本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈管理 + 延長擔(dān)保�。� 參考：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近些年來,面對經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的加速推進(jìn)以及日益激烈的市場競爭,制造商開始將自身的價值鏈從單純的產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域延伸至產(chǎn)品服務(wù)領(lǐng)域。擔(dān)保服務(wù)是產(chǎn)品售后服務(wù)中不可或缺的一項(xiàng),基本上可以分為基本擔(dān)保和延長擔(dān)保。延長擔(dān)保其實(shí)就是一種服務(wù)計(jì)劃,具體指在制造商的基本擔(dān)保期滿之后,提供商在一段時間內(nèi)為產(chǎn)品提供免費(fèi)或低價的一些維修服務(wù)。作為企業(yè)吸引消費(fèi)者的一種營銷手段,產(chǎn)品的延長擔(dān)保服務(wù)在給消費(fèi)者帶來優(yōu)惠的同時也為企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)了新的利潤源泉�，F(xiàn)在產(chǎn)品延長擔(dān)保已然成為企業(yè)改善產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、提高消費(fèi)者滿意度的有力方式。早期的時候,延長擔(dān)保都是由產(chǎn)品制造商提供的。隨著延長擔(dān)保的普及及其可觀的利潤空間,近年來零售商和第三方供應(yīng)商也都開始密切關(guān)注延長擔(dān)保市場并向消費(fèi)者提供延長擔(dān)保服務(wù)。但是,生活中仍然存在很多大型的產(chǎn)品制造商通過間接銷售、直銷以及雙渠道的銷售方式提供延長擔(dān)保服務(wù)的實(shí)例。就電器類產(chǎn)品而言,目前在國內(nèi)市場中提供原廠延長擔(dān)保服務(wù)的制造商包括:戴爾、聯(lián)想、海爾等。所以對于制造商而言,選擇何種渠道銷售延長擔(dān)保以及如何設(shè)計(jì)延長擔(dān)保是亟待解決的問題。針對市場上比較常見的幾種制造商關(guān)于延長擔(dān)保分銷渠道,本文將通過構(gòu)建斯坦科爾伯格博弈模型,結(jié)合消費(fèi)者風(fēng)險偏好和延長擔(dān)保長度,從微觀層面定量分析了制造商延長擔(dān)保的四種分銷渠道的選擇問題。同時從雙重邊際效應(yīng)和互補(bǔ)品效應(yīng)的角度定性分析了不同渠道之間利潤不同的深層原因。我們嘗試根據(jù)博弈理論模型解決以下幾個問題:不同的分銷渠道如何影響延長擔(dān)保的最優(yōu)長度以及四種模型中延長擔(dān)保最優(yōu)長度的大小關(guān)系如何?制造商是否應(yīng)直接或通過零售商銷售延長擔(dān)保?不同的分銷渠道如何影響制造商、零售商以及供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的利潤?
[Abstract]:In recent years, in the face of the acceleration of economic globalization and increasingly fierce market competition, manufacturers began to extend their value chain from pure products to products and services.Guarantee service is an indispensable part of product after-sales service, which can be divided into basic guarantee and extended guarantee.Extension of warranty is actually a service plan, which means that after the expiration of the manufacturer's basic guarantee, the provider provides some maintenance services for the product for a period of time free of charge or at a low price.As a marketing means to attract consumers, the extended guarantee service of products not only brings preferential benefits to consumers, but also finds a new source of profits for enterprises.Now product extension guarantee has become a powerful way for enterprises to improve product quality and improve consumer satisfaction.In the early days, the extended warranty was provided by the product manufacturer.With the popularity of extended guarantees and their considerable profit margins, retailers and third-party suppliers have also been paying close attention to extending the guarantee market and providing extended guarantee services to consumers in recent years.However, there are still many examples of large manufacturers offering extended guarantee services through indirect, direct and dual channels of sale.As far as electrical products are concerned, the manufacturers currently offering extended warranty services in the domestic market include: Dell, Lenovo, Haier and so on.So for manufacturers, choosing which channel to extend the guarantee and how to design the extended guarantee is an urgent problem.In this paper, we will build a Stainkelberg game model, combine consumer risk preference and extend the length of guarantee, aiming at some common manufacturers in the market about extending the guarantee distribution channel.This paper quantitatively analyzes the choice of four kinds of distribution channels for the manufacturer to extend the guarantee from the micro level.At the same time, this paper qualitatively analyzes the deep reasons for the difference of profit between different channels from the point of view of double marginal effect and complementary effect.We try to solve the following problems according to the game theory model: how do different distribution channels affect the optimal length of extended guarantee and the relationship between the optimal length of extended guarantee and the four models?Should the manufacturer extend the warranty directly or through retail sales?How do different distribution channels affect the profits of manufacturers, retailers, and supply chain systems?
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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