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  本文選題：閉環(huán)供應鏈　切入點：渠道　出處：《江蘇大學》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：進入21世紀以來,隨著科學技術的不斷發(fā)展和人們生活水平的日益提高,產品的生命周期日漸縮短,廢舊產品越來越多,伴隨而來的資源危機和環(huán)境問題變得日益突出。因此,大力發(fā)展循環(huán)經濟,保持社會可持續(xù)發(fā)展,構建資源節(jié)約型、環(huán)境友好型社會就成為一項迫在眉睫的戰(zhàn)略性問題。而循環(huán)再制造工程是實現循環(huán)經濟、緩解資源短缺和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的主要途徑之一。對廢舊產品的回收再制造也日益成為現代企業(yè)重要的戰(zhàn)略運作方式。有關閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)各節(jié)點企業(yè)之間的定價及協(xié)調機制的設計研究,對于提升供應鏈系統(tǒng)的整體優(yōu)勢和績效等方面,都具有非常重要的理論意義和現實意義。 盡管閉環(huán)供應鏈的研究已經引起人們的高度重視,出現了一些研究成果,但是還沒有形成完整的理論體系。人們通過對閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)進行建模研究了許多的定價和協(xié)調模型,但這些模型絕大部分基于市場需求確定、信息對稱等情況下的研究,與閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)運作的實踐存在著較大的差距,從而使得這些研究難以提高它的理論指導能力。本文從實際出發(fā),充分考慮更為接近現實的各種情況,在復雜的實際環(huán)境下,如多渠道的回收、銷售渠道和回收渠道之間的沖突、雙重信息不對稱等等,構建相應的定價決策模型進行分析和研究,并進一步探討了閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)中各節(jié)點企業(yè)的協(xié)調、激勵機制,以實現閉環(huán)供應鏈的整體最優(yōu)。其主要研究內容如下： 論文首先對閉環(huán)供應鏈及其協(xié)調的理論基礎進行研究。其中包括：閉環(huán)供應鏈的內涵以及與傳統(tǒng)供應鏈相比的所獨有的特點；閉環(huán)供應鏈的結構和關鍵流程的分析,在此基礎上進一步對閉環(huán)供應鏈運作的模式和協(xié)調模式進行了分析；對博弈論、委托代理理論、顯示原理等進行了系統(tǒng)的闡述,為后續(xù)的協(xié)調和激勵機制的設計奠定了理論依據。 接著,分別研究了信息對稱情況下閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)的定價和契約協(xié)調設計問題。隨著電子商務和信息技術的不斷發(fā)展,混合渠道的銷售和回收成為可能�；谶@種實際情況,通過構建渠道沖突下閉環(huán)供應鏈的定價模型,對不同回收渠道的閉環(huán)供應鏈進行了分析,探討了各成員的最優(yōu)定價策略和利潤,提出了一種改進的價格折扣契約,實現了閉環(huán)供應鏈系統(tǒng)的整體優(yōu)化和提升。以制造商和零售商的混合回收渠道為研究對象,構建了不同渠道權力結構下閉環(huán)供應鏈的決策模型,對各種模型下的定價決策進行了比較分析,提出運用兩部定價契約機制來實現不同渠道權力結構下閉環(huán)供應鏈的協(xié)調。最后,通過數值仿真對模型的各種結論進行了驗證。 基于隨機環(huán)境下,廢舊產品的回收量受到回收商的努力水平影響時,運用委托代理理論分析出現單邊道德風險下契約的設計問題,考慮如何設計契約來激勵回收商更加努力地工作。在此基礎上,進一步考慮了廢舊產品的回收量同時受到回收商和制造商的努力水平影響時,即出現雙邊道德風險下契約的設計問題,通過設立一個更具有一般性的投入產出函數(柯布道格拉斯函數)研究制造商和回收商雙方在合作回收的過程中,最優(yōu)契約的設計以及契約中參數的影響因素。最后,通過數值仿真分析了契約設計中各參數的特點。 在前面研究的基礎上,探討了雙重信息不對稱條件下閉環(huán)供應鏈的激勵機制設計。當廢舊產品的回收過程中同時出現逆向選擇和道德風險時,利用委托代理理論和信號甄別原理,制造商如何設計激勵契約實現雙目標的混合激勵,分析了最優(yōu)激勵契約的特征,并與單一信息不對稱時的激勵契約進行比較分析。特別是當不對稱信息為連續(xù)型變量時,通過對傳統(tǒng)激勵契約的改進,構建一種新的激勵機制模型,并對模型中的參數進行分析。論文中所得出的結論能為閉環(huán)供應鏈中企業(yè)的決策實踐提供有用的理論依據。
[Abstract]:Since twenty-first Century, with the development of science and technology and the increasing of people's living standard, the product life cycle is becoming shorter, more and more waste products, along with the energy crisis and environmental problems become increasingly prominent. Therefore, vigorously develop the circular economy, maintain social sustainable development, build a resource-saving and environment-friendly society become a strategic problem imminent. Recycling remanufacturing engineering is the realization of circular economy, one of the main ways to alleviate the shortage of resources and sustainable development. Making the recycling has become a modern enterprise important strategic operation mode. The design research on the pricing and coordination mechanism between node enterprises on the closed-loop supply chain system. To improve the supply chain system, the overall advantages and performance, has very important theoretical significance and practical significance Righteousness.
Although the research of closed-loop supply chain has attracted people's attention, there have been some research results, but has not formed a complete theoretical system. It was studied by many of the pricing and coordination model of the closed-loop supply chain system modeling, but most of these models are determined based on the market demand, research on information asymmetry condition and there is a big gap with the practical operation of the closed-loop supply chain system, which makes these studies difficult to improve its theoretical guidance ability. In this paper, considering the various situations is more close to reality, in the complex environment, such as the recovery of multiple channels, the conflict between sales channels and recycling channels the dual information asymmetry, construction analysis and research of pricing decision model, and further discusses the coordination of each node enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain system, Incentive mechanism to achieve the overall optimal closed-loop supply chain. The main research contents are as follows:
Firstly, the theoretical basis of the closed-loop supply chain and the coordination of the study. Including the definition of the closed-loop supply chain, compared with the traditional supply chain's unique characteristics; analysis of the structure and key processes of the closed-loop supply chain, analyzed on the basis of closed-loop supply chain operation mode and the mode of coordination; game theory, principal-agent theory, display principle of the system is discussed, which provides a theoretical basis for the design for the coordination and incentive mechanism.
Then, the system of closed-loop supply chain under symmetric information, pricing and contract coordination design problems were studied. With the continuous development of e-commerce and information technology, hybrid channel sales and recovery possible. Based on the actual situation, the pricing model of closed loop supply chain through the construction of channel conflict in the recovery of the closed-loop supply chain the channels are analyzed, discussed the optimal pricing strategy and the profit of each member, and proposes an improved price discount contract, to achieve the overall optimization and upgrading of the closed-loop supply chain system. The hybrid recycling channels of manufacturers and retailers as the research object, constructs the decision model of closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures of all, the pricing decision models are compared and analyzed, put forward to use the two part pricing contract mechanism to achieve different channel power structure of closed-loop supply chain Finally, all kinds of conclusions of the model are verified by numerical simulation.
Based on the random environment, the recovery rate of waste products affected by the recycling business effort level, using the principal-agent theory analysis and design problem of the single moral hazard under contract, how to design the contract in order to encourage recycling operators to work harder. On this basis, to further consider the recovery of waste products is also affected by the recycling business and the manufacturer's effort level, which is the design problem of double moral hazard contract, through the establishment of a more general input-output function (Cobb Douglas function) of manufacturers and recyclers in the process of cooperation both in recovery, as well as the influence factors of optimal contract design contract parameters. Finally, through numerical simulation and analysis of the characteristics of each parameter in the design of the contract.
On the basis of previous research, discusses the design of incentive mechanism of closed loop supply chain under dual information asymmetry condition. At the same time when the adverse selection and moral hazard in the recycling process of waste products, by using the principal-agent theory and signal screening principle, the manufacturer how to design incentive contract to achieve the goal of double mixing, analyzes the characteristics of optimal incentive the contract, and compare with the single information asymmetry incentive contract. Especially when the information asymmetry is a continuous variable, through the improvement of the traditional incentive contract, construct a new incentive mechanism model, and the parameters of the model are analyzed. The conclusions of the paper can provide useful theoretical basis for the practice of decision-making in the closed-loop supply chain.

【學位授予單位】：江蘇大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1657651