本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 + 參與者行為�。� 參考：《東北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),可持續(xù)發(fā)展和循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)受到世界各國(guó)的重視,同時(shí)與之相關(guān)聯(lián)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈問(wèn)題成為社會(huì)關(guān)注的重要議題之一。閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈多種渠道回收模式在再制造生產(chǎn)運(yùn)營(yíng)中已屬常見(jiàn),閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道相關(guān)問(wèn)題受到了更加廣泛的關(guān)注,因此雙渠道回收定價(jià)策略研究具有十分重要的理論及現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。另一方面,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈中的參與者的一些行為因素,如討價(jià)還價(jià)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度、公平關(guān)切等,使得傳統(tǒng)的運(yùn)籌學(xué)理論不能直接應(yīng)用于以人為中心的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中。探討參與者的行為對(duì)系統(tǒng)運(yùn)作和最優(yōu)策略的影響成為目前研究的熱點(diǎn)之一。所以,把行為科學(xué)引入到閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈策略研究中,在定價(jià)模型里考慮到參與者的行為因素,同樣具有重要的理論與實(shí)踐意義。本文在總結(jié)分析國(guó)內(nèi)外閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收定價(jià)策略研究及行為供應(yīng)鏈的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)考慮參與者行為因素的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈雙渠道回收定價(jià)策略進(jìn)行了研究。研究工作主要有以下三個(gè)方面：(1)考慮參與者討價(jià)還價(jià)能力的雙渠道回收定價(jià)與協(xié)調(diào)策略。針對(duì)再制造商委托第三方回收商同時(shí)回收的雙渠道回收模式,在分散決策和集中決策不同情形下,運(yùn)用博弈論方法研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)機(jī)制與協(xié)調(diào)策略；考慮到各參與者的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力,采用Rubinstein討價(jià)還價(jià)模型及貼現(xiàn)因子理論進(jìn)行閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈策略協(xié)調(diào)分析及收益的Pareto改進(jìn)；最后通過(guò)算例驗(yàn)證定價(jià)機(jī)制與協(xié)調(diào)策略的有效性。(2)考慮回收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的雙渠道回收定價(jià)策略。針對(duì)再制造商委托零售商和第三方回收商負(fù)責(zé)回收的雙渠道回收模式,考慮到回收渠道間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系及各參與者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避行為,分別構(gòu)建有無(wú)回收渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)制造商主導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈模型以及合作情形下的集中決策博弈模型,利用博弈理論對(duì)模型進(jìn)行分析求解；最后通過(guò)數(shù)值分析進(jìn)一步說(shuō)明參與者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避行為對(duì)回收價(jià)格和收益等的影響。(3)考慮參與者公平關(guān)切的雙渠道回收定價(jià)策略。針對(duì)制造商及委托零售商同時(shí)回收的雙渠道回收模式,把參與者公平關(guān)切行為引入閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈雙渠道回收模式中,分別針對(duì)參與者公平中性、僅制造商存在公平關(guān)切、僅零售商存在公平關(guān)切和雙方同時(shí)存在公平關(guān)切的四種情形構(gòu)建相應(yīng)定價(jià)決策模型,利用博弈理論對(duì)模型進(jìn)行分析求解；最后通過(guò)數(shù)值分析進(jìn)一步說(shuō)明參與者公平關(guān)切對(duì)回收價(jià)格和收益等的影響。最后,總結(jié)了本文的主要研究成果及結(jié)論、研究局限及未來(lái)需要進(jìn)一步開(kāi)展的工作。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the sustainable development and the circular economy have been paid much attention by all countries in the world. At the same time, the closed loop supply chain problem associated with it has become one of the important issues of social concern. The multi channel recycling mode of the closed loop supply chain is common in the Remanufacturing production and operation, and the related problems of the closed-loop supply chain recovery channel have been more widely closed. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the pricing strategy of dual channel recycling. On the other hand, some behavioral factors, such as bargaining, risk attitude and fair concern, have been found in the supply chain, which makes the traditional operational research theory cannot be directly used in the human centered supply chain system. The influence of the behavior of the person on the system operation and the optimal strategy has become one of the hotspots of the current research. Therefore, it is also of great theoretical and practical significance to introduce behavioral science into the study of closed loop supply chain strategy and consider the actor's behavior factors in the pricing model. On the basis of price strategy research and behavior supply chain, the dual channel recovery pricing strategy of closed loop Supply Chain Considering participants' behavior factors is studied. The research work mainly has three aspects as follows: (1) dual channel recovery pricing and coordination strategy considering participants' bargaining power. Third party recyclers are entrusted to the remanufacturer. At the same time, the dual channel recycling model is used to study the pricing mechanism and coordination strategy of closed loop supply chain by game theory under the different situations of decentralized and centralized decision-making. Considering the bargaining power of the participants, the Rubinstein bargaining model and the discounted factor theory are used to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain strategy. Pareto improvement of revenue; finally, the validity of pricing mechanism and coordination strategy is verified by an example. (2) double channel recovery pricing strategy for recycling competition and risk aversion is considered. The dual channel recycling model for remanufacturer responsible for remanufacturer and third party recyclers is considered, and the competition relationship among the recycling channels and the participants are considered. The Stackelberg game model and the centralized decision game model under the cooperative situation are constructed, and the game theory is used to analyze the model. Finally, numerical analysis is used to further illustrate the effect of the risk avoidance behavior of the participants on the recovery price and income. (3) the dual channel recovery pricing strategy considering participants' fair concern is considered. In the dual channel recovery model, which is recovered by the manufacturer and the entrustment retailer, the participant fair concern is introduced into the closed-loop supply chain dual channel recovery mode, and the participants are fair neutral to the participants, only the manufacturers have fair concerns, only the retailers exist public. In the four cases of fair concern and both sides, the corresponding pricing model is constructed, and the game theory is used to analyze the model. Finally, the effects of the participants' fair concern on the recovery price and income are further explained by the numerical analysis. Finally, the main research results and conclusions are summarized, and the limitations of the research are summarized. And further work to be carried out in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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