certain extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1

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本文編號(hào)：1956122