本文選題：博弈論　切入點(diǎn)：隨機(jī)需求　出處：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著環(huán)保意識(shí)的加強(qiáng)以及對(duì)自然資源節(jié)約的強(qiáng)烈關(guān)注，各國(guó)政府紛紛加大法律措施要求企業(yè)必須重視廢舊物品的回收再利用.意識(shí)到可持續(xù)發(fā)展帶來(lái)的重大利益，，企業(yè)對(duì)廢棄物品的回收處理更是顯得格外重要.一方面，企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收再制造在降低企業(yè)自身生產(chǎn)成本，增加經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的同時(shí)，間接會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)的外部形象有巨大的影響，可以提高企業(yè)自身的良好口碑;另一方面，回收再制造還可以起到保護(hù)環(huán)境的目的，積極響應(yīng)政府的號(hào)召，實(shí)現(xiàn)環(huán)境和經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的雙贏局面。 本文首先利用應(yīng)用博弈論理論探討了隨機(jī)需求下,在由一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性的制造商和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的銷(xiāo)售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中;提出的收益費(fèi)用共享契約的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)，主要是：1）考慮代理具有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避情況下縮短訂貨交付時(shí)間的庫(kù)存系統(tǒng);2)具有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避銷(xiāo)售商的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型。 最后,利用數(shù)值仿真分析研究了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈中各成員的定價(jià)策略以及利潤(rùn)的影響,并得出一些重要的管理啟示:(1)銷(xiāo)售商市場(chǎng)行為越保守，銷(xiāo)售價(jià)格就越低。(2)銷(xiāo)售商如果不能很好地將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移而一味地保守自己的行為只會(huì)讓自己的利益受損。(3)制造商不會(huì)因?yàn)殇N(xiāo)售商行為的保守程度增大讓自己的利潤(rùn)降低，反而制造商的利潤(rùn)會(huì)增加。
[Abstract]:With the strengthening of environmental protection consciousness and the strong concern for the conservation of natural resources, the governments of various countries have stepped up legal measures to require enterprises to attach importance to the recycling and reuse of waste goods.Realizing the great benefits of sustainable development, it is very important for enterprises to recycle waste materials.On the one hand, enterprises find that recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can reduce the production cost of enterprises and increase economic benefits, while indirectly has a huge impact on the external image of enterprises, and can improve the good reputation of enterprises themselves;On the other hand, recycling and remanufacturing can also protect the environment, respond positively to the call of the government, and realize the win-win situation of environment and economic benefits.In this paper, we first use the game theory to discuss the supply chain coordination of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse seller in the supply chain under stochastic demand, the proposed revenue-cost sharing contract.The main one is: (1) inventory system considering agent with risk aversion to shorten order delivery time) closed-loop supply chain coordination model with risk aversion seller.Finally, the effects of risk aversion on the pricing strategy and profit of each member in the supply chain are studied by numerical simulation, and some important management implications: 1) the more conservative the seller's market behavior, the more conservative the market behavior is.The lower the selling price, the lower the seller will be.) if the seller can't transfer the risk very well and keep his behavior to the detriment of his own interests, the manufacturer will not lower his profit by increasing the conservatism of the seller's behavior.Instead, the manufacturer's profits will increase.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：1705894