本文選題：生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品 + 雙渠道��； 參考：《云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：趁著電子商務(wù)火熱勢頭,越來越多的生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品企業(yè)紛紛增設(shè)線上直銷渠道,迅速發(fā)展起來,發(fā)展雙渠道銷售模式,這樣便使得傳統(tǒng)的線下零售商與線上供應(yīng)商不再只是上下游的關(guān)系,還存在著競爭關(guān)系,雖然在一定范圍內(nèi)的競爭能夠使得交易市場向積極方面發(fā)展,但是在缺乏有效管制的情況下,隨之發(fā)生渠道沖突,引起整個供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)利潤下滑。通過分析生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)營模式,然后采取措施協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道之間的沖突,本文將從這一方面展開研究,得出結(jié)論。首先,通過大量文獻(xiàn)閱讀總結(jié),充分了解有關(guān)于生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,總結(jié)雙渠道的流通模式、沖突類型、為何產(chǎn)生沖突和如何設(shè)計(jì)契約理論協(xié)調(diào)沖突。其次,通過博弈理論針對生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈構(gòu)建相關(guān)模型。一開始對生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型簡單描述,并根據(jù)其特殊性假設(shè)參數(shù),然后構(gòu)建無任何契約協(xié)調(diào)的基礎(chǔ)下集中模式和分散模式模型,并通過分析得出結(jié)論。然后采用價(jià)格折扣契約和收益共享契約構(gòu)建模型,進(jìn)行分析,使生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈消除沖突得到協(xié)調(diào),并得出相關(guān)結(jié)論,在使用價(jià)格折扣契約協(xié)調(diào)的條件下,還引入了轉(zhuǎn)移支付機(jī)制。然后,通過調(diào)查的數(shù)據(jù)與文獻(xiàn)的參數(shù)設(shè)置,結(jié)合本文研究特點(diǎn),確定參數(shù)值,進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析,驗(yàn)證模型的可行性。同時通過MATLAB7.0計(jì)算和作圖進(jìn)行分析影響生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈利潤的價(jià)格折扣率、新鮮度和市場份額等決策變量。最后,歸納總結(jié)了本文研究的結(jié)論,同時發(fā)現(xiàn)不足,確定未來的研究方向。綜上分析,得出在無任何契約的情況下,生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈各參與者集中決策情況下所獲得利潤高于分散決策,因此采用協(xié)調(diào)契約使分散決策下利潤最優(yōu)。分析發(fā)現(xiàn),價(jià)格折扣和收益共享契約都能夠起到協(xié)調(diào)生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的作用,但是價(jià)格折扣需采取轉(zhuǎn)移支付機(jī)制,才能夠促使供應(yīng)鏈和零售商接受價(jià)格折扣契約,使得利潤最優(yōu),收益共享契約需采取合理的收益共享系數(shù),否則仍無法協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈。通過決策變量的影響分析,可以得到通過提高價(jià)格折扣率,能夠增大供應(yīng)鏈各參與者的利潤,新鮮度也一樣,隨著新鮮度增大,供應(yīng)鏈的利潤也隨之增加,市場份額也能影響生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈各參與者利潤,供給商和零售商兩者都會爭取更大市場份額,使自身利潤最優(yōu)化。
[Abstract]:Taking advantage of the momentum of e-commerce, more and more enterprises of fresh agricultural products have added online direct marketing channels, developed rapidly, and developed a dual-channel sales model. In this way, the traditional offline retailers and online suppliers are not only upstream and downstream, but also competitive, although the competition in a certain range can make the trading market develop in a positive way. However, in the absence of effective regulation, channel conflicts occur, which leads to the decline of profit in the whole supply chain system. By analyzing the operation mode of the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, and then taking measures to coordinate the conflict between the two channels, this paper will carry out a study from this aspect and draw a conclusion. First of all, through a large number of literature review and summary, we fully understand the current situation of supply chain development of fresh agricultural products, summarize the circulation model, conflict types, why conflicts and how to design contract theory to coordinate conflicts. Secondly, the game theory is used to build the relevant model for the supply chain of fresh agricultural products. At first, the coordination model of supply chain for fresh agricultural products is described simply, and then the centralized model and decentralized model without any contract coordination are constructed according to its special hypothetical parameters, and the conclusion is drawn through analysis. Then we use the price discount contract and the revenue sharing contract to build a model to analyze the coordination of the conflict elimination in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, and draw the relevant conclusions, under the condition of price discount contract coordination. The transfer payment mechanism is also introduced. Then, through the data of the investigation and the parameter setting of the literature, combined with the characteristics of this paper, the value of the parameters is determined, the numerical analysis is carried out, and the feasibility of the model is verified. At the same time, through MATLAB7.0 calculation and mapping, the decision variables such as price discount rate, freshness and market share, which affect the profit of supply chain of fresh agricultural products are analyzed. At last, the conclusion of this paper is summarized, and the deficiency is found at the same time, and the future research direction is determined. Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that in the case of no contract, the profit of the participants in the dual-channel supply chain of fresh agricultural products is higher than that of the decentralized decision in the case of centralized decision, so the coordination contract is used to make the profit optimal under the decentralized decision. It is found that both the price discount and the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products, but the price discount needs to adopt the transfer payment mechanism in order to promote the supply chain and the retailer to accept the price discount contract. In order to make the profit optimal, the revenue sharing contract should adopt the reasonable revenue sharing coefficient, otherwise it can not coordinate the supply chain. Through the analysis of the influence of decision variables, we can get that by increasing the discount rate of price, we can increase the profit of each participant in the supply chain, and the freshness is the same. With the increase of freshness, the profit of the supply chain also increases. Market share can also affect the profit of all participants in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products. Both suppliers and retailers will strive for a larger market share to optimize their own profits.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F323.7

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