本文選題：電動(dòng)汽車(chē) + 消費(fèi)慣性��； 參考：《運(yùn)籌與管理》2017年08期

【摘要】：按是否擁有傳統(tǒng)汽車(chē)將潛在消費(fèi)者分成兩類(lèi),基于不同購(gòu)買(mǎi)行為的消費(fèi)者,根據(jù)消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買(mǎi)行為理論,針對(duì)每一類(lèi)消費(fèi)者分別建立效用模型,運(yùn)用斯坦伯格博弈理論求解得到廠商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略和政府的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼策略,進(jìn)而分析政府考慮包括廠商收益、消費(fèi)者剩余、政府支出以及環(huán)境效益在內(nèi)的社會(huì)福利最大化時(shí)電動(dòng)汽車(chē)的環(huán)境質(zhì)量、傳統(tǒng)汽車(chē)原擁有比例以及消費(fèi)者慣性三因素對(duì)電動(dòng)汽車(chē)普及率、政府補(bǔ)貼以及生產(chǎn)商收益的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:當(dāng)生產(chǎn)成本小于某閥值時(shí),電動(dòng)汽車(chē)的市場(chǎng)需求隨電動(dòng)汽車(chē)的環(huán)境質(zhì)量的增加而增大,傳統(tǒng)汽車(chē)的市場(chǎng)需求則隨之減小,反之亦然。電動(dòng)汽車(chē)的生產(chǎn)效率較高時(shí),政府的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼隨產(chǎn)品環(huán)境質(zhì)量的增加而增大,生產(chǎn)效率較低時(shí),最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼隨之減小,政府通過(guò)增大補(bǔ)貼的方式鼓勵(lì)生產(chǎn)商提高生產(chǎn)效率。最后通過(guò)數(shù)值實(shí)驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證了以上結(jié)論,并分析得到以上三方面因素對(duì)生產(chǎn)商收益的影響。
[Abstract]:Potential consumers are divided into two categories according to whether they own a traditional car. According to the theory of consumer purchase behavior, the utility model is established for each type of consumer, which is based on different purchasing behavior.By using Steinberg game theory, the optimal pricing strategy of the firm and the optimal subsidy strategy of the government are obtained, and then the government considers including the profit of the firm and the consumer surplus.The environmental quality of electric vehicle, the proportion of original ownership of traditional car and the consumer inertia influence the penetration rate of electric vehicle, government subsidy and the profit of producer when the social welfare including government expenditure and environmental benefit is maximized.The results show that when the production cost is less than a certain threshold, the market demand of electric vehicle increases with the increase of environmental quality of electric vehicle, and the market demand of traditional vehicle decreases, and vice versa.When the production efficiency of electric vehicle is high, the government's optimal subsidy increases with the increase of product environmental quality, and when the production efficiency is low, the optimal subsidy decreases. The government encourages the manufacturer to improve the production efficiency by increasing the subsidy.Finally, the above conclusions are verified by numerical experiments, and the effects of the above three factors on the producer's income are analyzed.
【作者單位】： 華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金重大國(guó)際合作項(xiàng)目(71320107001);國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71172093,71672065) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究青年基金項(xiàng)目(10YJC630331) 教育部新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才支持計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(NCET-06-0653) 中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金資助(HUST:2013QN101)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F416.471

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