本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 + 質(zhì)量控制　； 參考：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在近十幾年里,人們的環(huán)保意識增強并且國家的環(huán)保法規(guī)也日漸完善,企業(yè)在追求經(jīng)濟利潤的同時也越來越重視對自身所產(chǎn)生的社會責任,開始對本公司的廢舊產(chǎn)品進行回收管理,注重循環(huán)經(jīng)濟模式對企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。而閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的管理使得整個系統(tǒng)達到可持續(xù)經(jīng)濟模式,在保持經(jīng)濟增長的同時進行循環(huán)利用,正符合了循環(huán)經(jīng)濟的理念。在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的逆向回收管理中,企業(yè)進行創(chuàng)收的同時,也正向強化了自身的企業(yè)社會責任,提高了企業(yè)的核心競爭力。在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,各節(jié)點都是獨立進行決策,要達到閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的收益最大化,則要通過各節(jié)點的合作來完成整個閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的目標。因此,本文研究了不同主體負責回收時,影響回收產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量管理的回收水平和質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平對各節(jié)點和閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈期望收益的影響,通過設(shè)計質(zhì)量激勵契約來達到閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,本文從質(zhì)量管理角度,探討在非對稱信息條件下,對影響回收產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的因素進行分析,建立委托代理模型,并通過對比各節(jié)點和閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的收益,建立質(zhì)量激勵契約來實現(xiàn)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的質(zhì)量控制管理。本文使用maple18對模型數(shù)據(jù)進行數(shù)值仿真分析。本文的主要研究工作及其結(jié)論有:(1)在銷售商作為回收主體時,質(zhì)量檢測水平同質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平因素呈反比,同回收水平因素呈正比;在再制造商作為回收主體時,質(zhì)量檢測水平同質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平因素和回收水平因素都成反比。(2)在銷售商負責回收時,選擇回收水平進行信號傳遞比選擇質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平進行信號傳遞的效果更好。(3)在再制造商負責回收時,銷售商進行質(zhì)量控制后,能促進再制造商質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平和回收水平的提高,此時閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈有最優(yōu)期望收益,銷售商和再制造商的期望收益也同時達到最優(yōu)。對比已有的國內(nèi)外文獻,本文的創(chuàng)新之處有:(1)本文是在非對稱信息的條件下,研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的質(zhì)量管理問題。在已有的質(zhì)量管理文獻中,多以完全信息為前提進行模型構(gòu)建,基于回收產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的不確定性,在實際應(yīng)用中有一定局限性。非對稱信息條件下研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理更符合實際。(2)在研究廢舊電子產(chǎn)品的回收質(zhì)量控制問題中,進行道德風險的討論。在回收和再制造過程中,本文不僅研究了再制造件制造前逆向選擇的道德風險問題,同時也研究了再制造件制造后,再制造商有隱藏再制造件質(zhì)量的道德風險問題。(3)本文引入雙因素影響下的質(zhì)量激勵機制。分析了回收水平因素和質(zhì)量預(yù)防水平因素在分別作用和共同作用下,對各節(jié)點和閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的整體期望收益影響。
[Abstract]:In the past ten years, people's environmental awareness has been strengthened and the national environmental protection laws and regulations have been gradually improved. Enterprises are also paying more and more attention to their own social responsibility while pursuing economic profits. Start recycling management of the company's waste products, pay attention to the sustainable development of the recycling economy model for enterprises. The management of the closed-loop supply chain makes the whole system achieve the sustainable economic model, while maintaining economic growth and recycling, which is in line with the concept of circular economy. In the reverse recovery management of closed-loop supply chain, while enterprises generate income, they also strengthen their own corporate social responsibility and improve their core competitiveness. In the closed-loop supply chain, each node makes the decision independently. In order to maximize the profit of the closed-loop supply chain, the goal of the whole closed-loop supply chain must be accomplished through the cooperation of each node. Therefore, when different agents are responsible for recycling, the influence of recovery level and quality prevention level on the expected income of each node and closed-loop supply chain is studied. The coordination of closed-loop supply chain is achieved by designing quality incentive contract. On the basis of previous studies, this paper discusses the factors affecting the quality of recycled products under asymmetric information conditions from the point of view of quality management, establishes a principal-agent model, and compares the benefits of each node and the closed-loop supply chain. Establish quality incentive contract to realize quality control management of closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, maple18 is used to simulate the model data. The main research work and conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) when the seller is the main body of recycling, the quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor, and is directly proportional to the recovery level factor, and when the manufacturer is the recycling main body, the quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor. The quality detection level is inversely proportional to the quality prevention level factor and the recovery level factor) when the seller is responsible for the recovery, Selecting the recovery level for signal transmission is better than selecting the quality prevention level for signal transmission.) when the re-manufacturer is responsible for the recovery, the seller can promote the improvement of the quality prevention level and the recovery level of the re-manufacturer after the quality control. At this time, the closed-loop supply chain has the optimal expected return, and the expected return of the seller and the re-manufacturer is also optimal. Comparing with the domestic and foreign literature, the innovation of this paper is to study the quality management of closed-loop supply chain under the condition of asymmetric information. In the existing quality management literature, most of the models are constructed on the premise of complete information. Based on the uncertainty of the quality of recycled products, there are some limitations in practical application. The study of closed-loop supply chain quality management under asymmetric information is more in line with the reality. (2) in the study of recycling quality control of used and end-of-life electronic products, moral hazard is discussed. In the process of recycling and remanufacturing, this paper not only studies the moral hazard of adverse selection before remanufacturing, but also studies the problem after remanufacturing. The re-manufacturer has the moral hazard problem of hidden remanufactured part quality. (3) this paper introduces the quality incentive mechanism under the influence of two factors. The effect of recovery level factor and quality prevention level factor on the overall expected income of each node and closed-loop supply chain is analyzed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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