本文選題：三級供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) + 模糊需求��； 參考：《東北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球化的不斷深入和發(fā)展,產(chǎn)品生命周期縮短、市場需求的不確定性加劇,市場競爭由企業(yè)之間的競爭演變成供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭。供應(yīng)鏈中各成員從自身收益出發(fā),易發(fā)生利益沖突,使供應(yīng)鏈效率降低,對供應(yīng)鏈進行協(xié)調(diào)以提高供應(yīng)鏈整體效益勢在必行。契約作為供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的重要機制可以在供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)中發(fā)揮很大作用。供應(yīng)鏈成員的行為因素影響其決策,進而影響契約對供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)效果。因此研究在不確定需求下考慮行為因素如何用契約協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈決策以提高供應(yīng)鏈的運作效率具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實意義。本文的研究工作主要包括以下幾個方面：(1)模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)研究。在三角模糊數(shù)理論和供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)模型的基礎(chǔ)上,分別構(gòu)建了分散無協(xié)調(diào)、集中決策、收益共享契約協(xié)調(diào)及數(shù)量折扣契約協(xié)調(diào)四種情況的模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈決策模型。運用Stackelberg主從對策理論和多元線性方程對模型進行求解。通過算例分析證明收益共享契約和數(shù)量折扣契約都能在一定程度上實現(xiàn)對供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。(2)模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)研究。設(shè)計了由數(shù)量折扣契約和收益共享契約構(gòu)成的聯(lián)合契約,建立了模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)模型。對模型進行求解并通過算例分析得出,此種聯(lián)合契約比單一的收益共享契約或數(shù)量折扣契約對供應(yīng)鏈有更好的協(xié)調(diào)效果。(3)模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈考慮公平偏好的聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)研究。假設(shè)供應(yīng)鏈中多個零售商具有不同公平偏好,構(gòu)建了模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)效用模型。對模型進行求解并通過算例分析得出,零售商的公平偏好,不會影響聯(lián)合契約對模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)性。但零售商的公平偏好程度越高,其對供應(yīng)鏈的效用影響越大。本文構(gòu)建的模糊需求下三級供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)模型以及對多個零售商公平偏好的考慮,更加符合供應(yīng)鏈運作的實際背景,豐富、充實了供應(yīng)鏈管理領(lǐng)域的研究,對提高供應(yīng)鏈運作效率具有實際參考價值。
[Abstract]:With the deepening and development of globalization, the product life cycle is shortened and the uncertainty of market demand intensifies. Market competition evolves from competition between enterprises to competition between supply chains. It is imperative to coordinate the supply chain in order to improve the overall benefit of the supply chain because the members of the supply chain are prone to conflict of interest from their own income and reduce the efficiency of the supply chain. As an important mechanism of supply chain coordination, contract can play an important role in supply chain coordination. The behavior factors of supply chain members influence their decision making and the coordination effect of contract on supply chain. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study how to coordinate supply chain decisions by contract in order to improve the operational efficiency of supply chain under uncertain demand. The research work of this paper mainly includes the following aspects: 1) contract coordination of three-level supply chain under fuzzy demand. On the basis of triangular fuzzy number theory and supply chain contract coordination model, the three-level supply chain decision model under fuzzy demand is constructed, which includes decentralized non-coordination, centralized decision-making, revenue-sharing contract coordination and quantity discount contract coordination. The model is solved by using Stackelberg master-slave game theory and multivariate linear equations. Through the example analysis, it is proved that both the revenue-sharing contract and the quantity discount contract can achieve the coordination of supply chain to a certain extent. A joint contract consisting of quantity discount contract and revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination model of joint contract in three-level supply chain under fuzzy demand is established. The model is solved and analyzed by an example. This kind of joint contract has better coordination effect on supply chain than single profit-sharing contract or quantity discount contract. Assuming that many retailers in the supply chain have different fairness preferences, a three-level supply chain joint contract coordination utility model is constructed under fuzzy demand. By solving the model and analyzing an example, it is concluded that the fairness preference of retailers will not affect the coordination of three-level supply chain under fuzzy demand by joint contract. However, the higher the retailer's fair preference, the greater the impact on supply chain utility. The joint contract coordination model of three-level supply chain under fuzzy demand and the consideration of the fairness preference of many retailers are more in line with the actual background of supply chain operation and enrich the research of supply chain management. It has practical reference value for improving the efficiency of supply chain operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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