本文選題：契約　切入點(diǎn)：集組理論　出處：《清華大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：個(gè)體理性下的利益沖突長(zhǎng)久以來(lái)制約了供應(yīng)鏈契約的不斷完善,而集組理論同時(shí)考慮到個(gè)體理性和集體理性,研究將集組理論引入完善供應(yīng)鏈契約,繼承并突破了傳統(tǒng)博弈模型的經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)和分析范式,使博弈局中人在目標(biāo)利益一致的情況下做出更加明智的決策,為理性合作提供更多可能。本文基于集組理論設(shè)計(jì)重構(gòu)批發(fā)價(jià)格契約,在同時(shí)考慮到個(gè)體理性和集體理性的情況下分析需求依賴于批發(fā)價(jià)格的供應(yīng)鏈契約,并將批發(fā)價(jià)格契約在現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境中的博弈過(guò)程用數(shù)學(xué)方式表現(xiàn)出來(lái),展開(kāi)關(guān)于契約效果及影響的分析,深層次剖析批發(fā)價(jià)格契約的本質(zhì)。針對(duì)影響博弈局中人集中決策或者分散決策概率的因素展開(kāi)分析,分別包括批發(fā)價(jià)格、商品的市場(chǎng)需求彈性及此二者對(duì)概率的綜合影響,確定促使供應(yīng)鏈順利集中決策的最優(yōu)情況,以及在一般批發(fā)價(jià)格契約博弈中的批發(fā)價(jià)格通常出現(xiàn)的范圍。討論間接影響到契約的因素,分析供應(yīng)商和零售商在新契約環(huán)境下不同行業(yè)的收入成本比及其對(duì)選擇集中決策概率的作用影響。以花生油行業(yè)和中檔次轎車(chē)行業(yè)為例,分別討論了批發(fā)價(jià)格、商品的市場(chǎng)需求彈性、收入成本比等對(duì)供應(yīng)商和零售商選擇集中決策概率的影響,作出Mat Lab和SPSS等數(shù)據(jù)分析軟件呈現(xiàn)出來(lái)的效果圖,驗(yàn)證了供應(yīng)鏈在新契約環(huán)境下的普遍規(guī)律及各個(gè)因素之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。通過(guò)分析供應(yīng)鏈的結(jié)構(gòu)特征,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的特殊性對(duì)批發(fā)價(jià)格的影響,闡述了供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)褂眯缕跫s不斷調(diào)整適應(yīng)環(huán)境的可預(yù)見(jiàn)行為、新契約在不同條件下受到的發(fā)展限制因素及自我調(diào)整完善方向。設(shè)計(jì)并實(shí)施行為實(shí)驗(yàn),討論集中決策和分散決策對(duì)批發(fā)價(jià)格契約效果的影響,分別通過(guò)兩個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)?zāi)M討論現(xiàn)實(shí)行業(yè)行情,討論批發(fā)價(jià)格、核心企業(yè)、組間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等內(nèi)部因素,和市場(chǎng)價(jià)格、商品特征、行業(yè)交流等外部因素對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)的博弈選擇影響。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interests under the individual rationality has restricted the continuous improvement of supply chain contract for a long time, and the set group theory takes into account both individual rationality and collective rationality, so the set group theory is introduced to perfect supply chain contract. It inherits and breaks through the economic man hypothesis and analysis paradigm of the traditional game model, which makes the people in the game make a more intelligent decision under the condition of consistent goal and interests. This paper designs and reconstructs the wholesale price contract based on the set group theory, and analyzes the supply chain contract in which demand depends on wholesale price, taking into account both individual rationality and collective rationality. The game process of wholesale price contract in the real economic environment is shown in mathematical way, and the effect and influence of the contract are analyzed. The essence of wholesale price contract is deeply analyzed. The factors that affect the probability of centralized or decentralized decision-making in game bureau are analyzed, including wholesale price, market demand elasticity of commodities and their comprehensive influence on probability. To determine the optimal conditions for the successful centralization decision of the supply chain and the range of wholesale prices that usually occur in the general wholesale price contract game. The factors indirectly affecting the contract are discussed. This paper analyzes the effect of the ratio of income to cost and its influence on the probability of centralization decision in different industries of suppliers and retailers under the new contract environment. Taking peanut oil industry and middle grade car industry as examples, the wholesale prices are discussed respectively. The impact of commodity market demand elasticity and ratio of income to cost on the decision making probability of suppliers and retailers, and the effect of data analysis software such as Mat Lab and SPSS. It verifies the general law of supply chain under the new contract environment and the internal relation between various factors. By analyzing the structural characteristics of supply chain, the influence of market structure and market environment particularity on wholesale price, This paper expounds the foreseeable behavior of the supply chain using the new contract to adapt to the environment, the development limitation factors and the direction of self-adjustment of the new contract under different conditions, and designs and implements the behavior experiment. This paper discusses the influence of centralization decision and decentralized decision on the effect of wholesale price contract, discusses the real industry price, wholesale price, core enterprise, competition among groups, and market price, commodity characteristics through two experiments, respectively. Industry exchange and other external factors affect the game selection of supply chain enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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