本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 供應(yīng)鏈風險�。� 參考：《南京大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球化的發(fā)展和推動,供應(yīng)鏈在全球范圍內(nèi)的延伸,企業(yè)之間的競爭越來越表現(xiàn)為企業(yè)所在供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭,同時技術(shù)進步和需求的多樣化也使得產(chǎn)品周期不斷縮短,企業(yè)面臨縮短交貨期、降低產(chǎn)品成本、維持產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的壓力。由此,供應(yīng)鏈上的產(chǎn)品偷工減料問題愈發(fā)頻繁,也越來越難以控制。在產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量問題日益嚴峻的今天,產(chǎn)品偷工減料導致了許多產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量事故,造成了嚴重的經(jīng)濟和健康損失。在管理生活和研究中,貿(mào)易信貸,作為一種控制產(chǎn)品偷工減料的控制手段,被廣泛使用并得到不斷發(fā)展。貿(mào)易信貸是指企業(yè)間由于產(chǎn)品或者服務(wù)交易而發(fā)生的商業(yè)信用,包括貿(mào)易信貸信用和預(yù)付貨款信用。貿(mào)易信貸具有緩解資金約束、傳遞產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息、充當非價格競爭手段以及協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的功能,貿(mào)易信貸也是企業(yè)短期融資的主要來源和重要手段,因此交易信用在實踐中得到了廣泛的應(yīng)用。貿(mào)易信貸的普遍存在及其對企業(yè)運營的重要影響引起了學術(shù)界的密切關(guān)注,目前已有研究從運營管理的視角分析了貿(mào)易信貸與控制產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系。本文從供應(yīng)鏈管理的視角研究了貿(mào)易信貸對上游供應(yīng)商的偷工減料的生產(chǎn)行為的影響,具體的研究內(nèi)容包括:在斯坦科爾伯格博弈下,在給定貿(mào)易信貸合約時,銷售商使用貿(mào)易信貸可以防止供應(yīng)商的偷工減料的生產(chǎn)行為,并獲得最優(yōu)的銷售利潤。研究最優(yōu)的貿(mào)易信貸合同,我們可以得到如下結(jié)論:(1)當供應(yīng)商偷工減料的成本相對降低時,供應(yīng)商偷工減料的動機也相對升高,銷售商可以通過增加最優(yōu)付款期限來管理供應(yīng)商的偷工減料的生產(chǎn)行為;(2)當供應(yīng)商偷工減料的成本相對較低時,貿(mào)易信貸合同管理供應(yīng)商偷工減料的生產(chǎn)行為的效果也較好;(3)當供應(yīng)商的偷工減料動機高時,供應(yīng)商的偷工減料的生產(chǎn)行為也會使得銷售商乃至整個供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)更難獲得更大的利潤;(4)銷售商的最優(yōu)利潤和供應(yīng)商和供應(yīng)商和銷售商的融資成本之差越小,銷售商也更有可能獲得最優(yōu)利潤水平,則更有動機去使用貿(mào)易信貸合同。
[Abstract]:With the development and promotion of globalization and the extension of the supply chain in the global scope, the competition among enterprises is more and more manifested in the competition among the supply chains in which the enterprises belong. At the same time, the technological progress and the diversification of demand also make the product cycle shorter and shorter. Enterprises face the pressure of shortening delivery time, reducing product cost and maintaining product quality. As a result, product jerry-building in the supply chain is becoming more frequent and more difficult to control. Nowadays, the problem of product quality is becoming more and more serious, which results in a lot of product quality accidents and serious economic and health losses. In management life and research, trade credit, as a control means to control product jerry-building, has been widely used and continuously developed. Trade credit refers to the commercial credit between enterprises due to the transaction of products or services, including trade credit and advance payment credit. Trade credit has the functions of relieving financial constraints, transmitting product quality information, acting as a non-price competitive means and coordinating supply chain. Trade credit is also the main source and important means of short-term financing for enterprises. Therefore, transaction credit has been widely used in practice. The widespread existence of trade credit and its important influence on the operation of enterprises have attracted close attention in academic circles. At present, the relationship between trade credit and product quality control has been analyzed from the perspective of operation management. From the perspective of supply chain management, this paper studies the influence of trade credit on the production behavior of upstream suppliers. The specific research contents include: under the condition of Steinkelberg game, when the trade credit contract is given, Vendors use trade credit to prevent suppliers from underperforming production and to achieve optimal sales profits. By studying the optimal trade credit contract, we can draw the following conclusion: 1) when the cost of shoddy by suppliers is relatively low, the incentive for suppliers to cut corners is also relatively higher. Vendors can manage suppliers' shoddy production behavior by increasing the optimal payment period.) when the cost of shoddy is relatively low, Trade credit contracts also have a better effect on the production behavior of suppliers in the management of shoddy production.) when suppliers have a high incentive for cutting corners, The less productive behavior of suppliers also makes it more difficult for vendors and the entire supply chain system to obtain greater profits.) the smaller the difference between the optimal profits of vendors and the financing costs of suppliers and vendors, the smaller the difference between the optimal profits of vendors and the financing costs of suppliers and vendors. Vendors are also more likely to achieve optimal profit levels and are more motivated to use trade credit contracts.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F275;F832.4
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本文編號：1864994