本文選題：鐵路物流 + 物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈��； 參考：《西南交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟全球化、貿(mào)易一體化進程的加快,以供應(yīng)鏈管理的思維來運作物流已成為現(xiàn)代物流發(fā)展的新階段,鐵路物流作為現(xiàn)代物流體系的重要組成部分,在鐵路貨運深化改革、轉(zhuǎn)型升級的背景下,也逐步探索一體化供應(yīng)鏈的發(fā)展模式,以適應(yīng)現(xiàn)今需求多樣化、個性化的“買方市場”,尋求更大的利潤空間。然而,處于發(fā)展初期的鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈內(nèi)部管理體制僵硬,一體化程度和市場敏感度較低,難以與外部的物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)商建立有機的聯(lián)系,使得鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的利潤空間無法得到有效的釋放。因此,本文嘗試引入期權(quán)契約分別對企業(yè)物流及物流企業(yè)與鐵路運輸企業(yè)組建的一對一、多對一的鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型進行研究分析,主要工作如下:(1)界定了鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的概念及特征,并就鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈核心企業(yè)的功能及作用進行論述分析;基于此,構(gòu)建了鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的基本結(jié)構(gòu),分析論述了鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的必要性及協(xié)調(diào)機理。(2)基于鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)機理,構(gòu)建鐵路運輸企業(yè)與企業(yè)物流組成的一對一鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型。以集中和無協(xié)調(diào)契約分散決策下鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)狀態(tài)為邊界基準,研究分析了期權(quán)契約協(xié)調(diào)機制下,鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)時期權(quán)契約參數(shù)的設(shè)計規(guī)則,即期權(quán)價格的取值范圍。而后基于此,探討分析了期權(quán)契約參數(shù)對于鐵路運輸企業(yè)和物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)商之間收益分配的影響。最后,通過數(shù)值模擬,進一步驗證期權(quán)契約對于鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的有效性。(3)基于一對一的鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈模型,拓展研究了物流企業(yè)和鐵路運輸企業(yè)組建的多對一的供應(yīng)鏈契約模型,分析了集中決策和無協(xié)調(diào)契約的分散決策下,鐵路運輸企業(yè)和物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)決策和期望收益,并以此為基準,探討了期權(quán)契約機制下鐵路物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)時期權(quán)契約參數(shù)所需滿足的條件以及不同情況下鐵路運輸企業(yè)的采購決策及鏈上成員企業(yè)間的收益分配問題。通過數(shù)值模擬發(fā)現(xiàn),不同采購決策下,期權(quán)契約的存在可實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)但并不一定會被接受。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization and trade integration, it has become a new stage of modern logistics development to operate logistics with the thinking of supply chain management. Railway logistics, as an important part of modern logistics system, deepens the reform of railway freight transportation. Under the background of transformation and upgrading, the development mode of integrated supply chain is also explored step by step in order to adapt to the diversified and individualized "buyer's market" and to seek greater profit space. However, in the early stage of development, the internal management system of railway logistics service supply chain is rigid, the degree of integration and market sensitivity is low, and it is difficult to establish an organic link with external logistics service providers. The profit space of railway logistics service supply chain can not be effectively released. Therefore, this paper attempts to introduce the option contract to analyze the one-to-one, multi-to-one coordination model of railway logistics service supply chain between logistics enterprises and railway transport enterprises. The main work is as follows: (1) defining the concept and characteristics of railway logistics service supply chain, and discussing and analyzing the function and function of the core enterprise of railway logistics service supply chain, based on which, the basic structure of railway logistics service supply chain is constructed. The necessity and coordination mechanism of the coordinated development of railway logistics service supply chain are analyzed. The coordination mechanism of railway logistics service supply chain based on the coordination mechanism of railway logistics service supply chain is discussed. This paper constructs a one-to-one railway logistics service supply chain coordination model composed of railway transportation enterprises and enterprise logistics. Based on the optimal state of railway logistics service supply chain under centralized and uncoordinated contract decentralized decision-making, this paper studies and analyzes the design rules of option contract parameters when railway logistics service supply chain coordinates under option contract coordination mechanism. The range of option prices. Then, the influence of option contract parameters on the income distribution between railway transportation enterprises and logistics service providers is discussed. Finally, through numerical simulation, the validity of option contract for the coordination of railway logistics service supply chain is further verified, which is based on one-to-one railway logistics service supply chain model. This paper develops and studies the many-to-one supply chain contract model of logistics enterprises and railway transport enterprises, and analyzes the optimal decision and expected income of railway transport enterprises and logistics service providers under centralized and decentralized decision-making without coordination contracts. And on this basis, This paper discusses the conditions of option contract parameters when the railway logistics service supply chain is coordinated under the option contract mechanism, and discusses the purchasing decision of railway transportation enterprises under different circumstances and the problem of income distribution among the member enterprises in the chain. Through numerical simulation, it is found that the existence of option contract can realize the coordination of supply chain under different purchasing decisions, but it may not be accepted.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F532

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本文編號：1784895