本文選題：討價(jià)還價(jià) + 供應(yīng)鏈契約��； 參考：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展,在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的大環(huán)境下,供應(yīng)鏈間的競爭日益激烈,而供應(yīng)鏈的利潤分配會(huì)引發(fā)其內(nèi)部的競爭。由此導(dǎo)致的談判破裂使雙方蒙受巨大的損失,甚至影響到整條供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作。在供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制中,契約作為一種激勵(lì)手段可以在不損害某個(gè)成員利益的前提下,優(yōu)化整條供應(yīng)鏈,即帕累托改進(jìn)。雖然供應(yīng)鏈契約的研究已經(jīng)比較成熟,但是關(guān)于討價(jià)還價(jià)機(jī)制的研究起步相對較晚。將供應(yīng)鏈契約和討價(jià)還價(jià)機(jī)制相結(jié)合的文獻(xiàn)還很少,因此,本文將供應(yīng)鏈契約應(yīng)用于討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈中,可以解決供應(yīng)鏈成員的談判機(jī)制喜好和成員間的利潤分配問題,從而使供應(yīng)鏈在競爭中處于優(yōu)勢。本文針對可替代性不同的產(chǎn)品,基于三種討價(jià)還價(jià)機(jī)制,研究了不同的傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈契約對其產(chǎn)生的影響。首先,本文提出了基于一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和兩個(gè)零售商的基礎(chǔ)模型,然后對同時(shí)談判、序貫談判和價(jià)格匹配這三種談判方式進(jìn)行分析比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)單純依靠談判無法協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈。為了使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu),本文將保險(xiǎn)契約、收益共享契約和銷售回購契約應(yīng)用到討價(jià)還價(jià)問題的求解過程中,最后,對不同的契約與談判機(jī)制的組合對于供應(yīng)鏈績效的影響進(jìn)行分析比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)將在談判過程中應(yīng)用供應(yīng)鏈契約可以有效的提高供應(yīng)鏈的績效,說明本文的研究具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義和應(yīng)用價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the competition between supply chains is becoming more and more fierce under the environment of economic globalization, and the profit distribution of supply chain will lead to internal competition. The resulting breakdown of the negotiations caused huge losses to both parties and even affected the operation of the entire supply chain. In the supply chain coordination mechanism, the contract, as an incentive method, can optimize the whole supply chain without harming the interests of a member, that is, Pareto improvement. Although the research of supply chain contract is mature, the research on bargaining mechanism is relatively late. There are few literatures on the combination of supply chain contract and bargaining mechanism. Therefore, this paper applies supply chain contract to bargaining game, which can solve the problem of negotiation mechanism preference and profit distribution among supply chain members. So that the supply chain in the competition in the advantage. Based on three bargaining mechanisms, the influence of different traditional supply chain contracts on alternative products is studied in this paper. Firstly, this paper proposes a basic model based on one supplier and two retailers, and then analyzes and compares the three negotiation modes: simultaneous negotiation, sequential negotiation and price matching. It is found that negotiation alone can not coordinate the supply chain. In order to achieve Pareto optimal supply chain, this paper applies insurance contract, income sharing contract and sales repurchase contract to the solution of the bargaining problem. By analyzing and comparing the effects of different contract and negotiation mechanism on supply chain performance, it is found that supply chain contract can effectively improve the performance of supply chain in the negotiation process. It shows that the research in this paper has certain practical significance and application value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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