本文選題：再制造　切入點：專利保護　出處：《東北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著自然環(huán)境的惡化及人口的增加,自然資源開始變得越來越匱乏,為了保護環(huán)境和人類的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,許多專家學(xué)者及企業(yè)組織開始研究廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收再制造。并且隨著研究內(nèi)容的深入,人們發(fā)現(xiàn)再制造不僅能夠帶來顯著的環(huán)境效益,還能夠帶來巨大的經(jīng)濟效益,因而越來越多的企業(yè)開始躋身再制造行業(yè)。然而,廢舊產(chǎn)品回收再制造所涉及的知識產(chǎn)權(quán)問題,經(jīng)常使企業(yè)陷入知識產(chǎn)權(quán)糾紛中,這對企業(yè)來說無疑是巨大的泥潭。因此,企業(yè)在再制造的決策過程中,必須要考慮再制造的專利保護問題�，F(xiàn)如今對再制造專利許可的研究主要集中在法學(xué)角度,從管理學(xué)角度出發(fā)的研究文獻比較少。首先,本文闡述了再制造的相關(guān)研究背景及意義,提出了企業(yè)在再制造過程中面對的專利許可問題,描述了本文的研究思路和研究內(nèi)容,對再制造的相關(guān)文獻綜述進行了述評。其次,在制造商不進行技術(shù)許可的專利保護背景下,考慮新產(chǎn)品和再制造產(chǎn)品對消費者的效用差異,將市場劃分為普通消費者與綠色消費者兩類市場,分別建立了基于低價策略和高價策略的Stackelberg博弈模型,求出不同策略情景下的新產(chǎn)品和再制造產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)價格及供應(yīng)鏈各成員的最優(yōu)利潤。再次,在制造商進行技術(shù)許可的專利保護背景下(即將再制造技術(shù)許可給第三方再制造商),考慮新產(chǎn)品和再制造產(chǎn)品對消費者的效用差異,在制造商進行獨家許可和獨占許可的兩種情景下,建立了基于不同許可方式的Stackelberg博弈模型,求出不同技術(shù)許可策略下的新產(chǎn)品和再制造產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)價格及供應(yīng)鏈各成員的最優(yōu)利潤。最后,對不同專利保護策略下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型進行算例分析,分別探討了綠色消費者所占的比例、再制造的比例和廣告投入三個因素對新產(chǎn)品價格、再制造產(chǎn)品價格、制造商利潤及零售商利潤的影響。并以實際的公司為研究對象,給出了企業(yè)在不進行技術(shù)許可和進行技術(shù)許可的情形下,采取不同策略的臨界條件。
[Abstract]:With the deterioration of natural environment and the increase of population, natural resources are becoming increasingly scarce, in order to protect the environment and the sustainable development of mankind, Many experts, scholars and business organizations have begun to study the recycling and remanufacturing of used and end-of-life products. With the deepening of the research, people have found that remanufacturing can not only bring significant environmental benefits, but also bring huge economic benefits. As a result, more and more enterprises begin to join the remanufacturing industry. However, the intellectual property issues involved in recycling and remanufacturing waste products often lead enterprises into intellectual property disputes, which is undoubtedly a huge quagmire for enterprises. In the decision-making process of remanufacturing, enterprises must consider the issue of patent protection of remanufacturing. Nowadays, the research on remanufacturing patent license is mainly focused on the perspective of law, and there is less research literature from the perspective of management. First of all, This paper expounds the background and significance of the research on remanufacturing, puts forward the patent licensing problems faced by enterprises in the process of remanufacturing, describes the research ideas and contents of this paper, and reviews the relevant literature review of remanufacturing. In the context of the manufacturer's patent protection without technology licensing, considering the differences in the utility of new products and remanufactured products to consumers, the market is divided into two categories: ordinary consumers and green consumers. The Stackelberg game model based on low price strategy and high price strategy is established, and the optimal price of new product and remanufactured product under different strategy scenarios and the optimal profit of each member of supply chain are obtained. In the context of the manufacturer's patent protection for technology licensing (that is to say, a remanufacturing technology license is granted to a third party re-manufacturer, considering the differences in the utility of new and remanufactured products to consumers, Under the two scenarios of exclusive license and exclusive license, the Stackelberg game model based on different license modes is established. The optimal price of new products and remanufactured products under different technology licensing strategies and the optimal profits of each member of the supply chain are obtained. Finally, the closed-loop supply chain model under different patent protection strategies is analyzed by an example. The paper discusses the effects of the proportion of green consumers, the proportion of remanufacturing and advertising investment on the price of new products, the price of remanufactured products, the profits of manufacturers and the profits of retailers. The critical conditions for enterprises to adopt different strategies without and without technology licensing are given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272;F273.1

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