本文選題：鏈合創(chuàng)新 + 合作研發(fā)��； 參考：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇以及從技術(shù)到產(chǎn)品時(shí)間的縮短,企業(yè)若要提高創(chuàng)新效率,規(guī)避創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn),就必須以更有效的方式來(lái)進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新并改進(jìn)創(chuàng)新模式。經(jīng)過(guò)不斷的創(chuàng)新實(shí)踐,企業(yè)也逐步認(rèn)識(shí)到與產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈內(nèi)企業(yè)進(jìn)行合作研發(fā)的必要性。然而,由于中小企業(yè)融資越來(lái)越難,企業(yè)進(jìn)行獨(dú)立創(chuàng)新的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也越來(lái)越大,如何為企業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入進(jìn)行融資成為了鏈合創(chuàng)新實(shí)踐中的核心問(wèn)題。因此,研究供應(yīng)鏈融資背景下產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈“鏈合創(chuàng)新”的博弈問(wèn)題具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 論文從供應(yīng)鏈融資模式為技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入進(jìn)行融資的角度出發(fā),構(gòu)建了的鏈合創(chuàng)新博弈模型,采用逆向歸納法,針對(duì)一個(gè)由提供中間產(chǎn)品的上游供應(yīng)商和制造最終產(chǎn)品的下游制造商組成的兩層產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu),以及由提供中間產(chǎn)品的上游供應(yīng)商、制造最終產(chǎn)品的中游制造商和銷(xiāo)售最終產(chǎn)品的下游分銷(xiāo)商的三層產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu),分析比較了產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈內(nèi)企業(yè)在不同的創(chuàng)新形式下各參與者的策略選擇和期望收益函數(shù)。結(jié)論表明：合作創(chuàng)新相對(duì)于非合作創(chuàng)新有著更高的期望收益、期望產(chǎn)出以及創(chuàng)新度。最后,本文提出進(jìn)一步落實(shí)“以企業(yè)為主體”的創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略、建立多方面全方位的合作模式以及建立以核心企業(yè)為中心的合作創(chuàng)新機(jī)制等相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the aggravation of market competition and the shortening of time from technology to product, if enterprises want to improve the efficiency of innovation and avoid the risk of innovation, they must innovate in a more effective way and improve the innovation mode. After continuous innovation and practice, enterprises gradually recognize the necessity of R & D cooperation with enterprises in the industrial chain. However, because the financing of SMEs is becoming more and more difficult, and the risk of independent innovation is increasing, how to finance the technological innovation of enterprises has become the core problem in the practice of chain innovation. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the game of "chain innovation" in the context of supply chain financing. From the point of view that supply chain financing mode is financing technology innovation input, this paper constructs a chain innovation game model, and adopts reverse induction method. A two-tier industrial structure consisting of upstream suppliers of intermediate products and downstream manufacturers of final products, as well as upstream suppliers of intermediate products, This paper analyzes and compares the strategic choice and the expected income function of the enterprises in the industrial chain under different innovation forms between the middle manufacturer of the final product and the downstream distributor of the final product. The conclusion shows that cooperative innovation has higher expected income, expected output and higher degree of innovation than non-cooperative innovation. Finally, this paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions, such as implementing the innovation strategy of "taking the enterprise as the main body", establishing the cooperation mode in all aspects and establishing the cooperative innovation mechanism with the core enterprise as the center.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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