重大工程供應鏈協(xié)同合作利益分配研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-05-16 20:16
本文選題:協(xié)同合作 + 決策模式 ; 參考:《中國管理科學》2017年05期
【摘要】:本文以重大工程中承包商與供應商協(xié)同合作問題為研究對象,考慮到?jīng)Q策主體的決策環(huán)境、決策順序和決策目的的不同,從分散決策模式、集中決策模式兩種模式分別建立相應的協(xié)同合作動態(tài)博弈模型,模型構建考慮到承包商與供應商的異質(zhì)性,從而突出兩者對協(xié)同合作貢獻的不同權重,并分析給出不同模式下的最優(yōu)利益分配機制、最優(yōu)努力程度和供應鏈系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)收益,最后進行比較分析與數(shù)值模擬。研究結(jié)果表明:當承包商和供應商的努力都對產(chǎn)出有影響時,不管哪種決策模式,承包商與供應商的協(xié)同合作必須要分享收益才可以激發(fā)合作積極性,而收益分配系數(shù)只與雙方的產(chǎn)出貢獻權重有關;存在雙邊道德風險時,承包商在分散決策模式下的收益高于集中決策模式,因而承包商傾向于選擇分散決策模式,而供應商則相反,但承包商與供應商選擇集中決策模式對供應鏈系統(tǒng)整體收益最優(yōu)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the cooperative cooperation between contractors and suppliers in major projects is studied. Considering the different decision environment, order and purpose of decision making, the model of decentralized decision is taken into account. The two modes of centralized decision making establish corresponding dynamic game models of cooperative cooperation respectively. The model construction takes into account the heterogeneity of contractors and suppliers, thus highlighting the different weights of the contribution of the two models to collaborative cooperation. The optimal benefit distribution mechanism, the optimal effort degree and the optimal return of the supply chain system under different modes are analyzed and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis and numerical simulation are carried out. The results show that when the efforts of both the contractor and the supplier have an impact on the output, no matter what kind of decision-making model, the collaborative cooperation between the contractor and the supplier must share the benefits in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of cooperation. The profit distribution coefficient is only related to the weight of the contribution of both parties. In the presence of bilateral moral hazard, the contractor's income in the decentralized decision-making mode is higher than that in the centralized decision-making model, so the contractor tends to choose the decentralized decision-making model. The supplier is opposite, but the contractor and supplier choose the centralized decision mode to optimize the overall profit of the supply chain system.
【作者單位】: 南京大學工程管理學院;
【基金】:國家自然科學基金重大項目(71390520,71390521);國家自然科學基金資助項目(71571098,71501084,71301062,71271107) 江蘇省研究生培養(yǎng)創(chuàng)新工程項目(KYZZ15_0023,KYLX15_0031) 南京大博士研究生創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)意研究計劃資助項目(2016010)
【分類號】:F274;F426.92
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,本文編號:1898250
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