發(fā)布時間：2018-05-04 05:01

  本文選題：低碳供應(yīng)鏈 + 低碳政策��； 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,各國紛紛推出碳交易、碳稅等低碳政策,對企業(yè)的二氧化碳排放進行限制,在此背景下,企業(yè)的運營與管理面臨重大的變革。在低碳政策下,碳排放量、碳配額與碳價格等因素將如何影響企業(yè)運作,不同的政策是否會帶來截然不同的決策結(jié)果,這些問題均成為利益相關(guān)方的焦點。目前,低碳政策的推行還存在企業(yè)參與度低、碳信息不透明等難題,可能導(dǎo)致企業(yè)間的謊報行為,并制約供應(yīng)鏈整體效率。因此,各低碳政策下的企業(yè)謊報決策及其規(guī)避機制也是供應(yīng)鏈管理的重要問題。本文構(gòu)建以制造商為主導(dǎo)的二級供應(yīng)鏈,結(jié)合碳交易政策、碳稅政策,并引入免費配額的碳稅政策,率先基于“基準(zhǔn)法”配額分配方式,將企業(yè)區(qū)分為低碳排放企業(yè)與高碳排放企業(yè);并分別在對稱與非對稱碳信息下,研究低碳政策對不同類型企業(yè)的運作決策的影響及其協(xié)調(diào)機制,為企業(yè)的運作決策與政府的低碳政策決策提供理論依據(jù)。首先,在對稱碳信息下,分別基于分權(quán)式與集權(quán)式供應(yīng)鏈,探討在無減排政策、碳交易政策、固定稅率的碳稅政策與免費配額的碳稅政策下的供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)決策;分析各政策下的碳價格、碳排放量及碳配額系數(shù)對供應(yīng)鏈總利潤、利潤分配、供應(yīng)鏈模式的影響;并從多角度對各低碳政策進行比較,說明在不同情形下各低碳政策的優(yōu)劣情況不同,且在低碳政策下低碳排放企業(yè)更容易通過改變合作方式提高自身利潤。其次,在不對稱碳信息下,分析不同類型的制造商與零售商在不同低碳政策下的謊報決策、影響因素及其供應(yīng)鏈影響;說明在不同的低碳政策下供應(yīng)鏈成員具有不同的謊報策略;且碳信息不對稱下的謊報行為使得部分高碳排放零售商即使不采用減排投資也可獲得與無減排政策下相同的利潤,降低了低碳政策的減排刺激;且在各低碳政策下較高的價格敏感系數(shù)對低碳排放供應(yīng)鏈更有利。最后,在不同的低碳政策下,采用收益共享契約協(xié)調(diào)對稱及不對稱碳信息下的分權(quán)式供應(yīng)鏈,分別給出使得對稱信息下的分權(quán)式供應(yīng)鏈利潤最大化的收益共享系數(shù)的取值區(qū)間以及促使不對稱碳信息下的供應(yīng)鏈中的零售商真實反饋碳信息的契約參數(shù),并運用數(shù)值分析法對協(xié)調(diào)結(jié)果進行驗證。
[Abstract]:In recent years, many countries have introduced low-carbon policies, such as carbon trading, carbon tax and so on, to limit the carbon dioxide emissions of enterprises. Under this background, the operation and management of enterprises are facing great changes. In low carbon policy, how carbon emissions, carbon quotas and carbon prices will affect the operation of enterprises, and whether different policies will lead to different decisions, these issues have become the focus of stakeholders. At present, the implementation of low carbon policy still has problems such as low participation and opaque carbon information, which may lead to false behavior among enterprises and restrict the efficiency of supply chain as a whole. Therefore, it is also an important issue of supply chain management for enterprises to make false decision making and avoid mechanism under low carbon policy. In this paper, we construct a manufacturer oriented secondary supply chain, combine carbon trading policy, carbon tax policy, and introduce carbon tax policy of free quota, and take the lead based on the quota allocation method of "benchmark method". The enterprises are divided into low carbon emission enterprises and high carbon emitting enterprises, and under the symmetrical and asymmetric carbon information, the effects of low carbon policies on the operation decisions of different types of enterprises and their coordination mechanisms are studied. It provides the theoretical basis for the operation decision of the enterprise and the low carbon policy decision of the government. Firstly, under symmetrical carbon information, based on decentralized and centralized supply chain, this paper discusses the optimal decision of supply chain under no emission reduction policy, carbon trading policy, carbon tax policy with fixed tax rate and carbon tax policy with free quota. Analyze the influence of carbon price, carbon emission and carbon quota coefficient on supply chain total profit, profit distribution, supply chain mode, and compare each low carbon policy from many angles. It shows that the advantages and disadvantages of each low-carbon policy are different in different situations, and it is easier for the low-carbon enterprises to improve their profits by changing the cooperative mode under the low carbon policy. Secondly, under the asymmetric carbon information, we analyze the different types of manufacturers and retailers under different low carbon policy false decision, influencing factors and their supply chain impact; It shows that supply chain members have different false reporting strategies under different low carbon policies, and the false reporting behavior under asymmetric carbon information makes some high-carbon retailers obtain the same profits as those without emission reduction policies even if they do not adopt emission reduction investment. It reduces the incentive to reduce emissions of low-carbon policies, and the higher price sensitivity coefficient is more favorable for low-carbon supply chain under various low-carbon policies. Finally, under different low-carbon policies, a decentralized supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric carbon information is used to coordinate the revenue-sharing contract. The value range of profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain with symmetric information and the contract parameter of retailer's real feedback carbon information under asymmetric carbon information are given, respectively, in which the profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain is maximized under symmetrical information, and the value range of profit sharing coefficient of decentralized supply chain under asymmetric information is given. The coordination results are verified by numerical analysis method.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274

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