本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 + WEEE��； 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：伴隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展,WEEE所帶來的環(huán)境問題越來越受到學(xué)者和政府的關(guān)注。為了治理WEEE所帶來的環(huán)境問題,各國政府會(huì)選擇實(shí)施相應(yīng)的規(guī)制手段,但不同的政府會(huì)根據(jù)本國的國情采用不同的規(guī)制模式,現(xiàn)有常見的政府規(guī)制模式大致有三種：補(bǔ)貼、收費(fèi)、收費(fèi)與補(bǔ)貼相結(jié)合。然而,不同的政府規(guī)制模式對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各參與方的決策會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同影響。因此,政府該如何制定相應(yīng)的政策?不同的政府規(guī)制模式會(huì)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中的參與各方造成何種影響?以及供應(yīng)鏈中各企業(yè)如何應(yīng)對(duì)現(xiàn)行的政府規(guī)制? 針對(duì)以上問題,本文主要研究由單個(gè)制造商和單個(gè)零售商組成的WEEE閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈�？紤]三種政府規(guī)制模式下,考慮產(chǎn)品差異化情形下,以博弈理論為基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行數(shù)學(xué)建模和求解,最后得出最優(yōu)解,并比較分析了不同政府規(guī)制模式對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體的決策影響。統(tǒng)觀整篇文章,對(duì)本論文的主要工作做如下總結(jié)： (1)對(duì)我國針對(duì)WEEE頒布的相關(guān)法規(guī)條例進(jìn)行大致的梳理,引入產(chǎn)品綠色度概念,構(gòu)建WEEE閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的基本模型,重點(diǎn)突顯政府宏觀調(diào)控和再制造,對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體決策進(jìn)行博弈分析,分析政府規(guī)制和產(chǎn)品綠色度對(duì)決策的影響,并對(duì)比不同政府規(guī)制下政府宏觀調(diào)控工具對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體決策的影響。該研究發(fā)現(xiàn),不同政府規(guī)制模式下,閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體決策將受到不同的影響；產(chǎn)品綠色度與產(chǎn)品的零售價(jià)格以及產(chǎn)品的批發(fā)價(jià)格呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,同時(shí)產(chǎn)品綠色度對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體利潤產(chǎn)生直接影響。 (2)通過對(duì)產(chǎn)品綠色度與產(chǎn)品需求之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析,引入了產(chǎn)品差異化,并在此基礎(chǔ)上,比較分析了不同政府規(guī)制模式對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各主體的決策影響,最后通過數(shù)值仿真得出相應(yīng)的結(jié)論,結(jié)論表明,考慮產(chǎn)品差異化情形下,新產(chǎn)品的綠色度水平只對(duì)新產(chǎn)品的零售價(jià)格和新產(chǎn)品的批發(fā)價(jià)格的決策產(chǎn)生影響,再制造產(chǎn)品的綠色度水平也僅對(duì)再制造產(chǎn)品的零售價(jià)格和再制造產(chǎn)品的批發(fā)價(jià)格的決策產(chǎn)生影響。供應(yīng)鏈中各主體的利潤的影響效果與新產(chǎn)品綠色度水平和再制造產(chǎn)品綠色度水平差異化程度有關(guān)。最后通過數(shù)值仿真得出相應(yīng)的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the environmental problems brought by WEEE have been paid more and more attention by scholars and governments. In order to deal with the environmental problems brought by WEEE, the governments of various countries will choose to implement the corresponding regulatory measures, but different governments will adopt different regulatory models according to their national conditions. There are three common modes of government regulation: subsidies. Charge, charge and subsidize. However, different modes of government regulation have different influences on the decision-making of each participant in the supply chain. Therefore, how should the government formulate corresponding policies? What impact will different government regulation models have on the parties involved in the supply chain? And how to deal with the current government regulation in the supply chain? To solve the above problems, this paper mainly studies the WEEE closed-loop supply chain which consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Considering three government regulation modes and considering product differentiation, mathematical modeling and solution are carried out based on game theory. Finally, the optimal solution is obtained, and the influence of different government regulation modes on the decision-making of each main body in the supply chain is compared and analyzed. The main work of this paper is summarized as follows: 1) combing the relevant laws and regulations about WEEE, introducing the concept of green degree of products, constructing the basic model of WEEE closed-loop supply chain, emphasizing the government's macro-control and remanufacturing. This paper analyzes the influence of government regulation and product green degree on the decision making in the closed-loop supply chain by game analysis, and compares the influence of government macro-control tools on the decision-making of the main body in the supply chain under different government regulations. The study found that under different government regulation models, the decision-making of the main actors in the closed-loop supply chain will be affected by different factors, and the green degree of the product is positively correlated with the retail price of the product and the wholesale price of the product. At the same time, the green degree of the product has a direct impact on the profit of each main body in the supply chain. 2) by analyzing the relationship between product green degree and product demand, this paper introduces product differentiation, and on this basis, compares and analyzes the influence of different government regulation modes on the decision-making of each main body in the supply chain. Finally, the corresponding conclusions are obtained by numerical simulation. The conclusion shows that the green degree level of the new product only affects the retail price of the new product and the wholesale price of the new product under the condition of product differentiation. The green degree level of the remanufactured product only affects the retail price of the remanufactured product and the wholesale price of the remanufactured product. The effect of profit in supply chain is related to the green degree level of new product and the difference degree of green degree level of remanufacturing product. Finally, the corresponding conclusions are obtained by numerical simulation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;D630

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