本文選題：定價(jià) + 擔(dān)保�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文,我們主要從產(chǎn)品定價(jià)、擔(dān)保維修策略、信息水平以及博弈論的角度,構(gòu)建數(shù)學(xué)模型。在前一部分中,我們建立了兩個(gè)子模型,一個(gè)是含有生產(chǎn)商和顧客的兩階供應(yīng)鏈模型,另一個(gè)是含有生產(chǎn)商、零售商和顧客的三階供應(yīng)鏈模型。其中,由生產(chǎn)商或者零售商來給顧客提供擔(dān)保服務(wù),該擔(dān)保服務(wù)需要顧客付一定的費(fèi)用。在擔(dān)保期內(nèi),由擔(dān)保的提供者進(jìn)行周期性的預(yù)防性維修和小修,來保證設(shè)備的正常運(yùn)行。生產(chǎn)商和零售商之間是Stackelberg博弈的關(guān)系。以獲得生產(chǎn)商和零售商的最大收益為目的,我們找到了最優(yōu)的零售價(jià)格、擔(dān)保價(jià)格和預(yù)防性維修次數(shù)。最后,我們探討了這三個(gè)變量和關(guān)鍵參數(shù)的關(guān)系,并且通過數(shù)值例,對比了兩個(gè)模型的收益。在后一部分中,我們建立了一個(gè)含有一個(gè)生產(chǎn)商和兩個(gè)零售商的供應(yīng)鏈模型。這里生產(chǎn)商在決策批發(fā)價(jià)時(shí)有兩種方案:要么不考慮價(jià)格差異,對零售商定相同的批發(fā)價(jià);要么考慮價(jià)格差異,對零售商定不同的批發(fā)價(jià)。生產(chǎn)商和零售商之間是Stackelberg博弈的關(guān)系。一方面,我們探討了兩個(gè)零售商決策完全相同的情況,即都選擇合作的情況,優(yōu)化批發(fā)價(jià)和擔(dān)保時(shí)長,從而找到雙方最優(yōu)的收益,最后通過數(shù)值例與都選擇競爭的情況進(jìn)行比較。另一方面,我們探討了一方零售商對另一方?jīng)Q策完全不清楚的情況下,兩個(gè)零售商的均衡策略。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)無論生產(chǎn)商選擇哪一種定價(jià)策略,兩個(gè)零售商的均衡策略均是(不合作,不合作)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, we construct a mathematical model from the point of view of product pricing, warranty maintenance strategy, information level and game theory.In the former part, we establish two sub-models, one is the two-order supply chain model with manufacturer and customer, the other is the third-order supply chain model with producer, retailer and customer.Among them, the manufacturer or retailer provides the guarantee service to the customer, which requires the customer to pay a certain fee.During the warranty period, periodic preventive maintenance and minor repairs are carried out by the sponsor to ensure the normal operation of the equipment.The relationship between manufacturer and retailer is Stackelberg game.In order to maximize the profits of producers and retailers, we have found the optimal retail price, guaranteed price and the number of preventive maintenance.Finally, we discuss the relationship between the three variables and the key parameters, and compare the benefits of the two models by numerical examples.In the latter part, we establish a supply chain model with one manufacturer and two retailers.There are two ways for manufacturers to make wholesale price decisions: one is to set the same wholesale price for retailers regardless of the price difference, or the other is to set different wholesale prices for retailers, taking into account price differences.The relationship between manufacturer and retailer is Stackelberg game.On the one hand, we explored the exact same situation in which two retailers made the same decision, that is, they both chose to cooperate, optimize the wholesale price and the duration of the guarantee, so as to find the best return for both parties.Finally, a numerical example is given to compare the results of both selection and competition.On the other hand, we discuss the equilibrium strategy of one retailer when the other side's decision is completely unclear.We find that no matter what kind of pricing strategy the manufacturer chooses, the equilibrium strategy of the two retailers is (uncooperative, uncooperative).
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F224.32

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 Yiwen Bian;Shuai Yan;Wei Zhang;Hao Xu;;WARRANTY STRATEGY IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WHEN TWO RETAILER'S EXTENDED WARRANTIES BUNDLED WITH THE PRODUCTS[J];Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering;2015年03期

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本文編號：1733157