本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：收益協(xié)調(diào)　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著對社會可持續(xù)發(fā)展要求的提高，環(huán)境問題越來越受到人們的廣泛關(guān)注，企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)制造過程中也越來越重視對環(huán)境的傷害。一方面，企業(yè)管理者需要面向全球市場，與其他相關(guān)成員企業(yè)積極配合與合作，以求獲得更高的收益；另一方面，對廢舊產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行回收不僅可以有效降低資源浪費(fèi)，也能幫助企業(yè)降低成本、樹立良好的社會形象。 本文首先對廢舊產(chǎn)品回收模式和供應(yīng)鏈內(nèi)成員的收益協(xié)調(diào)問題進(jìn)行分析，然后針對由一個(gè)制造商、兩個(gè)零售商和一個(gè)第三方回收商構(gòu)成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)，在零售商分散決策和集中決策情境下，應(yīng)用博弈論探討在零售商、制造商和第三方分別主導(dǎo)回收這三種回收模式下，供應(yīng)鏈內(nèi)制造商、零售商1、零售商2和回收商的收益協(xié)調(diào)問題。進(jìn)而對不同回收模式下供應(yīng)鏈的整體收益和各成員的收益情況進(jìn)行比較分析，包括不同回收主導(dǎo)下供應(yīng)鏈成員與整體收益差的比較分析，同時(shí)也分析了不同回收主導(dǎo)下供應(yīng)鏈成員及整體的收益分配趨勢。最后通過算例驗(yàn)證模型的可行性與準(zhǔn)確性。 結(jié)果表明：（1）在零售商分散決策情境下制造商收益較大，且在第三方回收商回收模式下，零售商分散決策帶給制造商的收益更為明顯。（2）在零售商集中決策情境下，零售商的收益較大，且在零售商主導(dǎo)回收時(shí)要比制造商回收與第三方回收商主導(dǎo)回收更為顯著。（3）在零售商分散、集中決策情境下，回收商的收益一致，與零售商的決策情境無關(guān)。（4）制造商主導(dǎo)回收和第三方主導(dǎo)回收模式下，在零售商分散決策時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈整體收益較大，且供應(yīng)鏈整體收益在第三方主導(dǎo)回收模式下明顯高于其它回收模式。而在零售商主導(dǎo)回收模式下，供應(yīng)鏈整體收益在零售商何種決策模式下較大則受市場容量的影響。
[Abstract]:With the improvement of social sustainable development, more and more attention has been paid to environmental problems, and enterprises pay more and more attention to the harm to the environment in the process of production and manufacture.On the one hand, business managers need to face the global market and actively cooperate and cooperate with other relevant member enterprises in order to achieve higher returns; on the other hand, recycling used and used products can not only effectively reduce waste of resources,Also can help the enterprise to reduce the cost, sets up the good social image.This paper first analyzes the recycling model of waste products and the revenue coordination of the members in the supply chain, and then aims at the closed-loop supply chain system, which consists of a manufacturer, two retailers and a third-party recycler.In the context of decentralized and centralized decision-making of retailers, the game theory is applied to explore the manufacturers in the supply chain under the three recovery modes of retailers, manufacturers and third parties, respectively, which are dominated by retailers, manufacturers and third parties.Retailer 1, retailer 2 and recycler's income coordination problem.Then the paper makes a comparative analysis of the overall income of the supply chain and the income of the members of the supply chain under different recovery modes, including the comparative analysis of the difference between the members of the supply chain and the overall income under different recovery patterns.At the same time, it also analyzes the distribution trend of the supply chain members and the whole income under different recovery.Finally, the feasibility and accuracy of the model are verified by an example.The results show that: 1) under the situation of retailer's decentralized decision, the manufacturer's profit is larger, and under the model of third-party recycler's recovery, the retailer's decentralized decision brings the manufacturer's profit more obviously. (2) in the situation of retailer's centralized decision, the retailer's profit is more obvious than that of the retailer's centralized decision.The retailer's profit is larger, and when the retailer dominates the recovery, it is more significant than the manufacturer's and the third-party recycler's.) in the situation of the retailer's dispersion and centralized decision, the recycler's income is the same.Under the pattern of manufacturer leading recycling and third party leading recovery, the overall profit of the supply chain is larger when the retailer makes a decentralized decision.And the overall revenue of supply chain is obviously higher than that of other models under the third-party-led recovery mode.In the retailer dominated recovery mode, the overall profit of the supply chain is influenced by the market capacity under what kind of decision-making mode.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F713.2;F274

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