本文選題：保理 + 訂單融資��； 參考：《天津大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：供應鏈契約已成為供應鏈協(xié)調研究的一個重點，但目前對供應鏈契約的研究很少考慮到供應商資金水平的影響，而供應商資金是否充裕對整個供應鏈決策起著至關重要的作用。由于市場競爭及產業(yè)鏈競爭的加劇，越來越多的企業(yè)采用賒銷的結算方式，而賒銷使得企業(yè)產生了大量的應收賬款，不僅縮減了供應鏈流動資金運轉速率，而且加劇了企業(yè)財務風險。因此，在這種形式下，盤活應收賬款成為解決供應鏈資金缺乏的重要途徑。根據權威調查顯示，眾多供應商認為在應收賬款融資中“保理”是未來最好的融資方式之一。 通過分析文獻，，發(fā)現大多數文獻是對保理的定性介紹，將保理運用到供應鏈契約中的定量研究較少。因此本文將保理運用到供應商具有資金約束的供應鏈中，使研究更具現實意義。同時本文假設供應商在為制造商備貨時缺乏資金故不會產生交貨行為即未產生應收賬款，因此不可采用保理業(yè)務；而憑有效訂單即可獲得融資的訂單融資可解決此類問題，但訂單融資仍然存在一定弱點，因此本文采用了新型的融資模式——OF-F模式。OF-F模式是指訂單融資與保理相承接形成的新型融資模式，該模式既能解決上述問題，又能充分發(fā)揮保理的優(yōu)勢。本文基于單一供應商和單一制造商組成的兩級供應鏈，對比直接融資研究了OF-F模式下收益共享契約如何協(xié)調供應鏈的問題。 本文假定供應商運營資金不足且需求具有價格敏感性，構建了基于兩種融資模式（直接融資模式和OF-F模式）的供應商—制造商收益共享契約模型和OF-F模式下銀行利率模型，分析了兩種不同融資下利潤分配情況，結果表明：兩類融資模式下，收益共享契約都能實現供應鏈協(xié)調；對比直接融資模式，OF-F模式使得供應鏈總利潤升高；在供應商主導下且當制造商違約概率較小時，承擔主要經營風險的制造商利潤提高，而供應商則降低；在OF-F模式下，收益共享契約能提高供應鏈整體績效，并能實現總利潤在各成員間的合理分配。最后通過算例分析驗證了結論。
[Abstract]:Supply chain contract has become an important part of supply chain coordination, but the research on supply chain contract seldom takes into account the influence of supplier's capital level, and whether the supplier's capital is sufficient or not plays an important role in the whole supply chain decision.Due to the intensification of market competition and industry chain competition, more and more enterprises adopt the settlement method of credit sales, and credit sales make enterprises produce a large amount of accounts receivable, which not only reduces the running rate of supply chain liquidity.And exacerbated the enterprise financial risk.Therefore, in this form, activating accounts receivable is an important way to solve the shortage of supply chain funds.According to authoritative survey, many suppliers think factoring is one of the best financing methods in the future.Through the analysis of the literature, it is found that most of the literatures are qualitative introduction of factoring, and the quantitative research on applying factoring to supply chain contract is less.Therefore, this paper applies factoring to the supply chain with financial constraints, which makes the research more practical.At the same time, this paper assumes that the supplier will not produce the delivery behavior because of lack of funds when preparing goods for the manufacturer, therefore, the factoring business cannot be adopted, and the order financing that can be financed by valid order can solve this problem.However, there are still some weaknesses in order financing. Therefore, this paper adopts a new financing mode: OF-F mode. OF-F mode is a new financing mode which can solve the above problems.And can give full play to the advantages of factoring.Based on a two-level supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single manufacturer, this paper studies how the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain under the OF-F model by comparing direct financing.Based on the assumption that the supplier is short of operating capital and the demand is price sensitive, this paper constructs the Vendor-manufacturer profit sharing contract model based on two financing modes (direct financing model and OF-F model) and the bank interest rate model under OF-F mode.The profit distribution under two different financing conditions is analyzed. The results show that the profit sharing contract can realize the coordination of the supply chain under the two financing modes, and the OF-F model can increase the total profit of the supply chain compared with the direct financing model.Under the condition of supplier leading and when the manufacturer's default probability is small, the profit of the manufacturer who bears the main operating risk increases, while the supplier decreases. In OF-F mode, the profit-sharing contract can improve the overall performance of the supply chain.And can realize the reasonable distribution of the total profit among the members.Finally, the conclusion is verified by an example.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224

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本文編號：1753652